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Synopsis 
A thesis presented on the security issues of Identity Management in Mobile Ad- 
hoc Networks, considering the issues and utilisation of contextual information, 
user-centricity and user control in a new User-centred and Context-aware Identity 
Management (UCIM) Framework. 
ABSTRACT 
The emergent notion of ubiquitous computing makes it possible for mobile devices 
to communicate and provide services via networks connected in an ad-hoc manner. 
These have resulted in the proliferation of wireless technologies such as Mobile 
Ad-hoc Networks (MANets), which offer attractive solutions for services that need 
flexible setup as well as dynamic and low cost wireless connectivity. However, the 
growing trend outlined above also raises serious concerns over Identity 
Management (IM) due to a dramatic increase in identity theft. The problem is even 
greater in service-oriented architectures, where partial identities are sprinkled 
across many services and users have no control over such identities. 
In this thesis, we review some issues of contextual computing, its implications and 
usage within pervasive environments. To tackle the above problems, it is essential 
to allow users to have control over their own identities in MANet environments. 
So far, the development of such identity control remains a significant challenge for 
the research community. The main focus of this thesis is on the area of identity 
management in MANets and emergency situations by using context-awareness and 
user-centricity together with its security issues and implications. Context- 
awareness allows us to make use of partial identities as a way of user identity 
protection and node identification. User-centricity is aimed at putting users in 
control of their partial identities, policies and rules for privacy protection. These 
principles help us to propose an innovative, easy-to-use identity management 
framework for MANets. The framework makes the flow of partial identities 
explicit; gives users control over such identities based on their respective situations 
and contexts, and creates a balance between convenience and privacy. The thesis 
presents our proposed framework, its development and lab results/evaluations, and 
outlines possible future work to improve the framework. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave 
themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from 
it "- Mike Weiser 1991. 
We once assumed that Personal Computers (PC) would be the main medium of 
using the Internet and consumption as a device within all sectors of the economy. 
But currently in most markets the mobile Internet is overtaking the fixed Internet 
phenomenon. With the continuous growth and development of computer 
networks, the notion of ubiquitous computing coined by Mark Weiser has 
received increasing attention. This notion also leads to the proliferations in usage 
of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANets). However, this evolution faces a barrier 
in many ways. On the one hand, people want to construct a ubiquitous network to 
make the best use of computers. On the other hand, they must secure their 
network and protect their identity information as well as the need to be in full 
control of their information, in order to deal with a number of security threats 
from malicious entities. One solution for this is to provide a framework that will 
offer the users with such abilities in an efficient, dynamic and lightweight format, 
allowing users to be in full control of the system so as to minimise or eliminate 
relevant security threats. 
The main focus of this thesis is a combined study of identity management, 
context-awareness and user-centricity together with their security issues and 
implications in MANets and emergency situations where different systems need 
to interact in an ad-hoc manner. The emergent notion of ubiquitous computing 
makes it possible for mobile devices to communicate and provide services via 
networks connected in an ad-hoc manner. The use of contextual information in 
ad-hoc environments can extensively expand the adaptation and usage of such 
applications. Context is information that can be used to characterize situations or 
an entity that is considered relevant in the interaction process of a user or an 
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application. Context-awareness allows us to make use of partial identities as a 
way of user identity protection and node identification. This is coupled with user- 
centricity aiming at putting users in control of their partial identities, policies and 
rules for privacy protection. These principles help us to propose an innovative, 
easy-to-use identity management framework for MANets. The framework makes 
the flow of partial identities explicit, gives users full control over such identities 
based on their respective situations and contexts, and creates a balance between 
convenience and privacy. The thesis presents the development of the proposed 
framework and its methodologies, and outlines some possible future work to 
improve the framework. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the topic of the thesis and background 
information is presented. Second, the aims and objectives of the project are 
stated. Third, the novel contributions of the approach hypothesized in the thesis 
are summarised. Fourth, we present the project achievements in terms of research 
publications that consist of book chapters, journal and conference papers. Fifth, a 
brief summary of our methodology is presented. Sixth, an overview of the 
chapters of the thesis is provided. Finally, the chapter is summarized. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
With the emergence and development of wireless networks, the notion of 
"Ubiquitous Computing" coined by Mark Weiser [1] has received increasing 
attention. One of the fundamental building blocks for such ubiquitous computing 
applications is MANets, and is increasingly used to support mobile and dynamic 
operations such as emergency services, disaster relief and military networks. 
MANets can be defined as a platform or a set of nodes that can move freely and 
establish a transient self-configuring wireless network. A MANet offers a 
temporary network without relying on any predetermined network infrastructure, 
and communicates in a self-organising manner. Moreover, MANets play crucial 
roles in many application areas such as surveillance, marketing and military [2]. 
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While bringing huge benefits to these applications, they also raise serious 
privacy/security concerns, more specifically on the protection of users' private 
information and identity. 
Users currently rely on numerous forms of identities to access services via 
MANets. The inconvenience of processing and using these identities creates 
significant security vulnerabilities as well as significant user discomfort, including 
the disclosure of personal information. These growing trends have raised serious 
concerns over identity management (IM) due to a dramatic increase in identity 
theft [3,4]. IM in this context is about managing relevant digital identities of users 
and ensuring that they have fast, reliable and secure access to distributed resources 
and services via MANets within ubiquitous computing environments. 
Ubiquitous computing has the capability of providing computational environments 
that facilitate the provision of information through the use of "invisible interfaces" 
and allowing limitless sharing of information. If developed properly, ubiquitous 
computing could offer an invaluable support for many aspects of our society and 
its institutions. However, neglecting the above mentioned security or privacy 
issues and aspects such as proper integration of contextual data, use of efficient 
user control and centricity, and the adaptation of relevant access control policies 
can present a great likelihood that the end products will resemble an Orwellian 
nightmare [5]. 
1.2 PROJECT AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The main goal of this project is to develop the interoperability among different IM 
techniques and to propose a User-centred and Context-aware Identity Management 
framework (UCIM) for fulfilling such interoperability in MANets. The key 
objectives of the research are to make the proposed UCIM efficient, user-centred, 
context-aware and lightweight so as to meet the specific needs of MANets. 
Context-awareness allows us to make use of partial identities as a way of user 
identity protection and node identification. User-centricity is aimed at putting users 
in control of their partial identities, policies and rules for privacy protection. 
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Efficiency and lightweight on the other hand allow the application to be deployed 
on devices with less memory and processing requirements in order to increase the 
adaptability and usability of UCIM. 
UCIM should possess a number of capabilities. Particularly, it should be able to 
manage multiple identities for different MANet situations and perform 
negotiations with other peers about necessary identity information to be used for 
identification in relation to given security policy settings and situation awareness. 
UCIM should also be able to provide users with friendly control over their own 
identity information and security in terms of mobility across different MANets. 
Moreover, it should be able to separate users from the complexity of the technical 
implementation and operation issues of IM in MANets while allowing users to 
focus on policy aspects of IM. This ability is essential, as users typically do not 
want to learn detailed security techniques. 
1.3 PROJECT SCOPE 
In this section we briefly highlight the scope of our work by pointing out what it is 
all about and what we are not covering. 
The thesis covers the following contents: 
" Knowledge and information within our field of research 
" Our design of mechanisms for the privacy protection of user information 
" Our definition of user profile types needed for different application scenarios 
" Our design and implementation of a new dynamic policy specification 
language 
" Our adaptation of XML to make the proposed framework lightweight 
" Our design and implementation of a new algorithm for context filtering based 
on user policies and contextual information 
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" Our development and evaluation of a new identity management framework, 
which is context-ware, lightweight and user friendly. 
It is worth pointing out that, although our main focus is on ad-hoc networks, the 
solutions provided in chapter six, the general methodologies proposed in this thesis 
and the issues covered above are also applicable to other network environments 
such as P2P. The solutions presented in the thesis include an example on how we 
apply our solution to a P2P environment. Additionally, the proposed framework 
includes an element of a centralised component. This is mainly for the purpose of 
events of critical importance, which have a need for ad-hoc devices to be 
authenticated for retrieving some information from a single trusted source. 
The thesis does not cover the contents below: 
" Acquiring contextual information using sensors or other means 
" Developing communication protocols for the dissemination of contextual 
information among devices 
The above two points imply that our work is based on the assumption that 
necessary contextual information is available to individual devices when needed. 
1.4 NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS PROJECT 
Our main novel contributions include a new methodology (i. e. a new framework 
with a user policy definition ContextRank), utilisation of an existing technology in 
a new way (i. e. Identity and Social Identity Theory), and improvement of other 
methodologies (e. g. hybrid metrics based on energy metrics, and Context Based 
Access Control (CBAC) based on Role Based Access Control (RBAC)). The 
details of these contributions are summarised below: 
" New Framework UCIM: Our framework represents contextual information 
and user profiles using XML semantic representation. It facilitates the 
realisation of a more balanced solution to IM in MANets to cater for the 
6 
desirable features of privacy, user-centricity, context-awareness and user 
friendliness in a systematic and consistent manner. At present, based on our 
knowledge there is no such framework available for MANets. 
" User-Centred: Our framework gives total control of the system to users in 
terms of profile disclosure as well as the usage and definition of rules and 
policies. We introduced an improved version of the Role Based Access Control 
concept, i. e. Context Based Access Control (CBAC), where the context 
constraint of a profile type is used to restrict which users within the 
environment will be able to request and view other users' contextual 
information. The usage of portable user profiles within our framework enables 
users to be in total control of their information usage and be able to do so with 
minimal technical knowledge. This mechanism is highly portable and 
consistent with the mobility feature of ubiquitous networks. 
" Dynamic Policy Specification: This allows users to dynamically specify 
policies using predicates and functions. Policies are built from predicates 
(which are just inequalities containing properties and values) and sub- 
functions, joined together using logical operators. The use of sub-functions 
eliminates the problem of tackling complex mixtures of conjunctions and 
disjunction. Policy can be easily translated and used in many other 
applications. The methodological design can be implemented for any scenario 
and is adaptable. Policies are aimed to be stored in a tree structure in memory 
or in XML files in a way that is lightweight and portable. The design is 
modular, meaning that new modules can be plugged in to improve 
functionality. The technique could be easily integrated into current existing 
solutions, e. g. Ponder, to act as client applications and pass on created policies 
to the Ponder engine for processing. Policies can also utilize users' partial 
identities. Users can modify policies, which will take effect dynamically and 
with minimal interruption of the system. 
" ContextRank: This algorithm is designed to function in two main ways: either 
used as a filtering algorithm considering only the relevant contextual 
information for a user, or integrated with user defined policies from a Dynamic 
Policy creation module (to be presented in Chapter five) or any other policy in 
filtering context. It is designed to take in the criteria under which contextual 
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information can be filtered, and to produce an output for the users who meet 
the required criteria. The expected inputs for the algorithm are: an array or a 
list of all available contextual information within the range of a given user and 
one or more policy files. The expected outputs are: a list of relevant contextual 
information for the user, access to users' data or profile information and 
possibly a request for further information if required. 
" Lightweight: This is achieved via the use of XML representation of contextual 
information and new resource-efficient schemes, including protocols and 
mechanisms that are conceived for the formation and distribution of context 
information and the negotiation of identity information. A novel hybrid 
Euclidean Metric based algorithm has been devised to determine how to access 
or request contextual profiles from other nodes by using a restrictive hybrid 
metric that measures the balance of system resources such as energy levels, 
CPU usage and distances between nodes. Accordingly, the framework is also 
designed in a way that the user effectively influences the resource usage by 
introducing the concept of user-centric design to reduce the additional 
resources consumption on networks. The use of identity and social identity 
theory in influencing relevant context information to be displayed to the user 
will also help to limit the overhead of the framework on devices. 
1.5 PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS 
Our framework UCIM is the first framework that is proposed for identity 
management in MANet within ubiquitous computing environments by utilising 
both contextual information and user-centricity. It keeps the special requirements 
of ubiquitous computing in mind throughout its design and implementation. The 
methods used in UCIM set a new direction for future research and development. 
Practically, it ensures the feasibility and realization of identity management in 
ubiquitous computing and provides means of creating and modifying policies via 
the use of a user interface rather than hard coding such policies. 
The outcomes of our research have generated the following book chapters, journal 
and conference papers amongst other technical reports and documentations: 
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1.5.1 BOOK CHAPTERS 
" Arabo, A., Shi, Q., and Merabti, M., ContextRank: Begetting Order to Usage 
of Context Information and Identity Management in Pervasive Ad-hoc 
Environments, in Emerging Pervasive and Ubiquitous Aspects of Information 
Systems: Cross-Disciplinary Advancements, in Information Science Reference 
(an imprint of IGI Global), Symonds, J., Editor. 2011. p. 275-297 
" Arabo, A., Shi, Q., and Merabti, M., Dynamic Device Configuration in 
Ubiquitous Environments, in Global Security, Safety, and Sustainability 
Communications in Computer and Information Science, Tenreiro de 
Magalhaes, S. J., Hamid; Hessami, Ali G. (Eds. ), Editor. 2010, Springer. p. 
263-273. 
" Arabo, A., Shi, Q., and Merabti, M., Situation Awareness in Systems of 
Systems Ad-hoc Environments, in the 5th International Conference on Global 
Security. Safety and Sustainability 2009, CCIS, H. Jahankhani, A. G. 
Hessami, and F. Hsu (Eds. ). Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. p. 27- 
34. 
1.5.2 JOURNALS 
" Arabo, A., Shi, Q., and Merabti, M., Privacy Preserving Identity Management 
in Pervasive Ad-hoc and Context Sensitive Environments. Journal of 
Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing (AIHC), 2012 in press. 
" Arabo, A., Shi, Q., and Merabti, M., Context-Aware Identity Management in 
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1.6 METHODOLOGY 
The process for achieving the project aims and objectives is divided into the 
following phases: requirement analysis and specification, design, implementation 
and evaluation. The first phase, requirement analysis and specification, is based on 
identifying current works within the domains of MANets and IM, and capturing 
necessary requirements for the proposed framework. This includes an extensive 
literature survey to obtain the comprehensive knowledge of existing IM systems, 
MANets, lightweight privacy-enhanced mechanisms, key management, efficient 
trust management, context-aware systems, user-centric concepts and mechanisms. 
An awareness of the issues and limitations of these available techniques are then 
established. To tackle the issue of identities, personal and device attributes are 
investigated to derive a set of partial identities suited to MANet-based applications, 
which help to specify privacy policies for access to identity information. From 
these studies, a set of requirements for the proposed framework are defined and 
documented. 
The design phase of the project involves transforming the requirements identified 
in the first phase into effective solutions for their realisation, including the design 
of data structures, system architectures, interfaces and components. Before 
addressing the data structure issue, methods for collecting information required for 
IM in MANets have been explored. This helps us to build context-awareness from 
a mixture of different information such as locations, time, proximity selection, 
automatic contextual reconfiguration and context-triggered actions. For outdoor 
location information we suggest obtaining such information via the use and 
exploration of GPS technology, and provide a means that will allow the possibility 
of using active badges when required. As many small and low-cost devices do not 
necessarily have GPS, the method proposed by Bulusu [6] using a connectivity- 
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based localisation technique is explored. Since GPS does not support data 
communication [7] in such situations, our framework provides the means of 
allowing devices to track locations by listening to beacons from a cell-based 
station or query a local database for their current locations. Users can choose to 
advertise their current locations with respect to their privacy policies. Other low- 
level context information such as time, nearby objects, network bandwidth and 
orientation is also examined with reference to necessary quality context indicators 
[8]. 
The design phase also selects other suitable existing techniques for IM, key 
management, efficient trust establishment and lightweight privacy enhancement in 
relation to the requirements set out in the first phase. These techniques are then 
tailored, extended and integrated together with the context-aware solutions to 
produce necessary schemes, mechanisms and protocols, which collectively form 
the proposed framework. 
In the implementation and evaluation phases, simulation techniques and tools [9] 
such as NS-2 [10], GTNet [ 11 ] and OPNET [ 12] are examined to find an effective 
way to implement the framework designed. However, we decided to broaden our 
in-house developed simulator for testing the security of composed systems-of- 
systems to the needs of our framework and provide means of integrating the new 
simulator to work with other simulators when time permits. The main reason for 
using a simulation tool for the implementation is due to its cost-effectiveness for 
the framework evaluation and subsequent refinement as well as the limitation of 
resources needed for a real implementation. The simulated framework is assessed 
based on case studies to determine its compliance with the requirements specified 
in the first phase. We also try to test the framework on available portable hardware 
devices within the laboratory. 
1.7 THESIS ORGANISATION 
Chapter two: It reviews the issues related to the development of ubiquitous 
computing from its inception by Weiser, where the three main phases: the 
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Mainframe era, PC (Personal Computing) era and the Ubiquitous Computing era 
are presented. A brief history of computer networking is covered while presenting 
its future direction. The chapter also looks at the layered network in relation to the 
development of network security. It continues with several related areas in which 
smaller and cheaper computer chips are embedded into many appliances from a 
greeting card to a smart home so that people's daily lives can be closely connected 
to computers and beneficially become ever more convenient. Finally, along with 
the benefits, vulnerabilities of ubiquitous computing are discussed. Security is one 
of the major concerns for any computer network, including ubiquitous computing. 
Chapter three: In this chapter, we will narrow down the related work and provide 
more insight into the areas provided in chapter two. The chapter first introduces 
network security and identity management. It then further presents the historical 
issues (e. g. development, attacks and frameworks) of IM and an introduction to 
MANets in relation to IM. An overview of research issues in these areas is 
provided. The chapter also classifies users' personal identity into sub-identities to 
make it easier to protect user identities and define policies, which will be further 
expanded in the chapter five of the thesis. The chapter explores the importance of 
user-centricity and context awareness for both MANets and IM by highlighting 
how these two techniques can help to provide more security to users and networks. 
Other benefits include the efficiency of resources used, its impact on helping to 
create a lightweight framework, its ability to help improve service provisions, etc. 
Context reasoning and representation have also been introduced in this chapter. 
Chapter four: In this chapter, we will summarise the weaknesses of the related 
work identified in chapters two and three. The weaknesses identified are mainly 
focused on IM, including the issues of defining user profiles, user control and 
centricity, the usage of contextual information, and allowing users to define 
policies dynamically. These provide a justification for proposing a new framework 
to solve the weaknesses. For example, existing frameworks and solutions for IM 
are mainly aimed at wired networks, which do not meet the requirements of 
ubiquitous ad-hoc environments, and also they neglect the important role of users 
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and are not lightweight. From these identified weaknesses we will present our 
motivations for the thesis. Building from the identified limitations, the chapter also 
presents the aims and objectives of our project for the development of the proposed 
UCIM framework and provides the set of requirements for UCIM. 
Chapter five: Based on the identified limitations, project aims, objects and 
requirements in chapter four, this chapter presents the overall design of UCIM 
showing what modules or components are needed to create the framework. The 
chapter further looks into the details of each module by focussing mainly on how 
they meet the specified requirements of the framework and how they overcome the 
limitations summarised in chapter four. Some desirable features such as 
portability, heterogeneity, lightweight, dynamic policy creation and context 
filtering are also explained in detail with regard to the proposed framework. 
Chapter six: In this chapter we provide the proof of concept of UCIM. The 
proposed UCIM framework is implemented by extending our in-house built 
simulator, and developing new mobile and other relevant applications that provide 
the functionality of UCIM. The implementation is supplemented by scenarios that 
are aimed at helping readers understand the reason behind such implementations 
and methods used. The implementation is deployed on various portable devices 
and desktop computers with web based interfaces for other modules of UCIM. The 
chapter further presents the results of the implementation and deployment using 
screenshots. It also presents some of the code used in the implementation of UCIM 
to aid readers' further understanding and show how we have managed to turn our 
proposed algorithms and mechanisms in chapter five into a workable framework 
and solution so as to fulfil the project goal. 
Chapter seven: This chapter takes us back to the chapter one of the thesis by re- 
visiting the aims and objectives of the project as presented in both chapter one and 
five respectively. The chapter further provides the evaluation of the implemented 
UCIM with respect to the project aims and objectives as well as the requirements 
set out in chapter five, including a security analysis and test results. The chapter 
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also provides justifications on how UCIM is able to rectify the limitations of the 
existing work summarised in chapter four and most importantly fulfil the main 
aims and objectives of the project. 
Chapter eight: This chapter presents our conclusions and future work. 
1.8 SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have presented an overview of the content of the thesis. We 
have highlighted the fact that computing applications are becoming ubiquitous, 
which has created serious threats to users' privacy and security. Trivial embedded 
systems with abilities of computing and communication are becoming widely 
available and spreading everywhere for the purposes of sensing, control and 
information display. Hence, the need for the privacy and security protection of 
users is an inevitable and critical issue. These must be planned effectively to meet 
the future large-scale implementation and deployment of ubiquitous computing 
applications. Current IM frameworks are not fit for such an environment due to the 
resource constraints and heterogeneous infrastructure of ubiquitous computing. 
Therefore, this thesis provides a novel solution to the problem: UCIM for users' 
identity protection in MANets. This framework utilises flexible and adaptive 
system architecture to provide resource-efficient security protection against 
malicious activities, and gives users full control of their identity information. 
In the next chapter, the history of computer networks and the trend towards 
ubiquitous computing will be introduced. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
In this chapter, a brief introduction to the history of computer networks is 
presented. Then our focus is directed to the continuous growth and development 
of computer and network technologies, including introducing the early stage of 
the information era - ubiquitous computing and highlighting its possible future 
directions. Figure 1 depicts a graphical representation or summary of the 
development of computers, which is classified into three main phases: the 
mainframe era, PC (Personal Computing) era and ubiquitous computing era. 
These also summarise the main contents and points of the discussion in this 
chapter. 
Since the first version of mainframes, a number of decades have passed by. It is 
only in the 1960's that the notion of computers, which was supposed to work 
alone and process programs locally, set a new milestone and initiated a change 
pattern for this concept. The new concept came about allowing a set of 
computers to be connected together to allow remote access to computer 
resources. Since then, the world has witnessed one of the greatest miracles in 
human history - the Internet. Following this, the notion of ubiquitous computing 
was explored by Mark Weiser in the CS lab at Xerox PARC [13]. 
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Figure 1 Development of Computing 
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When analysing such developments within computer technology over the last 
century, a clear trend of events and shifts can be seen. Over the years as time goes 
by, when mapping the relation of how many people use how many computing 
devices, it can be seen that it goes from many-one in the 1960's to many-many in 
2010. A summary of this trends has been presented in Figure 2 [14]. 
Figure 2 Mainframe to Ubiquitous 
Computers [14] 
The three main developments or waves of computing have been summarised by 
Weiser as: The first wave of computing from 1940 to about 1980 was dominated 
by many people using one computer. The second wave, still peaking, has one 
person and one computer in uneasy symbiosis, staring at each other across the 
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desktop without really inhabiting each other's worlds. The third wave, just 
beginning, has many computers serving each person everywhere in the world, 
which is called 'ubiquitous computing' [1]. 
Weiser further states that: "The defining words [for the third wave in computing] 
will not be "intelligent" or "agent", but rather "invisible" and "calm" and 
"connection"" [1]. 
The development of ubiquitous computing itself has gone through various phases. 
The first phase has been where hundreds of computing devices ranging from the 
size of a memo pad to wall-size boards have become available for users in 
different ways, i. e. iPads, mobile, body sensors etc. The means of connection 
between devices are via wireless networks with abilities such as shared meeting 
applications and location-based services. Weiser envisioned the scenarios where 
"embedded computers [... ] will bring other worlds to us in new ways - sometimes 
in ways so unobtrusive we will not even notice our increased ability for informed 
action". Weiser described the kind of tune in a future alarm clock: "the kind of tune 
[it] plays to wake me up will tell me something about my first few appointments of 
the day. A quick urgent tune: 8 am important meeting. Quiet, reflective music: 
nothing until noon". Hence, devices "can be suggestive without being 
intermediating". Ubiquitous computing would allow us to focus on those issues 
that are really important, interesting and challenging. 
In order to turn Weiser's dream to reality, research organisations and industry need 
to be more focused on developing the required techniques, hardware and software 
with the careful consideration of security measures that will motivate users to 
adapt this new wave of interaction and gain its benefits. This research will include 
several areas related to such issues as: security protocols, policy definition 
interfaces, user-centricity, context-awareness, low cost devices, low power 
devices, identity management frameworks and techniques, mobility, applications 
for small devices, effective user interface, etc. The above issues are vital in order to 
encourage users to acclimatize new developments. As in today's growing world of 
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threats most users will only settle in new technologies when they are satisfied that 
they are in full control of their personal and identity information. 
The concept of ubiquitous computing has other related research areas such as the 
concept of calm technology, which extends the notion of ubiquitous computing 
and uses its principles to create technology that utilizes both the centre and 
periphery of a user's attention. Another area is augmented reality that makes heavy 
usage of the principles of ubiquitous computing to improve users' perception of 
computation by enhancing physical objects (such as a desk), using computer 
generated sensory inputs (such as sounds or graphics) to provide a direct or 
indirect view of a physical, real-world environment. Such technological 
advancement allows better interaction and usage of the physical objects. However, 
these areas are not related to our work. 
In the following sections we will turn to the issues of computer networks and 
security. 
2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMPUTER NETWORKS 
The initial stage of computers was stand-alone mainframe computers with each 
occupying an entire room. As time went by with the developments of more 
portable mainframe computers, the industry realised that there would be an 
advantage if these supercomputers could be connected in a way to allow them to 
talk to each other, i. e. sharing information. From this, the notion of computer 
networks was born. Hence, the term `network' in computer science can be seen as 
a means of interconnecting computer systems by making use of transmission 
technologies. 
The early development of computer networks came about in the late 1960's with 
the main aim of connecting researchers to remotely accessible expensive computer 
resources that individual research centres or institutions could not afford. This 
came about via the ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) project 
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ARPAnet [15], which produced the first prototype of modern networks. Its 
connection speed at that time was 50 kbits/s, but ARPAnet brought a fundamental 
change from centralized to distributed computing and incorporated features of 
reliability and robustness, e. g. multiple links and distributed routing. The ARPAnet 
project, initiated in 1969, is sometimes referred to as the grandfather of the 
Internet. The network was designed as a computer version for a nuclear bomb 
shelter to protect the flow of information between military installations by creating 
geographically separated computers capable of exchanging information via the use 
of the Network Control Protocol (NCP). The initial connection consisted of four 
computers from the UCLA (University of California Los Angel) Research Lab, 
Stanford Research Institute, UC (University of California) Santa Barbara and the 
University of Utah. The first data exchange within the network was between 
UCLA and Stanford Research Institute. In the first attempt to log into the 
Stanford's computer by typing "login", researchers in UCLA managed to crash the 
network when they typed the letter `g'. 
From then on, the ARPA development led to an array of new hardware and 
protocols, and this eventually emerged as the Internet. The Internet is defined as a 
set of networks connected by routers that are configured to pass traffic among any 
computers attached to a network in the set. Initially the Internet had only a few 
hundred computers and a few dozen sites. Today, hundreds of millions of 
computers, small portable devices and thousands of networks worldwide are 
connected together. 
Another analogy on the development of the Internet as seen by Frank Casanova, 
who was a Director of Apple Computer Inc. is [16]: 
"The concept of computers as things that you walk up to, sit in front of and turn on 
will go away. In fact, our goal is to make the computer disappear. We are moving 
towards a model we think of as a 'personal information cloud'. That cloud has 
already begun to coalesce in the form of the Internet. The Internet is the big event 
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of the decade. We'll spend the next 10 years making the network as it should, 
making it ubiquitous. " 
The development of the Internet brought about a new industry. Companies like 
Cisco, IBM and Microsoft continuously work out new products on networking 
hardware, computers and relevant software. Today, the Internet has become a new 
phenomenon that networks are an important part of everyday activities. Through 
the Internet, we can do shopping at home, finish a degree without going to a 
university, make friends with people from anywhere of the world, etc. In many 
ways, it changes the way we live. Currently, it is even possible to produce 
specially designed objects (tables, chairs, cloths, shoes, etc. ) from a computer and 
print them using a 3D printer. In [17], Weinberg wrote "the ability to reproduce 
physical objects in a small workshop and at home is potentially just as 
revolutionary as the ability to summon information from any source onto a 
computer screen". 
2.2 MOBILE AD-Hoc NETWORKS (MANETS) 
A MANet is a collection of mobile nodes forming a network on demand without 
the assistance of any centralized structures. These networks can be well used and 
suitable for environments where either the infrastructure is lost or the deployment 
of an infrastructure is not very cost-effective. In today's growing use of 
technology, MANets are used in a number of environments for various reasons. 
For example, the military can employ them to track an enemy tank as it moves 
through a geographic area covered by the networks. Your local community can use 
an ad-hoc network to detect your car moving through an intersection and to check 
the speed and direction of the car. In an environmental network, you can find out 
temperatures, atmospheric pressures, amounts of sunlight, and relative humidity at 
a number of locations. 
Historically, the whole life cycle of ad-hoc networks could be categorized into the 
first, second, and third generation ad-hoc network systems. Existing ad-hoc 
network systems are considered the third generation [18]. 
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The first generation goes back to 1972. At the time, they were called PRNET 
(Packet Radio Networks) [19]. PRNET were used on a trial basis to provide 
different networking capabilities in a combat environment. 
The 1980's provided us with the second generation of ad-hoc networks. When the 
ad-hoc network systems were further improved and implemented as a part of the 
SURAN (Survivable Adaptive Radio Networks) program. 
In the 1990's, the concept of commercial ad-hoc networks arrived with notebook 
computers and other viable communication equipment. At the same time, the idea 
of a collection of mobile nodes was proposed at several research conferences. 
The IEEE 802.11 subcommittee had adopted the term "ad-hoc networks" and the 
research community had started to look into the possibility of deploying ad-hoc 
networks in other areas of application. 
In the intervening time, the work was going on to advance the previously built ad- 
hoc networks. GloMo (Global Mobile Information Systems) and the NTDR (Near- 
term Digital Radio) [20] are some of the results of these efforts. GloMo was 
designed to provide an office environment with Ethernet-type multimedia 
connectivity anywhere and anytime in handheld devices. 
The requirements of MANets represent a spectrum of network challenges. During 
the last few years, almost every aspect of MANets has been explored to some level 
of details. Yet, more questions have arisen than been answered [21]. The major 
open problems are listed as: 
" Identity Management - How to protect users' identity information such as 
text, address books, emails, personal information, etc. 
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" Autonomous - No centralized administration entity is available to manage 
the operation of the different mobile nodes. 
" Dynamic topology - Nodes are mobile and can be connected dynamically 
in an arbitrary manner. Links of the network vary timely and are based on 
the proximity of one node to another node. 
" Device discovery - Identifying relevant newly moved in nodes and 
informing about their existence need dynamic updates to facilitate 
automatic optimal route selection as well as other contextual information. 
" Bandwidth optimization - Wireless links have significantly lower capacity 
than the wired links. 
" Limited resources - Mobile nodes rely on battery power, which is a scarce 
resource. Also storage capacity and power are severely limited. 
" Scalabiliry - It can be broadly defined as whether a network is able to 
provide an acceptable level of service even in the presence of a large 
number of nodes. 
" Limited physical security - Mobility implies higher security risks such as 
peer-to-peer network architecture or a shared wireless medium accessible 
by both legitimate network users and malicious attackers. Eavesdropping, 
spoofing and denial-of-service attacks should be considered. 
" Infrastructure-less and self-operated -A self-healing feature demands that 
a MANet should be able to realign itself for its protection when some 
nodes move out of its range. 
" Poor transmission quality - This is an inherent problem of wireless 
communication caused by several error sources that result in a degradation 
of received signals. 
" Ad-hoc addressing - Standard addressing schemes should be developed. 
" Network configuration - The whole MANet infrastructure is dynamic and 
is the reason for the dynamic connection and disconnection of variable 
links. 
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" Topology maintenance - Updating the information of dynamic links 
among nodes in MANets is a major challenge. 
The issues mentioned above still forms the fundamental research issues today. In 
our work and sections to follow we try to address some of the issues by focusing 
more on the security aspects. Having introduced the history of computer networks, 
the next section will look at security issues within computer networks. 
2.3 AN OVERVIEW OF NETWORK SECURITY 
With the rapid developments of computer networks as summarised in the previous 
section, security issues become of concern to the community, and ways of trying to 
tackle such issues becomes of paramount importance. Looking back 20 years ago, 
network security was mainly at the level of separating networks. In 1994, William 
Cheswick and Steven Bellovin wrote a book titled `Firewalls and Internet Security' 
[22]. This book defines the prevailing mentality that vulnerable services and 
vulnerabilities in general are the source of security breaches. At that time 
vulnerabilities were mainly caused by errors in code rather than hacking into a 
system. To some extend it is still true today. 
However, it was in 1993 when a classic paper titled `Improving Security of Your 
Site by Hacking Into It' [23] was published, which shined a further spotlight on 
defending against security breaches. With the development of the Internet in the 
early 1990's, this led to a dramatic change in the scope of information and 
computer/network security. This was a consequence of the requirements for 
opening up networks to promote information and computing resource sharing, 
which made the networks far more vulnerable to new threats. Hence, network 
security has been challenged to adapt to new and constantly changing threats while 
trying to keep up with performance. This has created the need of a connection- 
based security - affecting network layers 3 and 4 respectively. 
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One of the most widely used models for networks is the International Standards 
Organization's (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 7-layer reference model 
[24]. However, it is worth pointing out that the OSI 7-layers are not the same as 
the Internet stack. The Internet Stack mainly provides a number of trace sources in 
its protocol implementation. The 7-layer model is the main guide to designing 
network protocols. Each of the layers is named and numbered from bottom to top 
as shown in Figure 3. Each layer is designed to fulfil specific functions in 
communications within a network setting. The application layer consists of a 
number of protocols that are commonly needed, for example, File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP) and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). The presentation layer 
defines the common formats for the representation of data. The session layer 
manages sessions such as login to a remote computer. The transport layer is 
designed for a main functionality to let computers carry on a conversation and is 
the heart of the whole protocol hierarchy. Two types of transport service, i. e. the 
connection-oriented Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the connectionless 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP. The network layer is in charge of address 
assignment and data delivery across a physical network by using the Internet 
Protocol (IP). The data link layer formats data in frames and delivers frames 
through a network interface. 
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After the initial stages have been developed and the basic firewall phenomenon has 
been examined, the trend in network security has consistently moved up towards 
layer 7 in the network stack. What started out as computer security has evolved 
through network security, enterprise security and information security in the years 
that follow to get where it is today. Whereby, every aspect of technology or our 
life is analysed to see how to break networked systems or make systems more 
secure in the ubiquitous world we are currently living in. 
The flexible layered architecture allows multiple networks and computers to be 
connected in a seamless way, irrespective of the requirements demanded by 
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various applications. Software implemented from the layered design has layered 
organization. The software for each layer depends only on the services of the 
software provided by lower layers. The software at layer n at the destination 
receives exactly the same protocol message sent by layer n at the sender. This 
implies that the protocols designed can be tested independently and replaced 
within a protocol stack. The software at each layer communicates with the 
corresponding layer through information stored in headers. Each layer adds its 
header to the front of a message from the next higher layer. Headers are nested at 
the front of the message as the message traverses the network. 
In the past years, we have seen an enormous development of market segments, 
methodologies and security requirements. In a conference in 1978 [25], the main 
issues of concern for the conference were policy development, disaster recovery 
planning, data centre physical security and the new technology of access control 
systems. Well, arguably these areas highlighted above are still some of the key 
security concerns today. The main difference is that in the early stage, researches 
were concerned with protected systems (single networks), but in today's world 
from the early 1980's everything has changed. With the introduction of portable 
and affordable computers in 1981 and when Weiser coined his notion of 
ubiquitous and pervasive environments, these developments make network 
security much more challenging and interesting. Hence, we are no longer dealing 
with enclosed networks. While some people are trying to solve loopholes, others 
are busy on trying to create and find new defects of computer systems. 
In the late 1990's, a general overview of traditional (old) generation security 
models, the trend in security, areas of specialisations, principles and advances was 
examined and analysed [26]. It highlighted and compared the military security 
models and computer security models that were used in older days as well as the 
similarity in the changes that they had both gone through. In the past, everything 
was centralised, but now everything is becoming more decentralised and 
distributed, which makes computer security more vulnerable. 
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Computer security used to be largely perimeter-oriented: block outsiders and give 
insiders access. Security management was centralised. However, now it is 
becoming more difficult to differentiate between an insider and outsider, e. g. a 
Trojan horse program can be downloaded remotely into a local area network. The 
rapid advance of computing technology is making computer security difficult to 
keep up with its pace in general. 
Hence the following factors have been considered as a must for all security system 
designers and implementers to put in mind: 
" Policy: it is of paramount importance to have/develop a good policy 
framework. The three properties of security need to be carefully 
considered while drawing up a policy: confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA). However, it is always difficult to have CIA at the same 
time. Therefore a balance between CIA needs to be addressed for a 
particular environment in consideration. 
" Privilege: this deals with the issue of assigning privilege controls to either 
individuals or a group of computer users. 
9 Correctness: the needs to mediate access privileges correctly. 
" Audit: making use of log files to plan for better security analysis. 
Other identified areas, where computer security as a profession has been 
diversified and specialised within the computing field, include trusted systems, 
policy, operating systems, database management systems, distributed systems, 
cryptography, protocols, system correctness, intrusion detection systems, malicious 
code protection and mobile code. 
Hence, it is apparent by looking at the fact that at that time, even now, most of the 
methods for protecting computer systems were based on building string perimeter 
defence as was widely used when computer systems were around the mainframe, 
central administration and distinct organisations era. However, in the current age 
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these models are no longer applicable due to some trends developed. Some of the 
trends include: a significant shift from centralised to single user work stations, 
desks becoming virtualised with virtual workstations (people working from home), 
companies becoming multinational, and the notion of ubiquitous computing coined 
by Weiser becoming reality. Therefore, the security paradigm of perimeter 
protection is becoming less appropriate. The emerging mode of secure computing 
builds on computer security fundamentals that are established over the last three 
decades and makes use of self-protecting systems, strong protection mechanisms, 
dynamic security policies, and rigorous assurance techniques. Nevertheless, the 
fundamental security goals of confidentiality, integrity and availability still apply. 
Figure 4 illustrates an overview of information security presented in the ISO 17799 
[27], showing a general relationship between threats, threats agent, assets and 
vulnerabilities as well as possible safeguards. The Figure has classified threats into 
three categories: people, accident and nature. Asset has a value and sensitivity 
level indication which together defines the potential impact of the asset. These are 
then associated with security risks, and used to define possible safeguards based on 
security requirements. 
Figure 4 Information Security Overview 
[27] 
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2.4 COMPUTER SECURITY 
Computer security as an area of research comes out as a subfield of computer 
science, which can be seen as trying to control or minimise risks related to 
computer systems. This can be in terms of the data stored in computers and 
physical or remote access to computer resources. In the early development of 
computer security, a typical traditional approach to security was by physically 
restricting access to a computer, and then specifying and enforcing a security 
policy on the computer system to restrict the actions an entity (user or program) 
could perform. It is still debatable with regards to what a secure action really 
means. Hence, the notion of security can have different meanings depending on the 
environment or situation involved, e. g., a university may have a very different 
notion of security from a military or bank. Consequently, security here is a 
property that is only one of its kinds to each situation and so must be explicitly 
defined by a security policy. 
In computer security, there is no such state as 100% secure. However, a secure 
system should still permit authorised users to carry out legitimate and useful tasks. 
It can be argued that one might be able to secure a computer beyond misuse only 
by using extreme measures such as those noted by Eugene H. Spafford: The only 
truly secure system is one that is powered off, cast in a block of concrete and 
sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards - and even then I have my doubts 
[28]. However, as we are dealing with real systems that are functioning, not turned 
off, the system mentioned by Eugene H. Spafford would not be regarded as a 
useful secure system, but it helps to point out that to have a completely secure 
system is a continuous challenge or a dream. For that reason, there is always a 
trade-off between the security and utility of computer systems. 
When talking about system security, we usually mean a system that has at least 
some of the characteristics and challenges of a secure system, which include 
reliability/availability, safety, integrity, confidentiality, accountability, robustness, 
etc. Hence, a short description of some related terms is provided below: 
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Data accessibility - the contents are accessible to legitimate users. 
" Data integrity - the contents are not modified by unauthorized entities. 
This ensures that any received data has not been altered or deleted in 
transit. Hence, we should keep in mind that an adversary could initiate 
attacks when necessary measures are not taken to prevent such attacks. 
" Data confidentiality - the contents are not revealed to unauthorized 
entities. To secure data from eavesdroppers, it is essential to guarantee the 
confidentiality of private data. To achieve data confidentiality, encryption 
functions are normally used, which are a standard method. However, to 
protect the confidentiality of data, encryption itself is not sufficient, as an 
eavesdropper can perform traffic analysis on the overheard, in order to gain 
access to sensitive information about the data. Likewise, to avoid the 
misuse of information, the confidentiality of private data also needs to be 
enforced via access control policies from the owner of the data. 
Accountability - responsible for tracking who has accessed the data. 
Authorization - responsible for who is allowed to access the data. 
As a general concept, computers used in the work environment are interconnected 
via the Internet. However, the future can lead to the fact that billions of miniature 
intelligent devices will inhabit the world, their means of connection will be via the 
wireless medium, and the number of such devices will be continuously increasing 
more than the human population. These devices will also be embedded into many 
physical objects, which form what Gartner calls the "Supernet" [29]. A so-called 
Hyper Cycle Graph is used to illustrate how new and promising technologies will 
go through various phases of development. Figure 5 known as the Gartner's Cures 
is taken from a report looking at ICT related technologies [30]. It shows the typical 
progression of a technology from over enthusiasm, through a period of 
disillusionment, to an eventual understanding of the technology's relevance and 
role. 
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Figure 5 Hyper Cycle 
2.5 CONCEPT OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
Future access to the Internet will not always be through the traditional means of 
desktop computers, laptops, mobile phones, ipads, a-book readers etc. Common 
equipment, like watches, clothes, household furniture or even household 
appliances, will connect to online information. In a recent development a 
PaperPhone prototype has been seen to do all the things that a normal Smartphone 
is capable of doing [31 ]. The devices look, feel and operate like a small sheet of 
interactive paper. A user performs relevant usual functions of a Smartphone via 
bending the PaperPhone into a cell phone, flipping the edge to turn pages, or 
writing on it with a pen. The authors of the PaperPhone also predicts that 
everything is going to look and feel in a similar way like the PaperPhone within 
five years' time, and that this technology will realize the paperless office dream. 
However, one of the limitations of PaperPhone is that it still needs to be connected 
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to a laptop for data and action interpretation. The PaperPhone only replaces the 
interface part of a normal Smartphone functionality. There is another prototype 
called the Snaplet, which takes on different functions depending on how it is worn. 
It is a watch when it is convex, a PDA when it is flat, and a phone when it is 
concave. This can even happen without the users being aware of which appliances 
are actually connected. Instead of individuals actually making a connection to a 
network, their tools will automatically connect to it without personal intervention. 
This concept as invented by Marc Weiser is called "ubiquitous computing". 
However, the security issues will be more crucial and importance to address and 
plan beforehand. It is also not about the provision of security, but how to configure 
it right, especially when these devices are used within emergency ad-hoc 
environments. 
Ubiquitous computing in a way can be referred to as the post-desktop model of 
Human Computer Interaction (HCI). Users can escape the normal stereotypical 
interaction of computers via the use of keyboards, mice, etc. Instead, they can 
interact with systems via everyday objects and activities, e. g. remote controls, 
gestures and thoughts. Hence, the aspiration of ubiquitous computing is to move 
computers away from the central focus of users, so that they are used 
subconsciously to enhance existing tools or communications. 
The term ubiquitous computing was brought out by Mark Weiser, who is widely 
considered as the father of ubiquitous computing, at Xerox PARC (Palo Alto 
Research Centre) in 1991. His article "The Computer for the 21st century" [1] 
coined this notion and described a version of technologies that weave themselves 
into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it. He further 
explained that the most powerful and successful technologies are those that 
naturally blend into our world until they are effectively invisible. 
Hence, these technologies can become human's second nature due to their 
usefulness and wide availability. This will result in a situation where people will 
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stop thinking of themselves as using a technology. Instead, they just consider 
themselves capable of doing whatever the technology enables and more. 
We can elucidate that this approach of understating technology is based on the 
fundamental principles and observation that the ratio of computers to persons is 
constantly increasing (see figure 2). Currently, most people might have three or 
more computers wherever they are either in the office, home or on the move. 
As an example, during the first era of computers, this ratio was one mainframe to 
hundred or even thousand persons. It quickly reached a stage of one-to-one - the 
personal computer era. Now it is advancing to the situation of one person having 
more than one computing unit, e. g. a mobile phone, PDA, watch, or iPod - the 
ubiquitous computing era. As this ratio increases, so is the expectation or intention 
of users on how to best utilise such facilities in order to cost-effectively interact 
with the applications built into them. This has prompted some experts in saying 
that one of the most precious resources in a modem computer system is no longer 
its processor, memory, and network; but rather a resource that is not subject to 
Moore's law: user attention [32]. A good example is the communication 
technologies for mobile phones. If I say "I spoke to my brother in Nigeria this 
morning", we understand implicitly that they used the telephone networks to do so 
or Skype or something similar. We would never hear someone saying like "This 
morning I used the telephone networks to speak ... " 
Looking at it from another perspective, pervasive computing, which is a synonym 
to ubiquitous computing, is defined as the evolution of mobile computing [33]. 
Mobile computing on the other hand builds on the foundations of distributed 
systems, mobile networking and energy-aware systems [34]. However, pervasive 
computing extends these with four additional research challenges: smart spaces, 
invisibility, localized scalability and uneven conditioning [33]. The main issue 
surrounding the use of a smart-space more efficiently lies in the fact of trying to 
bring the physical world together within a conceptual world. Weiser refers to the 
issue of invisibility as "seamless integration of fabric of our everyday life". 
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Localized scalability can be looked at from the point of view of finding methods 
for avoiding intensive interaction with the user, by employing methodologies that 
help to decrease the similarity of users with services based on the distance between 
the users. 
Just like other technologies, computing is becoming more and more ubiquitous. 
Five more trends have been identified for the technical feasibility of this change 
[35,36]. The first trend is given by Moore's law [35], which talks about the fact 
that the number of transistors on a single chip doubles every 18 months - hence, 
chip prices will keep on falling. The second trend is about the emergence of new 
materials. Thirdly, communication technologies will be further advanced and used 
more widely. Progress on sensor network technologies and mobile ad-hoc 
networks dominates the fourth trend. The last trend focuses on the new concept of 
modelling infrastructures for smart spaces and smart objects in everyday life. 
Even though the term ubiquitous computing was first coined by Weiser in the early 
1990s, it is still not clear whether the first vision by Weiser has been achieved or 
not. Perhaps it is still in its early stage. This can be supported by the fact that most 
of existing research work and publications within the fields of 
ubiquitous/pervasive computing cite Weiser's initial paper as their main 
motivation of research and development. The existing work also thinks that the 
realization of Weiser's vision is still looking at the future of ubiquitous computing 
despite the fact that this vision was made about two decades ago. It can also be 
envisaged that the age of ubiquitous computing is here (at the moment), as we 
currently have computing without computers and utilise information processing in 
our everyday life. Mostly research in computer science is motivated or defined by 
a concept of technological problems, hence driven by building or elaborating on a 
body of past work. For example, user-centred computing is typically driven by end 
users' needs. The research on ubiquitous computing on the other hand is an area 
for a wider range of very different kinds of technological areas and interests. They 
are brought together by a common vision mainly driven by its possibilities for 
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future developments, needs and concerns for computational challenges and worlds, 
rather than the problems of the past. 
If Weiser's vision of proximate future and our concept of his proximate future are 
the same, then a question to be asked is how can we prove that this vision has been 
materialised or is still being materialised? Well, it is possible that the ubiquitous 
computing vision can never come to pass, i. e. the proximate future analogy is a 
future indefinitely postponed. Consequently, ubiquitous computing is never about 
here and now. Alternatively, the vision has already come to pass, i. e. ubiquitous 
computing is already here. But it has taken a different form of mobile computation 
and pervasive mobile phones from that envisioned by Weiser. Devices with 
wireless data communication and powerful computational capabilities are 
ubiquitous in our society. Hence, "the future that ubiquitous computing has been 
attempting to build is not our own, but 1989s future - yesterday's tomorrows' [37]. 
A general methodology to address the problem of application-oriented research 
within the area of ubiquitous computing has been discussed [38]. Three main goals 
that need to be focused on have been identified as: theory, technology and scenario 
elements. Madhavapeddy [39] has identified that the field of ubiquitous computing 
research consists of people from different areas and knowledge zones, which 
include software, hardware and social engineers. It has also been pointed out that 
due to this diversity, a number of research areas have been identified such as 
context-awareness, sensor networks, low-power computing, activity inference and 
location sensing infrastructures. One of the main problems identified is the fact 
that the field is lacking a unifying determination that will drive this scattered 
research into real-world deployments. A decent market does exist for the media 
industry that could hugely benefit from the expertise of the ubiquitous computing 
research community. The problems created by the transition of media (mainly TV) 
from analogue to digital environments point out a golden opportunity for 
ubiquitous computing to get involved in creating an effective platform for the 
future of ubiquitous media for consumers. Hence, it was suggested that the 
ubiquitous computing research community should step forward and examine ways 
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of improving the handling of digital media for the next generation of home 
appliances. For example, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) tags can be used 
to allow objects in a home, hospital or emergency environment to be detected 
automatically for interaction and efficiency purposes [40]. 
Laurent Ciarletta presented a position paper [41] that sees pervasive computing as 
a complex and user-centric research and development discipline. The main 
emphasis of the paper is on an "augmented emulation" as a core toolkit for the 
development and assessment of future work. Ciarletta defines ubiquitous 
computing as a convergence of four main computer science areas: Networking, 
Embedded Computing, Personal Computing and Computer-Human Interaction 
(with Al providing the needed context-awareness and automatic customization). 
The paper mainly suggests that the emulation serves as the key to the underlying 
engine and fuel for ubiquitous computing research. Ciarletta also points out that 
due to security concerns, ubiquitous computing is mainly confined to 
entertainment industry and security is the main factor that prevents it from entering 
a critical field of medicine. Another factor for such hindrance might be that it 
cannot be convincingly demonstrated to serious users. The paper proposes to 
follow the two parallel paths below to achieve demonstrable and evolved 
application oriented research and development: 
" To use large-scale (both vertical and horizontal) emulations based on 
scenarios to test, demonstrate and emulate creativity for applications. 
" In other to improve interaction between different communities and foster 
collaboration, there is a need to develop a simple model to place every 
work and concept where they belong and define good practice to integrate 
them within the emulation toolkit. 
Hence, Ciarletta proposes the development of a large-scale community test bed 
and a framework known as PCBone (Pervasive Computing Bone), where everyone 
could participate and interact with other researchers in a real-time fashion. 
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Additionally, Salber [42] attempts to define the space of ubiquitous computing 
applications using dimensions of user mobility and interaction transparency, and 
identifies that increased interaction transparency can only be achieved via a 
breakthrough in the area of Human Computer Interaction (HCI) research. The 
paper also discusses two functional themes that are of importance across the area 
of ubiquitous computing systems - context awareness and automated capturing as 
well as integration and access. A clear agenda for HCI research in relation to 
ubiquitous computing is defined for each of the above two themes. A purpose of 
the paper is to provide a definition of what is ubiquitous computing. This has been 
achieved through examining two properties of ubiquitous computing first 
suggested by Weiser - mobility and transparency. 
Whichever view the research community accepts or way they define ubiquitous 
computing, and to what extends this vision has been realised, the field of 
ubiquitous computing still remains an interesting research area with more 
challenges to be addressed. Compared to when it was initially coined, ubiquitous 
computing still presents research topics that will enable a promising market. 
Looking at the future of technological development, it can be concluded that 
perhaps ubiquitous computing can never fully achieve its potentials, and there will 
still be many exciting ways and applications that need to be developed to help 
improve the quality of our lives. Hence, the vision made two decades ago has sky 
and human imagination as its limit. 
In a nutshell, ubiquitous computing has three main aims: products are to be 
everywhere (by being portable), to be small, and to be context-aware (of their 
environments and users). These aspirations are aimed at giving users complete 
autonomy of movement, ability to define policies as well as freedom of interaction. 
Making computing ubiquitous will make computing more attractive to those who 
find the current way of interacting with computers and networks distant, foreign 
and not very inviting. Although the idea of everywhere and inside everything may 
sound rather intimidating at first, if used properly, it could help us with the 
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problem of 'information overload' in very special ways. However, cleaver methods 
and means of balancing the availability of this information and security need to be 
developed. 
2.6 SUMMARY 
We have introduced the history of computer networks in this chapter, looking at 
the historical development from the first network project carried out in the late 
1960s to the current stage. Computer networks are still growing with no sign of 
stopping. Currently, we have hundreds of millions of computers, devices and 
ordinary day-to-day equipment (e. g. mobile phones) joined together to form the 
biggest cyber-society: Internet. The notion of ubiquitous computing was 
introduced as a prospective view about the future usage of computers, although it 
can also be argued that today we are in this stage of ubiquitous computing. Smaller 
and cheaper computer chips are enabling us to embed computing ability into any 
appliances from a piece of paper to our bodies. People's daily activities are now 
closely connected with computers and beneficially become ever more convenient. 
The future seems more on such integrations of humans and computers. However, 
the great features of ubiquitous computing inevitably expose its inherent 
vulnerabilities, particularly with regard to security and privacy. The chapter also 
reviews the issues in relation to the development of ubiquitous computing from its 
inception by Weiser, where the three main phases: the mainframe, PC (Personal 
Computing) and ubiquitous computing eras are presented. A ubiquitous network 
must be properly secured so that it can be relied upon. 
In the next chapter, we will present the work related to network security by 
focusing more on MANets. As a defensive countermeasure, IM, context-awareness 
and user-centricity amongst other mechanisms will be introduced. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NETWORK SECURITY AND IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
In computer security, identity can be simply referred to as distinguishing one user 
from another or a device from another device. IM is an act of trying to manage 
those various identities in a more structured manner. The issue of IM has not 
always been what it is today. In the early stages of computer development it was 
more about an issue of a physical control to premises of computer resources. It was 
only in the mid-60s when time sharing systems like IBM TSS-360 and DEC 
TOPS-10/20 [25] were introduced, which made accesses or identity management 
become an issue. While in the 70s UNIX provided users with the ability or concept 
of giving away their access rights permanently to programs, this made it possible 
for other users to execute applications and access data which could have been 
inaccessible with those users' normal access rights. However, this provided a great 
new functionality but at the same time it introduced new security problems and 
more complex scenarios or problems. Hence, the new authentication and access 
management of user identities started to emerge. As a result, a single sign-on 
became important, and role-based access control (RBAC) was introduced. In this 
chapter, we briefly introduce these issues within the area of computer security, and 
examine in more detail the issues of IM and user centricity as well as the role of 
context-awareness in IM. 
3.1 IDENTITY MANAGEMENT (IM) 
Mobile users may make use of partial identities. Identity is defined as something 
that can be used to identify a particular person, device or entity. With regard to 
mobile devices they have fixed identifiers, which essentially provide mobile 
identities. Such identities take into account locations and user identities that enable 
users to enforce security and privacy. Partial identities on the other hand is defined 
as a set of personal attributes of a user, where the user can have several partial 
identities, e. g. his/her work address, home telephone number, etc. [43]. 
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MANets at the first glance may not seem to be directly related to the issue of IM. 
IM normally gives the impression of a traditional client server structure, where 
users can establish a handshake with a server for authentication and other 
purposes. These technologies cause an enormous impact with implications for 
security such as packet forwarding and routing, network management etc., which 
are functions, carried out by all available nodes within the network. 
However, we are mainly concerned with the issues of IM, context-awareness, user- 
centricity, privacy, and user anonymity in this research project. The information 
related to these issues can be used to track users' whereabouts, monitor their 
behaviour, collect information about them as well as incriminate individuals based 
on the location of the devices used in a crime as evidence against them. These can 
be achieved by building profiles of individuals from the partial identities used by 
them, which can be utilised to harm people's privacy. The Hype Cycle Graph of 
Identity and Authentication related technologies and trends as of September 2003 
are illustrated in Figure 6. The Figure highlights some of the issues in terms of 
technology visibility and maturity from inception to the stage that it has been 
generally accepted. 
Figure 6 Identity and Authentication [29] 
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The research of IM schemes is of crucial importance because of the underlying 
cause of identity thefts. Although current IM frameworks have provided 
techniques, methods and policies to securely handle identity information, there are 
still several vulnerabilities that need to be addressed [44]. Hence, it is an extremely 
difficult problem to solve or address. Most people's personal data is in literally 
thousands of systems, potentially accessed by tens or hundreds of thousands of 
people. The two major threats faced by users are identity theft and identity 
disclosure. Conversely, it is imperative to acknowledge that above and beyond the 
risks to individuals, government and business organizations have a newly 
emerging and substantial liability specifically for the theft of employee identities. 
These demonstrate the need of ways and frameworks to help in mitigating this 
threat. A few strategic maps have been proposed, and an example of such maps 
designed by the BSC designer is shown in Figure 7, while Figure 8 provides a 
graphical representation of the variety of ways on how personal information is 
stolen. As reported in the Computer Weekly Magazine [45], a top German Police 
Officer told the ISSE 2010 conference that fighting cybercrime will be the greatest 
challenge in years to come, identifying that computer fraud makes up 46% of the 
total crime, Internet crimes 23% and a 64% increase of phishing. "We expect a 
70% growth in 2010 in the number of phishing cases, where access credentials and 
digital identities are stolen for criminal purposes, " said Jürgen Maurer, a Vice- 
president of the German Federal Criminal Police Office. 
Figure 7 Strategy Map Adapted from [46] 
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Figure 8 How Identity Information Is 
Stolen Adapted from [46] 
The field of mobile IM in MANets is still in its infancy. However, there are some 
research papers and other studies that have been published, looking at various 
aspects of the area as to be briefly analysed in the following paragraphs. This 
observation also holds true for many MANet security problems as highlighted in 
Figure 9. Cao et al [47] have provided a survey paper of various IM models and 
paradigms, where three forms of paradigms have been presented based on the core 
design principles: network centric, service centric and user centric paradigms. Also 
when considering different implementations of such paradigms, current IM 
protocols, standards and systems have been classified into three models - isolated, 
centralised and federated models. This is done based on functionality, identity 
storage methods, cross-domain support, user control and privacy protection. 
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Mobile devices including netbooks, tablets computers, mobile phones and PDAs 
are the main devices used in ad-hoc networks. It is worth pointing out that the 
manufacturers of such devices have done little in terms of informing users if and 
when their information is used by third parties, or when other third party 
applications are downloaded and how they use users' personal information. This 
same issue has been pointed out in the work of Enck et al [48]. Their research was 
focused on the vulnerability of third party applications deployed on Android 
devices. 
The research findings include half of the 30 applications studied shared location 
information and unique identifiers with advertisers. They also reveal that 15 of 
these applications sent out location information without informing users that the 
data was shared. Some of the applications gathered and despatched location 
information even when they were not running normal operations for the users, and 
some of them also sent out the information updates every 30 seconds. Seven of the 
studied applications shared unique identifiers known as IMEI (International 
Mobile Equipment Identity) numbers, and others also shared users' personal phone 
numbers or serial card numbers. 
Although an IMEI number is only used to identify a device and does not relate to a 
specific individual, it is still very useful information that when compromised might 
raise some security concerns. However, other numbers such as the ESN 
(Electronic Serial Numbers) and MEID (Mobile Equipment Identifiers) can link an 
individual to a phone. Usually, an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 
number stored on a SIM card can identify the subscriber on a network. 
While some of the applications ask permission to gather information from users 
before installation, none of them informs the users of how the data would be used 
or who will share it. Hence, users have no control of such information after 
installing the applications - these imply that users blindly trust the applications. In 
some cases, applications have a legitimate reason of accessing users' sensitive and 
private data. However, it is of paramount importance that users have full control of 
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such data and its usage. Thus, there is a need to assure that the users' data will be 
used properly and they will be able to revoke the data usage. 
It is not just Android devices that pass on user information to third parties, but also 
a far more controlled environment like Apple's IOS is another guilty party, as 
reported by the study performed by Eric Smith [49]. There is a historical 
background for the study. In 1999, Intel announced a Pentium III processor that 
contains a unique serial number per processor. The main problem with this is that 
it could be used to track users' online behaviour, and some governments even went 
as far as asking for a ban on Pentium III processors. Intel removed this serial 
number shortly afterwards. The Unique Device Identifier (UDID), which is found 
in iPhone, iPod Touch, and iPad, is something similar. Apple promotes the use of 
UDIDs as a way for application developers to link information to specific devices, 
e. g. storing high scores in a game on a central server. While Apple states that the 
UDID may not be linked to personally identifiable information, there is no 
mechanism in place to prevent this from happening, nor is there a mechanism to 
prevent the UDID from being shared with third parties (such as advertisement 
firms). 
The study discussed above was carried out to "determine if the privacy fears 
surrounding the Pentium 3 have manifested themselves on the iPhone platform" 
[49]. Hence, the author studied 57 random popular applications from the App 
Store, and came out with two interesting conclusions: 
" "We found that 68% of these applications were transmitting UDIDs to servers 
under the application vendor's control each time the application is launched. 
Furthermore, 18% of the applications tested encrypted their communications 
such that it was not clear what type of data was being shared". The study 
notes, "A scant 14% of the tested applications appear to be clean. We also 
confirmed that some applications are able to link the UDID to a real-world 
identity. " 
48 
" "For example, " the study continues, "Amazon's application communicates the 
logged-in user's real name in plain text, along with the UDID, permitting both 
Amazon. com and network eavesdroppers to easily match a phone's UDID 
with the name of the phone's owner. The CBS News application transmits 
both the UDID and the iPhone device's user-assigned name, which frequently 
contains the owner's real name. " 
The study [49] states that all these pose a real threat to iOS users. "Privacy and 
security advocates, personal iPhone owners, and corporate iPhone administrators 
should be concerned that it would be feasible - and technically, quite simple - for 
their browsing patterns, app usage, and physical locations collected and sold to 
unintended customers such as advertisers, spouses, divorce lawyers, debt 
collectors, or industrial spies". The study argues, "Since Apple has not provided a 
tool for end-users to delete application cookies or to block the visibility of the 
UDID to applications, iPhone owners are helpless in preventing their phones 
from leaking this information. " 
The above two examples have painted a gloomy picture of security worries in 
mobile applications and devices. Surely, as a matter of principle, devices should 
not discharge personal information or any information that can be linked to a 
user for everyone to see without users' consent. On the other hand, allowing very 
fine-grained control over these matters will only serve to confuse most users. 
This confusion could have two outcomes. One the one hand, users can see a 
complicated privacy dialog and automatically cancel out of fear. On the other 
hand, considering just how many applications use personal data, it could also 
lead to users becoming insensitive to such dialogs [50]. The insufficiency of 
transparency while exchanging people's identity and other information makes it 
hard or even impossible for users to participate in the protection process of their 
identities and personal information. In some applications or services that provide 
such facilities, most of the protection is done by the service providers rather than 
the users. 
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This issue is not limited to applications developed for mobile devices. As reported 
recently, Facebook had to take an action of banning developers that they caught for 
selling user names and contact lists. In the report, it is stated that developers trade 
user details to data brokers who use the information to target advertising more 
precisely. However, Facebook did confirm that the sale of user identities did not 
give access to other personal information. Hence, no private data has been sold or 
compromised [51]. 
For IM in MANets we are not only concerned with fixed identifiers, but also with 
other personal attributes of a user, as we are more interested in identifying and 
providing security to the user of the device rather than the device itself. 
Mohammad et al [52] categorised user identities as: personal identity (PID), 
corporate identity (CID), and social identity (SID). PIDs can be used to identify 
users in their very personal and commercial service interactions. CIDs and SIDs 
can be used in professional and social interpersonal interactions respectively. 
Additionally, a user's interests, preferences or tastes can be part of his/her 
identities as well, which may be dealt with by the user's SID. Some of these 
identities are very sensitive in nature, and therefore stronger authentication 
requirements have to be satisfied for their protection. 
Privacy refers to the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for 
themselves, when, how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others. IM can be looked at in different contexts with regard to 
privacy. One example is that it can refer to an integrated system of business 
processes, policies and technologies, which enables organizations to facilitate and 
control user access to critical online applications and resources while protecting 
confidential personal and business information from unauthorized users. In the 
case of mobile IM, location data may also include partial identities of the subject 
concerned. 
Consequently, it can be seen that the issue of user privacy profiles is of crucial 
importance. Moreover, IM has only a chance to succeed if it is clear from the 
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beginning that users remain in control of their IM systems. The interoperability of 
such systems will not be accepted by the users unless it is, by default, controlled by 
the users themselves. 
This feature makes MANets much more exposed and susceptible to security 
attacks, as the infrastructure is not fully defined and fixed. Thus there is a pressing 
need for cost-effective IM solutions in such environments. We can see that mobile 
IM is still in its infancy, where location information and users' personal 
preferences for the configuration of mobile devices and user interfaces present a 
complex research area and significant challenge to the research community. 
As seen above, establishing identity management within a single entity has proved 
to be difficult and challenging. This takes another dimension when we consider 
establishing and implementing identity management within MANets and Systems- 
of-Systems (SoS) in ubiquitous environments. This also involves mutual contracts 
that have been setup amongst various systems and systems boundary. It also 
involves agreements such that an identity in one organisation is recognised by 
another identity within the Community of Interest (Col) in SoS. This necessitates 
establishing a mapping among the different identities related to a user, which is 
called a single virtual identity domain [53]. Some of the challenges involved 
include: technology, security, regulatory requirements, privacy governance and 
legal issues. 
Balasubramaniam et al [54] have also pointed out that establishing trust between 
identity providers, synchronization of such identities, agreeing on data ownership 
issues, minimising risks involved, compliance with regulations, preventing privacy 
violation and policy enforcements constitute some of the other challenges. 
However, as can be seen in chapters five and six, a successful implementation of 
identity management within MANets and SoS provides a number of benefits that 
outweigh the challenges above. Some of such benefits include: quicker 
development of systems-of-systems, minimisation of identity duplicates, 
diminishing of privacy and security violations, reducing data and profile misuse, 
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the ability of making use of partial identities, etc. However, in order to be able to 
succeed in doing so, we need to make the systems more user-centric in nature, so 
as to allow the systems to engage with users and be more adaptive to their needs. 
3.2 USER CENTRICITY IN MANETS 
The main aim of user centricity is to allow users to be in control of their 
applications as well as devices with the ability to present the information that is 
suitable for the users at any given time based on their conditions/policies. Hence, 
ubiquitous computing within MANet environments needs to provide the ability to 
empower users for human-computer interaction as well as embodiment of a sense 
of control from the users. ""Feeling in control" is a key concept in the context of 
the oncoming information society. People should be able to get the information 
they need (and deserve to get) in a convenient way. They should not feel 
intimidated or dominated by either the amount of information coming towards 
them, or by the technology (e. g. computers or computing devices) needed to get it" 
[55]. 
User centricity issues have been addressed by Eap et a1. [56] by proposing an 
architecture based on a service-oriented framework called Personal IM that allows 
users to be in control of the management of their identities. However, the 
requirements of MANets have not been addressed by Eap et at Camenisch et al. 
pointed out that user centricity is a significant concept in federated IM as it 
provides stronger user control and privacy [57]. 
Bartolomeo et al. have also considered a shift from a technical-centric approach of 
current IM solutions to a user-centric one. They have proposed a user profile and 
designed a distributed approach to manage user profile information and examine 
the possibilities for the choice of a unique user identifier [58]. The issue of user 
centricity has also been looked at from the point of view of its usage in Enterprise 
Directory Services to provide complete protection from a user's perspective. It has 
been suggested that combining public key infrastructures, user-centric IM and 
52 
Enterprise Directory Services would allow users to have control of their personal 
information stored within a directory as well as who is allowed to access the 
information [59]. Thus, a user may employ PKI to encrypt attributes, and then 
share decrypted details with selected entities. User-centric IM has also been 
examined in [53,60,61]. 
DAIDALOS (Designing Advanced network Interface for the Delivery and 
Administration of Location independent Optimised personal Services) is another 
project of interest to our proposed framework as it addresses some of the elements 
of context-awareness within pervasive environments. The project has over 40 
partners, which ran between 2003 -2008 [62]. The pervasive computing element in 
DAIDALOS is addressed for supporting ordinary users within IM context [63]. 
3.3 CONTEXT-AWARENESS IN MANETS 
The first question to be asked is: what is context? By the definition of the Oxford 
Dictionary, context is a circumstance in which something happens or in which 
something needs to be considered. However, many researchers in the research 
industry are not satisfied with such a general definition of context. As a result they 
have tried to come up with a more accurate one. Schilit et al. [64] claimed that 
three important aspects of context are: where you are, who you are with, and what 
resources are nearby. Context is also defined as any information that can be used to 
characterise the situation of entities (e. g. a person, place or object) that are 
considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an application, including 
the user and the application themselves [65]. Chen et al. [66] redefine context as a 
set of environmental states and settings that either determine an application's 
behaviour or in which an application event occurs and is interesting to the user. 
One of the most essential aims of context-aware applications is to deliver 
contextual resources efficiently and effectively [67]. In today's real world, context- 
awareness is a key factor to the success of any ubiquitous application, which will 
enable conceptual data to be understood and communicated along with other 
entities in the system. Verkasalo proposed and developed a specialized algorithm 
53 
that can be used in conjunction with hand-held devices to acquire contextual 
information and classify them into home, office and on the move categories [68]. 
However, it is worth pointing out that by storing the information centrally, the 
problem of a single point of failure has not been addressed; hence the network can 
be affected by compromising one of the nodes that stores the data. 
From the above definitions, contexts are typically referred to locations, identities 
and states of people, groups, and computational and physical objects. 
Context is of paramount importance in ubiquitous computing devices, having to 
interact with users automatically with or without their direct control. Hence, 
context-aware applications should be insightful in respect to the users. They should 
react as the users expect them to. This requires the applications to collect and 
analyse contextual information. A possible taxonomy of this context information 
can be expressed by the following questions: 
Identity: Who is the user? 
" Time: When did an action happen, or when should it happen? 
" Activity: What did the user do, or what does he wants to do? 
Location: Where is the user? 
Context-aware applications may use all these information to react automatically to 
input. However, the taxonomy needs to be developed in such a way that the notion 
of "feeling in control" is applicable. This will allow users to define or change their 
policies, status etc. on the fly, which will in turn reflect how the application is 
used. 
Another question also needs to be addressed as to the reason of why context 
information is important in ubiquitous computing. Context reduces the input cost. 
Unambiguous input from users is also very expensive and time consuming. It 
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interrupts the users' thoughts and slows down the speed of the interaction, hence 
affects the efficiency of the application. By making the application able to sense 
the environment and interpret explicit actions, mobile devices could provide a rich 
and implicit context. This can further enhance the communication between humans 
and computing devices and make it much more efficient. Contextual information 
may provide an exciting user experience without much effort from the users. Users 
benefit through context sharing, if we assume that users and their friends have 
similar preferences, which means something that attracts one group member's 
attention has a higher probability of being preferred by the other group members. 
By sharing the context, the system could provide a better service. 
There are some challenges involved when moving the interaction beyond the 
desktop to small portable devices, as this requires stirring the interface from 
humans vs. computers to humans vs. context-aware environments. A user may 
have multiple devices such as phones, tablet computers, etc. It is also possible that 
a device may be shared by different people. Therefore resolving the possibly 
conflicting input of different cooperating devices becomes more crucial than 
before in the design process. This makes it of paramount importance to have 
knowledge in the world. One of the goals of HCI design is to create a convenient 
user experience by better predicting the user's behaviour and understanding the 
delicacy of everyday activities. 
It is also worth pointing out that ubiquitous activities are not so task-centric while 
the majority of usability techniques are. It is not at all clear how to apply task- 
centric techniques to informal everyday computing situations [69]. To address 
these requirements of ubiquitous computing, the notion of context in the constantly 
changing environment needs to be understood. Context can be classified into three 
categories instead of the narrow perspective that just focuses on locations. 
Computing context refers to the hardware configuration used, such as the 
processors available for a task, the devices accessible for user input and display, 
and the bandwidth. User context represents all the human factors, such as a user's 
profile, calendars, policies, involvements and profiles. Physical context on the 
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other hand refers to the information provided by a real world environment, which 
includes variables like locations, times, lighting, noise levels, etc. The three 
categories are equally crucial as the information can be used to determine the 
appropriate and customized interaction between the users and applications [70]. 
Context-awareness is also of crucial importance in IM because users within 
MANet environments would be able to access and view services or available 
participants based on contextual information. For example, a user who is within a 
city centre and looking for friends to socialise with can make his social identities 
available within a MANet and search for friends within such an environment. 
Hence, services and security settings can be tailored based on the contextual 
information provided. Context-aware services are often viewed as a generalisation 
of location-aware services, and subsequently many context-aware systems 
necessarily inherit the data management problems associated with any location- 
aware subsystems [71]. Context-awareness within the field of pervasive computing 
allows systems to adapt their operations based on the current contextual 
information with or without explicit user intervention and thus has the capability of 
increasing usability and effectiveness by taking contextual information into 
account. Putting this into the context of MANets, such networks might react 
specifically to the current location, time and other contextual attributes as well as 
adapting behaviour according to the changing circumstances as context data may 
change rapidly. With regard to user centricity and privacy, contextual information 
can play a crucial role in terms of allowing the policy maker to set privacy rules 
which depend on dynamic context data. For example, a policy can be set where 
access to specific information is either granted or restricted based on the location 
of a requesting user or device. Hence, context-awareness is one of the key 
elements for developing adaptive applications in ubiquitous environments and 
MANets in particular. The use of contextual information helps to provide 
personalised services to the users. The future will demand personalised search and 
contextual information results delivered to devices in accordance with users' mood 
or context [72-74]. 
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Dingldine et al. [75] proposed anonymous communication for context-awareness 
issues for the traditional Internet. Some basic principles of cultivating identities on 
the web and the importance of personal identities to oneself as well as others in 
order for them to recognise one's contributions have also been examined [76]. 
Some location-centric isolation of misbehaving nodes in sensors networks has 
been proposed [77,78]. This is of a data centric nature and suitable for use in 
energy constrained networks. Some versions of centralised trust based security 
systems, which deal with the specific needs and challenges of MANets by 
combining decentralised security management and context-aware computing 
capable of establishing an appropriate trust level for various situations, have been 
proposed by Moloney et al. [79]. 
Google has unveiled Latitude [80], a Google map for mobile and Internet 
applications, which allows users to report their approximate locations or different 
ones to friends. Other similar tools include FireEgale developed by Yahoo that 
helps users take their locations to the Web while giving them the ability to easily 
control how and where their locations are shared [81], and IYOUIT which allows 
users to share their information among friends where such information is 
automatically available to friends [82]. The tool (IYOUIT) allows users to opt-in 
so as to protect their privacy, and in addition users can also falsify their locations. 
Hadjiantonis et al. [83] have presented a hybrid approach for MANet management 
that has considered some aspects of context-awareness and the capability of 
effectively managing a MANet. The issue of quality of context in pervasive 
context-aware systems for dealing with the complexity of context-specific 
operations such as acquisition, aggregation, reasoning and distribution has been 
addressed by Sheikh et al. [8], through the definition of five quality-of-context 
indicators for context-aware middleware. Recent publications have also looked at 
the issue of context awareness within the domain of publish-subscribe in MANets. 
The publish-subscribe paradigm has been extended with the ability to manage and 
exploit context information by using formal models for context-aware publish- 
subscribe implementations for MANets [84]. 
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Additionally, Verkasalo proposed an algorithm for hand-held devices to acquire 
contextual information classified into home, office and on-the-move categories 
[68]. The algorithm classifies contextual data based on the usage of the devices 
involved. Users can also use their mobile devices for business purposes even when 
they are at home or on the move. Chen et al. proposed a paper-based leaning 
support environment where mobile phones, traditional textbooks and web-based 
forums are integrated to promote students' acquisition of knowledge. Students 
receive contextual messages from an online learning community based on their 
learning statuses [85]. 
Chen et al. [86] proposed a framework for supporting context aware environments 
in MANets. They make use of a virtual overlay network and two approaches (pull 
and push) to improve the efficiency of data delivery in MANets. The surrounding 
context of mobile nodes is used to determine which scheme, push-based or pull- 
based, is employed. In the framework nodes are divided into mobile context 
managers which are organized into an overlay segment-tree virtual network, and 
context providers/service requestors which send/receive contextual information via 
the segment-tree virtual network [87,88]. Then, a push-based approach is used to 
handle real-time information and combine a pull-based approach for supporting 
context-aware environments in MANets. 
Another application for Mobile Location-Aware Handheld Event is an event 
planner that has been proposed in [89], which provides a tourist guide service 
based on GPS location acquisition. Users may also use this system to send or 
receive emails. The system also allows the users to set up event reminders. 
Moreover, the system takes the privacy issue into account. A user could set a 
visibility based on persons or groups, which could help to control who can see 
whom. AccesSights is a multimodal user interface to support different user groups 
[90]. Its main objective is to support both blind users and sighted users at the same 
time with the same tourist content but for each user group in their preferred 
modality. Not only providing suggestions during the tour, the system also warns by 
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vocal output when some obstacles are in the way, which especially benefits blind 
visitors. 
As seen above, context-awareness is one of the key elements for developing 
adaptive applications in ubiquitous environments and MANets in particular. Some 
of the research questions that need to be addressed in terms of context-awareness 
include the followings amongst others: 
" What information should be sufficient to describe a mobile user's identity 
so as to present the current mobile situation and context (e. g. locations, 
personal information, general preferences set by users, temporal constrains 
etc. )? 
" How should the data used to present a mobile user's identity be collected, 
i. e., which parties (e. g. network operators, law enforcement agencies, 
profile providers, and/or service providers) should be involved in addition 
to the mobile user? 
" What technical standards need be imposed so as to obtain access to these 
different components of mobile identities? 
" Would it be necessary to introduce group identities such as work, friends 
and private for easy privacy and policy management? 
" What policies should be used in terms of negotiating the exchange of 
information on mobile identities? 
3.4 Context-Aware Monitoring in System-of-Systems (SoS) 
Context or situation awareness in SoS is of crucial importance, especially when we 
are dealing with crisis management and emergency situations. As a result, some 
research efforts have been directed to this area and have been considered by 
various projects. The e-SENSE project focuses on the notion of context in order to 
understand how to capture the appropriate context data to enable real applications 
[911. The main focus of the project is on psychosocial aspects of context in order to 
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enhance context-awareness by considering the activities of users with mobile 
lifestyles. 
The e-SENSE scenarios are based on Mood Based Services provided to users in a 
range of application areas to enable the variation of psychological, sociological and 
physical aspects of context. Another similar project, EMERGE [92], aims at 
investigating situation recognition approaches that enable dependable emergency 
assistance services based on unobtrusive sensors seamlessly integrated into daily 
living environments. By monitoring the behaviour patterns of assisted individuals, 
the system automatically reasons based on deviations in behaviour and assess the 
functional health status of assisted persons. If suspicious situations or upcoming 
trends are detected, the system provides stepwise assistance by checking with and 
notifying external helpers, e. g. a socio-medical service centre, which might then 
undertake further preventive measures or rescue missions. 
Situation awareness within the domain of emergency medical dispatch (EMD) and 
the way systems can support it appropriately have been examined by Blandford et 
al. [93]. They conducted a study of situation awareness in a large ambulance 
service, and the study has revealed some of the issues encountered during the 
development and exploitation of situation awareness particularly among the more 
senior EMD operators (called allocators). The notion of a `mental picture' as an 
outcome of situation awareness and the issue of how an awareness of the situation 
are developed and maintained dynamically, as well as the difficulties they face in 
doing so are described. One important finding of the ambulance control system 
identified by the study is the relatively routine behaviour, which occasionally 
intermingles with incidents that demand much higher levels of attention than 
usually expected, but that the routine work must still be completed as a matter of 
urgency and importance. Operators exhibit contrasting levels of situation 
awareness for these different kinds of incidents [93]. 
Another aspect of addressing situation awareness in emergency services has been 
researched by Craddock et al. [94] by utilizing the concept of Web mash-up. Their 
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Secure Situation Awareness (SSA) concept demonstrator integrates several 
technologies together into a single situation aware system by using both public and 
private information, such as GPS locations, maps (using Google Maps) and 
location information about emergency service equipment (e. g. fire engines from a 
fire service department). A EU FP7 project `Innovative and Novel First 
Responders Applications' (Infra) [95] has also provided us with the basic layers of 
interoperability and communication needed for a successful implementation of 
identity management within SoS. The Infra project's main objectives focus on 
three main levels: providing first responders with reliable communication, 
interoperability of navigation systems based on three location sensors, and 
standardization of the framework of communications and applications. Our work 
aims to make use of these fundamental principles and add a layer that will provide 
users within SoS (or first responders as referred to in Infra) with the ability to 
manage not only their identity information but also any other information that is of 
crucial importance in terms of sharing information and identities with other users 
within SoS, by focusing mainly on the use of mobile devices. 
A recent market survey for alternative positioning technologies in consumer 
devices, including mobile phones, portable computing devices, and cameras, 
reveals that it is set to explode over the next five years with revenues reaching 
more than $2.5 billion by 2015 as shown in Figure 10 [96]. The demand for low 
cost, ubiquitous location data has increased significantly over the decade. 
Companies such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, Nokia, Facebook and others are 
battling to enable and control consumer locations. This will bring new 
opportunities and threats (as hackers will try to break into the new developments 
and exploit devices) to the market but ultimately will drive a 400% [96] increase in 
alternative location technology penetration across a range of portable devices, 
location technologies and location providers. 
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Figure 10 Positioning Technologies 
3.5 SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
In today's digital communication revolution, it is all about connecting people 
ubiquitously and bringing communities together globally. Hence, `social networks' 
is the keyword for such a current trend. Different applications are developed to 
fulfil the needs of such growing demands. We have seen applications including 
Facebook and MySpace. However, in the past, researchers studying social 
networking or systems interaction have not addressed the utilisation of contextual 
information to enhance user experience. The adaptation of such applications 
mainly focused on establishing the most appropriate model with the potential to 
formulate and use contextual information, but did little or no effort in considering 
the security implications of such actions. 
Even those applications with the consideration of security implication have not 
provided means of putting such policies under the control of users or handling the 
matters arising after the exchange of either partial information from users or 
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files/data shared with participants in an ad-hoc manner. These issues have been 
discussed previously in section 3.2, where Facebook, Android applications and 
iPhone applications allow developers to sell users' private data. 
Additionally, item-based filtering algorithms for online recommender and 
advertising systems have been proposed by various researchers, but these 
algorithms are mainly focusing on the use of either k-nearest neighbours [97] or 
top-N item-to-item similarities recommender models [98]. Other well-known 
ranking algorithms include the Google pageRank algorithm [99], which is also 
extended for different purposes such as the SimRank [100] that computes the 
structural context similarities. The initial pageRank algorithm is aimed at ranking 
and displaying top relevant pages from an individual keyword search. However in 
the late 2009 things changed. A post appeared on Google's cooperate blog with a 
headline "Personalised search for everyone". Hence our assumption that when we 
search a term on Google we all get the same results becomes false. As Eli Pariser 
[101] pointed out in the book titled "The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding 
from You" that the result you get is what Google's algorithm thinks is best for you 
based on your location, previous search terms and internet viewings. This is done 
without the user knowing about it. However, another survey carried out by Click 
listeners [ 102] suggested that the claims made by Eli are inconclusive, as there has 
been little or no variation on the results obtained in the survey. Other social 
networking and web-based services have followed suit on trying to provide 
customised services for users intrusively. 
Other recent work in this area mainly focuses on database-oriented [103], agent- 
oriented [104] and service-oriented approaches [105]. Helmhout et al. [106] have 
also proposed an instant knowledge platform in P2P environments that enables the 
privacy-conscious sharing of mobile social context information either 
automatically or manually at an enterprise-wide network of contacts [107]. As part 
of the Core 4 Research area: instant Knowledge of Mobile Virtual Centre of 
Excellence [108], the project aims to allow calendar entries on personal devices to 
be instantly harnessed to deliver real value to telecom operators. The project also 
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plans to develop a distributed algorithm to support machine learning, context- 
based, recommender engine for use within a user's personal network. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has established and introduced the multiplicity of possible attacks 
involved in computer systems, with more focus on identity theft. The chapter has 
highlighted the major trends of technological development in terms of inception, 
maturity and general acceptance by users. We have also provided an overview of 
security issues in MANets, some mechanisms and impacts of contextual 
information and user centricity, and the ways in which they can be used to help 
improve security in MANet environments. 
In the next chapter we will summarise the main limitations of the existing work 
discussed in this chapter and chapter two. We will also provide the motivations for 
our research project based on these identified limitations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT IDENETITY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES 
Traditional identity management schemes were developed for wired networks. To 
our knowledge, there is no appropriate identity management framework yet, which 
has been particularly proposed to meet the special requirements of MANets 
normally involving devices with lower battery capacity and processing power. 
However, with the continuous development of MANets, especially the progress 
made on wireless ad-hoc networks and distributed systems, we believe that some 
existing solutions could be extended or some of their methodologies can be used 
for ubiquitous computing. In this chapter, we will summarise the limitations 
identified from the critical review of the existing work in the previous chapters two 
and three respectively. The chapter also introduces the main aims and objectives of 
the project and then the requirements of UCIM. 
4.1 USER CENTRICITY 
User centricity issues have been addressed in Eap et al. [56] , Camenisch et al. 
[57] and Verkasalo [68]. Other similar tools include Google Latitude [80], 
FireEgale [81], and IYOUIT [82]. Chen et al proposed a paper-based leaning 
support environment where mobile phones, traditional textbooks and web-based 
forums are integrated to promote students' acquisition of knowledge. Students 
receive contextual messages from an online learning community based on their 
learning statuses [85]. However, all the proposed work has the following 
limitations: 
Storing the information centrally can lead to the problem of a single point 
of failure and this has not been addressed. Hence the network can be 
affected by compromising one of the nodes that stores the data. 
" Google Latitude [80] for mobile and Internet applications allows users to 
report their approximate locations or different ones to friends. However, 
users cannot specify who amongst their friends is able to see such 
information or to be able to stop them from misusing the information 
0 Verkasalo classifies contextual data based on the locations (i. e. Home, 
65 
office, etc) of the users as the usage type of the devices is involved. 
However, users can use their mobile devices for business purposes even 
when they are at home or on the move. 
" Chen et al proposed a paper-based leaning support. The main issue with 
this is all students will be able to view the details. This would prevent 
some students from using the tool, as they might just want the 
lectures/tutors to view the details or just certain students. It might also be 
the case that it will distract other students from their work. For this 
reason, it is of paramount importance to be able to define polices to allow 
users to control such details. 
4.2 DYNAMIC POLICY 
Policies are currently expressed as an integral part of the compose scripts within a 
provided solution. However, this can be clearly separated from the security 
policies in a system, so that the policies drive the corresponding analysis, rather 
than vice versa. 
Separating the two would also allow us to construct and express policies in a way 
that would be easier for users to work with. The development of composed scripts 
is neither user-friendly nor intuitive. Hence, there is a need of a clear separation 
between policies and analysis, while allowing users to be able to define and 
modify policies to meet their situations. Other policy-related questions include 
whether context, trust, reputation and risks should have an effect on driving 
dynamic policies, as well as issues relating to policy interactions. 
Some of the related work on policy creation discussed in chapter three includes: 
role based access control (RBAC) proposed by David Ferraiolo and Rick Kuhn 
[109], and the Ferraiolo-Kuhn model integrated with the framework developed by 
Sandhu et al. [ 110] to create a unified model for RBAC [ 111 ]. However, all such 
proposed work has the following limitations: 
" The approach is mainly based on a central RBAC system, where context 
data is assumed to be globally accessible [112], and the static and 
66 
dynamic separation of duties makes up the most common constraints in 
RBAC. 
" The summarized related work in section 3.6 based its solutions on fixed 
constraints or elements to compare against those not allowing the 
interaction of the systems with their users. 
Although many publications as seen above have examined the issue of 
policy specification, data filtering, etc, they have been done almost 
universally from a theoretical standpoint. Some relevant work with a 
more practical focus has grown out of the interest in web based retail 
applications to recommend products based on the content of users' items 
in their baskets or that they have viewed. 
4.3 CONTEXT-AWARENESS 
Some of the limitations of related work with regards to the utilisation of contextual 
information and context-awareness issues in MANets includes amongst others: 
The use of an overlay network in Chen et al [86] framework via the 
segment-tree virtual network [87,88] creates another extra load on the 
processing power needed for dividing nodes into context providers, 
context servers, etc. Such nodes with designated functionality creates 
another security issue of what happens if a context server node has been 
compromised, or is out of the range. This issue makes the framework not 
suitable for the requirements of a MANet ubiquitous environment, as it is 
trying to mimic a central server process. 
" There is a possibility of a single point of failure in the Chen et al [861 
proposed framework as a results of dividing nodes into mobile context 
managers, context providers, etc. Also if the node(s) performing a specific 
task is compromised, there will be some security effect within the 
network itself. 
4.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The earlier discussions in chapters 2 and 3 as well as the sections 4.1 - 4.3 of this 
chapter indicate that the evolution towards ubiquitous computing demands a new 
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generation of resource-efficient identity management frameworks. Hence, the main 
focus of this project is on the interoperability among different IM techniques and 
the development of an IM framework for fulfilling such interoperability in 
MANets. As outlined earlier in Section 1.2, the framework should be efficient, 
user-centred, context-aware and lightweight so as to meet the specific needs of 
MANets. It should also be able to manage multiple identities for different MANets 
situations, to perform negotiations with other peers about necessary identity 
information to be used for identification in relation to given security policy settings 
and situation awareness. The framework should be able to provide users with 
friendly control over their own identity information and security in terms of 
mobility across different MANets. Moreover, it should be able to separate users 
from the complexity of the technical implementation and operation issues of IM in 
MANets while allowing users to focus on policy aspects of IM. This ability is 
essential, as users typically do not want to learn detailed security techniques. 
The aim of the project is to design such a framework, which is able to minimize 
the use of system resources such as energy consumptions and communication 
overheads, make use of relevant contextual information and put the users of the 
system in full control of their identity information and resources. It should have an 
appropriate system architecture that is flexible and scalable. 
More specifically, the following main objectives are set out for this project: 
" To provide a background to ubiquitous computing and demonstrate the 
unfitness of existing identity management frameworks when applying 
them to ubiquitous computing environments, particularly MANets. 
" To specify a set of requirements for the proposed IM framework through a 
detailed analysis of the needs, characteristics and application scenarios of 
IM in MANets. 
" To propose an original set of mechanisms, strategies and protocols that 
together achieve resource-efficiency in identity management. 
. To propose a set of mechanisms, methods and strategies that together will 
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constitute and establish the IM framework, with respect to the 
requirements specified. 
" To prototype the framework in order to provide a proof-of-concept for the 
proposed work and perform an assessment in relation to the proposed 
requirements, where possible. 
" To apply a simulation technique and its related tool such as MATTS, NS2, 
GTNets or Matlab to produce a simulation of the framework. 
" To perform an assessment of the simulation based on case studies to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in terms of the 
expected characteristics of privacy, user centricity, context-awareness, 
lightweight and user friendliness. 
4.5 REQUIREMENTS 
In this section, an analysis of the requirements for our proposed framework is 
presented. The analysis has been undertaken from three perspectives: anonymous 
communication, identity management, and usability requirements. The 
requirement analysis is expected to cater for the needs of end users and the key 
functionalities of the framework such as operation, mobility, security and 
personalization. The requirements can help answer two questions: 
1. What partial identities should be used in certain situations? 
2. Shall requested data be delivered in a specific situation to a particular 
requester, and what data is communicated if the delivery is permitted? 
4.5.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION 
Anonymous communication is needed as a tool to protect a user's privacy against 
certain adversaries [43]. It is worth pointing out that most of the current 
anonymous communication mechanisms in use today are developed mainly for 
wired networks, whereby ad-hoc networks have other questions or issues to be 
answered differently. This includes the following: 
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1. Can the existing mechanisms provide enough protection for ad-hoc users, 
meet the low energy requirements of devices involved, and offer good 
performance? 
2. Are the mechanisms dynamic enough to meet the required mobility of 
MANets? 
3. Can anonymity be possible for both large and small ad-hoc networks? 
4. Is it possible to provide total anonymity for ad-hoc networks without the use 
of a fixed infrastructure? 
The questions above lead to part of the solutions that we have provided in UCIM. 
These have been demonstrated in the chapters six and seven of the thesis, where 
we have provided detailed solutions and evaluations of UCIM. 
Hence, the following requirements for an anonymous communication mechanism 
might enable us to address the above issues in a more constructive manner: 
1. Scalability: Enables the mechanism to be dynamic enough to operate on 
different network topologies 
2. Security and reliability: Provide security against well-known protocol 
attacks, while maintaining the quality of communication 
3. Performance: Takes into account the issues of mobile devices' limited 
resources such as low battery and processing capabilities 
4. Robustness to topology changes: Addresses the nature of dynamic 
topological changes in MANets to ensure the sustainability of security and 
performance 
5. Independence of a fixed infrastructure: Makes the mechanism independent 
of any fixed infrastructure such as the Internet PKI 
6. Privacy and trust: Ensure the authenticity, confidentiality and legitimate 
unlinkability of information transmitted. 
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4.5.2 REQUIREMENTS FOR IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
Managing identity information plays a very curial role within our proposed 
framework. The following set of requirements is essential for guaranteeing users 
that their identities are well protected: 
1. Functionality: This includes handling and representing identities; having 
pseudonyms with specific properties and ability to recover real identities; 
enabling history management (i. e. storing and analysing communicated 
data or data flows); helping to identify which partial identity is used for 
what transactional context, when, where and how; allowing users to have 
control on their identities by choosing their required profile settings and 
preferences; and managing multiple identities of a user. 
2. Interoperability: One major characteristic of MANets is the variety of 
devices, e. g. PDAs, smart phones and laptops, which need to communicate 
with each other or can be found within such a networking environment. 
Hence, the proposed framework should be able to handle and communicate 
with any of these devices effectively with little effort required from their 
users. The success of an IM system very much depends upon such ability 
to interoperate across a network of businesses, partners, and services 
regardless of the platforms, programming languages, or applications with 
which they are interacting. The framework should also be able to easily 
integrate into similar tools. 
3. User-centricity: It means the system should only reveal identity information 
about a user with his/her consent. Security is a main concern of this system. 
It should protect the user against deception, and verify the identities of any 
parties who ask for the user information to ensure that it goes to the right 
place. In the user-centric approach, the user will decide and control the 
extent of his/her identity information to be transmitted. The system should 
disclose the least information needed for the user to gain requested 
services. By following these practices, the least possible damage can be 
ensured in the event of a breach. These are some of the requirements 
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employed to design a user-centric identity management system in The 
Laws of Identity [113]. 
4.5.3 USER REQUIREMENTS 
1. The user to be able to adaptively control information usage and disclosure 
2. Lightweight to be usable in energy and memory limited resource devices 
3. Customisable in response to available contextual information 
4. Location authentication - location authentication is of paramount importance 
with regard to security. Note that a device used in the network can be 
identified as being used at certain location, but this does not imply that the 
device owner is using it, unless the owner authenticates him/herself as the 
user. 
5. Location determination: This helps to identify users at certain locations, and 
to allow them to set the profiles that fit their commitments and possibly the 
environment. 
6. Security and privacy: To enhance security, users should be able to choose 
end-to-end data encryption. Unauthorised users should not be allowed to 
access, view, or modify identity information. With the growing awareness 
of privacy and the wish to protect it, users would be looking for more 
control over their privacy, in particular, what information is known about 
them and by whom. With an effective IM system, a user should be able to 
exert some control as to how much identity/data they want to release 
(which may include an approval for sending some particular identity 
attributes) as well as being able to retrieve data concerning the location of 
their identity data and who is able to access it. Users should also be able to 
stay anonymous while accessing some network services such as the 
network time protocol (NTP). 
4.6 SUMMARY 
In summary the key weaknesses of MANets that need to be addressed include 
among others the followings: 
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" Mobile nodes in MANets can be used to track people and also monitor 
their behaviours without any mechanism that allows users to protect their 
privacy and anonymity. 
" Most of the proposed frameworks analysed earlier are aimed at wired 
networks and not in compliance with the requirements of MANet 
environments. 
" The contextual information considered is mainly based on locations, and 
there is a need to look beyond this to other contextual information such as 
times and commitments. 
The current IM has an insufficient privacy and security protection 
baseline. 
There is insufficient user control in IM, i. e., it is not user-centric, as users 
are required to trust providers. 
No universal or standardised approach has been adopted, because the 
current standards are only specific to some applications. 
Therefore, it is clear that due to the characteristics of MANets, none of these 
proposed existing approaches can be directly used to meet all the requirements of 
MANets [114]. Even the solutions that are provided for peer-to-peer networks 
(p2p) such as Tarzan [ 115] and MorphMix [ 116] do not meet the requirements 
and characteristics of MANets. In response to the above challenge, our aim is to 
conduct research into the issue of IM frameworks for MANets, which should be 
user-centric, context-aware, lightweight and user-friendly. Any new framework 
developed should fully meet the needs of MANet environments. 
The next chapter will capitalise on the identified limitations presented in this 
chapter and present the aims and objectives of our project for the development of 
our proposed UCIM framework. The chapter will also provide the overall design 
of the framework showing what modules or components are needed to create the 
framework. The chapter further looks into the details of each module by focussing 
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mainly on how they meet the specified requirements of the framework and how 
they overcome the limitations summarised in this chapter. Some desirable features 
such as portability, heterogeneity, lightweight, dynamic policy creation and 
context filtering are also explained in detail with regard to the proposed 
framework. 
74 
CHAPTER FIVE 
UCIM DESIGN FOR MANets 
During the study, we have identified several major weaknesses within (see Chapter 
4) existing frameworks and solutions. For example, they are mainly aimed at wired 
networks, which do not meet the requirements of ubiquitous ad-hoc environments, 
neglect the important role of users, and are not lightweight. We have also specified 
our requirements [117] for IM in MANets and justified the need for new IM 
frameworks in section 5.2. The chapter provides detailed design of UCIM 
including each of the modules, protocols and other techniques used during the 
design with clear justifications. 
5.1 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
We assume that mobile nodes that joined a network have gone through a proper 
authentication process, and that they are aware of their locations through GPS, 
UWB, and Bluetooth or other means. Hence, these nodes are able to infer 
information about their neighbours. We refer to a node as a proxy node if it is the 
closest to the node concerned in terms of the distance between them. If two or 
more nodes are within the same distance, then the available energy levels of these 
nodes will be used to establish which node will serve as a proxy node. A proxy 
node is required in this case to help provide a more secure and energy efficient 
way of communication between the devices so as to provide better services. 
Another security issue is about the possibility of users, after successfully 
authenticating themselves to the network, trying to change their profile information 
for malicious reasons. To tackle this problem, our framework will only allow a 
user to change parts of its profile (i. e. its office address, room number, extension 
number, etc) before joining the network but not afterwards. On the other hand, the 
user's profile information such as its name, date of birth, role, etc will be static, 
and the user will be prevented from changing such information. Users will only be 
allowed to switch between their available profiles based on their current 
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commitments. However, all the information about such profile types will be fixed 
while connected to the network. 
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To address some of the weaknesses identified in chapters three and four 
respectively, we have proposed a new framework for User-centred and Context- 
aware Identity Management (UCIM) in MANet environments as shown in Figure 
11. More specifically, we are considering Mobile Ad-hoc Networks and Crisis 
Management environments. The framework is designed to be context-aware, user- 
centred and lightweight. In trying to achieve the requirements of a lightweight 
framework, we have designed a novel hybrid metric that will calculate the energy 
level of each node in comparison to the required receiving and transmission energy 
and get a balance for deciding the means of transmitting and communicating 
between devices either directly or via the use of proxy nodes. We have also 
designed and used XML schemas to allow the information stored to use minimal 
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storage space and speed up processing and transmission of data. An algorithm has 
also been proposed that reduces information granularity without loss of integrity 
before transmission. The framework also allows users to be in full control of their 
identity information as well as designing policies that will be used in requesting 
information and communication between other devices. Users are also allowed to 
create and modify policies via the use of an interface and the underlying policy is 
created after selecting the required properties within the interface. These policies 
are also stored as XML files. 
The modules shown in Figure 11 will be explained in the following sub-sections. 
5.1.1 CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION 
The Context Provider (CP) is responsible for acquiring contextual information 
from various contextual sensors or providers. It is also responsible for processing 
contextual information into meaningful information that will be easily understood 
by non-technical users for its presentation within the user interface. 
The Context Server (CS) stores the processed contextual information. After the 
contextual information has been acquired and processed, the information can be 
sent via the use of the pull approach to the context server. The main role of the 
context server is to store the information of a user and respond to the query of 
other users about the contextual information of the user/devices. It is also used to 
query other devices and store relevant information of the current devices for its 
own usage. From our literature review, it is evident that location information is 
widely studied and used as contextual information. We have studied social identity 
theory [118,119] which is used to help identify other contextual information that 
is significant to users (see Figure 12). 
77 
u 
Context Server 
Social Identity 
Theory Module 
I Context 
j information 
Figure 12 Relevant contextual information 
The Context Requestor (CR) module is responsible for invoking queries to both 
CP and CS. It invokes queries to CP via the use of the push method, which 
provides a real time response to the query only within the device itself. While the 
query via CS is in the form of getting information about other devices within the 
MANet environment, the pull method is used. 
5.1.2 PERSONAL IDENTITY MANAGER 
The Personal Identity Manager consists of the user's personal information, 
processed information from the contextual information layer, and the set of 
policies and rules required for the application. As each user plays numerous roles 
in life, some of these identities are very receptive in nature. 
The Personal Information module contains user details stored as an XML file. This 
structure is preferred to a normal conventional database because we are dealing 
with devices with limited resources. 
The Contextual Data contains the processed data from the Contextual Information 
layer, where all relevant contextual information is identified by applying the social 
identity theory (Figure 12) and ready for usage by devices in a way that is 
comprehensible to users. 
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The Policy and Rules module deals with relevant security issues to protect the 
user's information from unauthorized access or disclosure. The user will be able to 
tick some boxes within a graphical user interface for the specification of the 
policies and rules. Such rules will also be depending on the contextual information 
that must be evaluated if personal data is requested. The rules can further deal with 
issues of access control and data abstraction. 
5.1.3 PRIVACY MANAGER 
The Privacy Manager module consists of the profile information, privacy manager 
decision module and the profile zoning. In the current solutions policies are 
expressed as an integral part of the scripts. Other policy-related questions include 
whether context, trust, reputation and risk should have an effect on driving 
dynamic policies, as well as issues relating to policy interactions. 
The Privacy Manager module makes use of the Profile Information and the 
Contextual Data to decide what user information can be released or made available 
within the environment. This will classify the user's personal information into two 
groups: allowed or not allowed to be accessed by other users within the 
environment. This information is then passed on to the Profile Zone module. The 
interaction between devices within the MANet environment requires the user to be 
able to select part of his/her identity (partial identity) to be visible to other users 
based on the contextual information. We define this information as a set of 
attributes as to be detailed in section 5.4.1 PARTIAL IDENTITY. 
5.2 USER CENTRICITY 
Putting users at the forefront of systems within ubiquitous environments is an 
indispensable aspect for the adaptation and accomplishment of any development in 
such environments. Users within a ubiquitous environment always have the desire 
to be able to protect personal information as well as secure access to their 
resources. This can be achieved in two ways: determining who other users are and 
what they are allowed to do. This also refers to authentication and authorisation. 
In order to provide authorisation facilities for users, it is of paramount importance 
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to allow users to define policies using a simple interface, without the need of 
knowing the techniques underlying such policies. Policies are currently expressed 
as an integral part of the compose scripts within the provided solutions. Composed 
scripts are rules that are hard-coded into the main scribe as policies, giving users 
less ability to make changes to the policies. However, policies and composed 
scripts can be clearly separated from the system, so that the policy drives the 
analysis, rather than vice versa. Hence, in UCIM we have proposed and developed 
a system whereby users are able to define polices to control access to their 
resources. This is possible as users will be able to define who their users are, create 
their authorisation and access policies (using a dynamic policy creation interface) 
and establish agreement with other users on how such resources will be utilised. 
5.2.1 SECURITY POLICIES 
Separating the two would also allow us to construct and express policies in a way 
that would be easier for users to work with. Development of compose scripts is 
neither user-friendly nor intuitive. Hence, there is a need of a clear separation 
between policies and analysis, while allowing users to be able to define and 
modify policies to meet their situations. Other policy-related questions include 
whether context, trust, reputation and risk should have an effect on driving 
dynamic policies, as well as issues relating to policy interactions. Hence, we have 
provided an interface (a software component) as part of the Privacy Manager 
module that enables users to create and modify policies from a set of defined node 
properties that consist of user statues, locations, profile information, etc. Currently 
we have developed a tool that allows users to define such properties and store them 
as XML files to be used latter. To generalise this process, XML NET is used to 
create a corresponding dialog without the need to rewrite code as new properties 
are introduced. Other issues include: 
" Would it be necessary to introduce group identities such as work, friends, 
private, etc. for easy privacy and policy management? 
" What policies should be used in terms of negotiation of exchange of mobile 
identity information? 
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" How to represent such policies in the interface and the underlying policy 
file? 
A user may then have an option to decide under what circumstances the other 
nodes are considered as safe, or the opposite. For access control, users can decide 
the sensitivity levels of components based on their own application scenarios. In 
this case, they may have a list of access control policies to choose from, such as the 
Biba or Bell-LaPadula model. In both cases the policies could be recorded as a list 
of rules. 
In UCIM we have represented such polices in XML files by using a binary tree 
structure, and the use of disjunctive and conjunctive representation of logical 
operators within policy creation and analysis. These also involve the exploration 
on how Lex and Yac [120] can influence such representations. We have explored 
the use of the JBoss Drools business rule management system [121] for policy rule 
specification and logic. 
5.2.2 CONTEXT BASED ACCESS CONTROL (CBAC) 
In UCIM we apply the concept of RBAC but put users in control of their access 
policies and rules. This is achieved by integrating contextual information (mainly 
users' statuses/commitments) in the access decision process instead of using 
traditional RBAC. Hence, users' contextual information and roles have a 
significant and active influence on the access decision making module. 
Consequently, we refer to our improved approach as Contextual Based Access 
Control (CBAC), which takes context information, mainly the users' condition, as 
the deciding factor of either allowing users to access the required information or 
denying such access. We have further improved CBAC by designing and 
developing a dynamic policy creation interface that eliminates the problem of 
creating nested policy rules as well as users getting confused when they are 
required to make use of nested brackets while creating policies. 
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The main difference of our proposed CBAC from existing ones is the fact that the 
rules have totally eliminated the need of a role when accessing the information and 
have eliminated the problem of conjunctions and disjunctions. Other related works 
extend RBAC to include a new constraint of context. Hence, users still need to be 
assigned roles either by an administrator or request roles dynamically. The CBAC 
has a different set of rules and policies and it is designed and implemented with 
full control of system users. 
In the case of conflicts between rules and policies, a Deny Override Policy will be 
applied, where if any of the rules results in a `deny' response, the requesting user 
will not be allowed to perform the transaction and an unavailable message will be 
sent to the user. Each profile type is identified by its unique name, i. e. 
HomeProfile, OfficeProfile, or HealthProfile. Users are also allowed to define a 
new profile type. However, this depends on the situation that this framework is 
used. For example, when used for a social event then this can be permitted, but 
when we are dealing with crisis management situations of crucial importance then 
users are limited on what they can change or portray. 
The structure of the user profile is a 3-tuple consisting of. 
<Deviceld, Profiletype, plDProfile> 
which represents the device identification number, the profile type of the users of 
the device and the profile identification number currently in use by the user. 
The profile information consists of attributes that users have selected to present 
their current profiles, e. g., if a user is at work, his/her profile attributes might 
comprise his/her office room number, extension number, calendar commitments, 
etc, as shown below: 
Profileinfo = [officeDetails, commitments, availability) 
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To access such information we design a CBAC method for utilising the user's 
current status as contextual constraints in allowing other nodes to see and access 
relevant parts of the user's profile as depicted in Figure 13. A requestor first 
checks its table for the availability of the user ID that the requester is trying to 
request the profile from and the profile type of the user. If the user is available 
within the network, then using the distance metric, the requesting user will decide 
if it wants to make a direct or indirect request. A direct request will allow such 
request to be sent directly to a relevant user ID. An indirect request will require the 
use of a proxy node. Then the proxy node will deliver the message to the relevant 
user. When a proxy node needs to make an indirect request, it will first determine 
if the nodes in-between are considered secure to route the information to. This part 
is considered as part of network optimisation, by trying to find the most cost 
effective and secure way of coordination between nodes, so as not to disallow a 
function that might be of crucial importance, e. g. transferring patient data for an 
urgent medical usage. After receiving the request the node will check the required 
policy from the privacy manager. If the policy matches, profile details are 
dispatched either directly or via a proxy node to the requesting node, and the 
process is completed. Otherwise, some information will be fed back to the 
requesting node either directly or indirectly with a proposed modified policy or a 
deny reply. If it is a proposed modified policy the process starts again, and else the 
process ends. 
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Figure 13 Privacy Policy Protocol Sequence Diagram 
5.3 LIGHTWEIGHT 
5.3.1 HYBRID EUCLIDEAN METRIC 
When dealing with small ubiquitous devices it is of paramount importance to try to 
balance system resources such as CPU usage, network overhead, storage space, 
and energy consumption. When users within Community of Interest (Col) need to 
share information, it is essential to find a cost-effective and secure means of 
exchanging such information between users. For example, if the distance between 
the users concerned is excessive, the transmission of shared data via a proxy node 
Targol Node 
3.1: Cheri Polio for both Req oeMor and Target Node 
4: ReWrn poky OK 1 
tans 
- --- -- 
_- -- 
9.1: Pass request 
9.1.1: Chock Policy to both Requests and Taget 
Podcy OK 
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will enable a used device to save energy. Hence, this hybrid metric is aimed to 
solve or minimise resources usage and improve efficiency. 
In UCIM we have proposed a hybrid metric to measure these factors together for 
the dynamic determination of cost-effective identity management deployment. 
Another added feature is that a node's trustworthiness should also be considered in 
this hybrid metric to enhance the system's security policy. Specifically, it shows 
how a node can be utilized to save the computing-related energy; how a user 
profile can be managed in a distributed pattern to reduce the communication- 
related cost; and how a hybrid metric is used to balance both of them in order to 
extend the network lifetime. 
Below, we describe a restrictive hybrid metric that measures the balance of 
system/node resources such as energy level, CPU usage and the distance between 
nodes to determine how to access or request contextual profiles from other nodes. 
The trustworthiness of nodes will be addressed as future work to meet the required 
node security policy and rules. 
The metric will be based on two sets of energy metric calculations that are: the 
required communication related (both transmitting and receiving) energy metric 
and the node energy or battery level as explained below: 
" The communication-related energy refers to the energy used by the radio 
transceiver of a node to communicate with others. This includes 
transmitted/received event records such as contextual information and 
request/transmission of user profiles. An approximation of energy 
consumption when transmitting or receiving r bits between two nodes n, 
and n2 with a distance of d(nl, n2) is given in [122] as: 
E, 
x =(a,,, +a,, 2 
d (n, , n2 )" )r (1) 
E, 
x =a2 r (2) 
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where E denotes the transmitting energy and E, x denotes the receiving 
energy. a1 1, a12 and a2 are constants, and their typical values are a1 1= 
45nJ/bit, a2 = 135nJ/bit, a12 = IOpJ/bit/m2 (for n= 2) or 0.001pJ/bit/m4 
(for n= 4). n is the reduction factor. Based on the results of the typical 
values obtained for a1 1, a2 and a2 by using n=2 and n=4 respectively, 
we choose n=2 in this proposed framework as it gives a12 a much 
greater value than OpJ/bit/m4. 
The computing-related energy refers to the energy used to implement the 
UCIM modules. It is used for the purpose of monitoring network statuses 
and user activities, executing algorithms, maintaining and updating user 
profiles. We assume this part of the consumption is proportional to the 
number of event records. That means the more user activities are 
observed, the more computing-related energy will be consumed. For each 
record, its processing is assumed to have a fixed charge EE =5 mJ so as to 
have a uniform unit of measurement in performance level for our work. 
" The energy of a node or its battery refers to the expected remaining 
lifetime of the node concerned in terms of its remaining battery level. For 
simplicity, we will model this metric with an initial fixed amount of 
battery level. This level is reduced whenever an activity that consumes 
energy occurs, i. e. processing, transmitting or receiving. Hence, this level 
is automatically updated, and when the level equals to a pre-set 
minimum, the full level of energy is therefore used as the replacement 
value. 
E'1=E1-(1xE, +mxE,, +(1-m)xErx) (3) 
In the above equation, E, represents the current battery level of node n, 
before the occurrence of the next transmitting or receiving activity A 
including its related profile record processing, and E', denotes the 
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updated battery level after the occurrence of A. The initial value of E, is 
set to the full battery level of the device used by n,. When E, reaches a 
threshold of minimal energy, the battery should be fully recharged and 
E,, is re-set to the full capacity. 
Additionally, 1 (>_ 0) in equation (3) is the number of profile records 
processed by A, and the energy consumed for processing each record is 
E, as stated earlier, i. e., the total energy consumption of record processing 
by A is 1xE, m (E {0,1)) signifies the mode of A with m=I for 
transmitting or m=0 for receiving. EE and E, x are calculated using 
equations (1) and (2) for the energy consumptions of transmitting and 
receiving by A, respectively. 
" Consequently, to determine whether the information should be requested 
directly by node nl or via an intermediate node (proxy node) np, a 
restrictive third metric EDh is used. This enables the node with the 
maximal energy as represented in equation (4) to be selected: 
ED,, =Max(Ed, Ep) (4) 
Here, Ed is the positive value of equation (5), which represents the energy 
level left after a direct transaction from n, to another n2. Ep is the positive 
value of equation (6), representing the energy level left after using proxy 
node np for an indirect transaction from n1 to n2 via np. 
Edr in equation 5 refers to the required energy for the direct transaction 
from n, to n2, which is calculated using equation (1) defined earlier. Ep 
in equation 6 is the energy for the indirect transaction from n, to np that 
then forwards the information to n2, and Ep is also calculated using 
equation (1). 
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Ed -(Enl -Edr ) (5) 
Ep = (Enl - Epn ) (6) 
5.3.2 CONTEXT ONTOLOGY 
As soon as contextual information is detected, the model needs to represent such 
information into an XML schema, which is integrated into an XML-based 
metadata. We decided to make use of XML models as a result of a survey by 
Strang et al [123] which demonstrates that XML models are suitable and meet the 
requirements of our framework. The decision was also based on the fact that one of 
the advantages of using XML schemas, compared to other ways of contextual 
representation analysed by Strang et al, is that XML provides a means of 
encapsulation and reuse of models (inheritance). 
Figure 14 presents the defined XML schema for contextual information. We first 
start by creating a general schema that contains the base elements of all schemas, 
and then from there other schemas are created inheriting from the general schema 
as well as other schemas. The line(s) between the boxes that represent each of the 
individual schemas represents the inheritance. In Figure 14 both OfficeProfile and 
HelathProfiles inherit from the RootContext schema, ProfileContext schema and 
Status schema respectively. We adopted the notion of defining the schemas shown 
in Figure 14 to reduce the level of duplication in terms of defining users' profiles. 
For example, to define a new profile "SocialProfile", we can inherit the elements 
from RootContext and just add new properties for the new profile type. This not 
only eliminates repetition but also saves storage space, level of user interaction 
etc., hence makes the system more portable, lightweight and efficient. 
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RootContext 
-Name : string 
-ID: int 
-Type : string 
-TimeStamp : ulong 
-Location : string 
ProfileContext 
-PersonName : string 
-Status : string 
ý 
OfficeProfile 
-Skills : string 
-RoomNo : string 
-Tel. Ext : int 
-Usemame : string 
Figure 14 XML Schemas 
Status 
-Office : string 
-Home : string 
-Social : string 
-Health string 
ý 
HeathProfile 
-Insurance : string 
-BloodGroup : char 
-Medication : string 
-Username : string 
. '/'Set of pro j -c typE's 
prof ileTVpe = (Off ice, Social, Home, HealtCare) 
Action. Tvpe = (triggerCommnue. nication, rnakeAppoin. tment, bookTable} 
//relevant profile details 
p1DProfile_of fice 
=( Skills, corn 7nitnaents, ph oneNurn. b e-r, room, calendar } 
plDProfile_Home = {address, availabilitv, phoneNumber ) 
pl DPro f ile_Social = {Hobbies, phoneNurnber ) 
plDProf ile_HealtCare = {insurance, bloodGroup, medications, history} 
The above just show an example of elements that can be included in profileType, 
ActionType etc. Other things can also be included as and when needed. 
5.3.3 INFORMATION GRANULARITY 
In a context aware system, it is possible that the sharing of information between 
participating parties is of paramount importance for fulfilling a given common task 
to achieve an objective between users of Community of Interest (Col). The level of 
information shared or sent at any given time should be as minimal as possible for 
many reasons such as: limiting the bandwidth during transmission, particularly 
when the devices involved are small, reducing the amount of information that 
unauthorised users might intrude, and preventing users from building a whole 
profile of a user. 
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For these reasons, to reduce the amount of information sent and received within the 
network, we are proposing an algorithm for the flow of events depicted in Figure 15 
to be implemented in the Privacy Manager module for adjusting the granularity of 
information before sending. The process is initiated after receiving a query where a 
relevant policy will be checked. If the request is successful then this is passed on to 
the algorithm used to reduce the amount of information before sending. The `Adjust 
Required Information (Granularity)' process is triggered to allow users to be able to 
reduce the level of information that is to be sent to the node involved. The user will 
be given the option and an interface showing the current information available to 
other nodes. The user will then decide if he/she wants to reduce such information by 
providing a tick to the appropriate boxes that represent the user's various 
information. 
0 
Load 
Results 
Check Permission 
Information adjusted 
Load Policy and Rules 
Figure 15 Information Granularity 
5.6 DYNAMIC POLICY SPECIFICATION 
Currently policies are defined or specified as an integral part of the system either hard 
coded as a programming tool into the system or designed in a way that users 
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will be able to interact with the policy environment, without the need of having a 
superficially technical knowledge or understanding. Hence, there is a need for 
policy-based systems to have policy rules defined using declarative policy 
languages that are distinct from actual system programming languages. A key 
advantage of using declarative languages to express policies is that the defined 
policies are more suitable for humans to view and edit. In addition, by separating 
the logic (i. e. policy rules) from the control (i. e. program implementations) of the 
systems, policy-based security and privacy protection systems are typically more 
flexible and adaptable than other non-policy-based systems. Also by creating a 
suitable user-friendly interface, the use of policies and user control will be much 
more friendly and suitable for humans, especially when using small portable 
devices in dynamic ubiquitous environments. 
It is also important to emphasise users' desire privacy protection because they are 
concerned about the possible misuse of their information. However, this does not 
imply that they desire all of their information to be hidden from context-aware 
systems or that they want to know all the technical details required in setting up the 
required policies for their data usage. By completely prohibiting context-aware 
systems to share information, it will get in the way of the systems' ability to 
provide relevant services and information. The same principles apply, when 
editing or adding new policies to the systems becomes very complicated. This will 
deter potential users to adapt the usage of the systems. Hence, the reason above 
forms the basis of our motivation to provide a balanced system that is dynamic and 
adaptive. 
Our concept of dynamic policy specification is motivated by the work of Janicke et 
al. [124], a case study on NHS's policy specification [125], and the Cassandra 
access control policy [126]. By policy we mean a set of rules that can be used to 
determine if a given query will be materialized or not. The policy consists of a 
head and body. Initially to deduce the head of the rule, all the body predicates must 
be deducible in such a way that the constraint is also satisfied. The sequence of 
predicates on the right hand side of the arrow is the body of the rule, while the 
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head of the rule is on the left hand side of the arrow. Mathematically, a policy 
p can be expressed as p Re q F- Dec , where Re q 
is the set of access requests 
and Dec is the set of decisions made from the requests. Decisions can either be 
grant permission or deny access permission. Queries can be in two forms, 
perform an action or request credentials or information, which are explained 
further below: 
" Perform an action: the query corresponds to permit 
predicates/functions/procedures 
" Request: the query corresponds to can Re ad predicates and then the 
information itself 
permit and canRead functions are defined as follows: 
canReg(p, constraint) 
permit (p, item) 
In the case of canReg, this implies that the user with profile p is allowed to make a 
request for information based on the constraints constrain/ specified. Function 
permit means that the user with profile p is allowed or permitted to view or 
perform the action represented with the predicate item. 
Each function represents a rule, where each rule consists of either conjunctions or 
disjunctions only. All the rules on the body of the policy need to be faired in order 
to deduce the head of the rule. Our policy specification makes use of dynamic 
literals as shown in the equations below using propositional logic so as to meet the 
demanding nature of ad-hoc environments rather than just hard coding the rules in 
the rule engine. 
Dynamic Literals (L):: = A± P(X )} 
Dynamic Rulas (R):: = A +-L 
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Notation: the notation of a line above a variable, e. g. X, represents a (possibly 
empty) sequence of distinct variables X; ... X,,. PE Pr ed, AE Atom . This 
definition is based on the first order function-free 
j= (Const , Pred) with 
possibly infinite many constants Const and a set of finite predicates Pred . This 
generates a set of atoms that represents predicate names applied to equations of 
appropriate rules, denoted as Atom(A) .A policy P is a finite set of rules R. 
Using these connectives of propositional logic will allow us to define more 
complex predicates of our policy creation. These can be built from simpler ones in 
such a way that the truth or falsity of the compound in some binding depends only 
on the truth or falsity of the parts in the same binding. 
We use predicates for a variety of purposes. Dynamic predicate names represent 
actions (or access requests), and dynamic rules define the conditions and state 
updates associated with actions, so dynamic rules are also called action definitions. 
Starting from the basic atomic objects defined here, we can utilize Z composite 
types, mainly Sets, Cartesian products and Schemas ([127] P. 25), to define 
composite types as well as predicates. For example, the following rule: 
Delllnfo (u2 , f) F- Rang (u, , u2 ) 
represents a simple example of deleting a file f based on the function for the range 
between two devices, u, and u2 , where 
device u2 already stores f. This rule can 
be further expanded to check if a user u has a file f using a function has (u, f) with 
its result being true or false: 
Delllnfo( u2 ,f) +-- Rang (u, 9 u2 ), has(u2 , f) 
An owner of profile information or any information can also specify who is 
allowed to read and modify the information, e. g. 
can Re ad (u, f )F--, Sealed(u, f) 
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This implies that the user u can read the file/information f given that the 
information is not sealed by for the user. 
In general, the function to seal information takes three parameters: the owner of 
information x, the person or group y of individuals' devices that the information f 
is sealed from. This function is denoted as Seal(x, y, J). The + in front of the 
sealed function specifies the addition of the associated information to the existing 
list of sealed information - logical "and". 
Additionally, another function canSeal(x, y, J) is used to determine if a user x can 
conceal the information represented in f from another user y. This means that user 
y will not be able to view the information f. 
Seal (x, y, f) <- canSeal (x, y, f), + Sealed (y, f) 
In more general terms, we can define a rule to seal information as: 
Seal(who, whom, what) 
where each of the three parameters 
who, whom and what 
can be an- tuple parameter, e. g. 
who = (owner, area, group, user) 
We define a projection function to take the required element from an - tuple to 
represent any of the parameters of the Seal policy. That is 
X, ", Where n is the number of elements in the tuple and i is the i" element in the tuple 
So in the above 4-tuple of who, X; =owner, where the start and end parameters 
define the validity period of the sealed item, either in terms of time or distance. 
Generally speaking, we anticipate that any further dynamic rules can be derived 
from five special functions which are: 
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canRead, Read, DellInfo, has and canSeal 
By making use of this process, we aim to make the policy creation more 
expressive. Also by using procedures in the body of the dynamic rules, we aim to 
eliminate the problem of policy expressiveness in terms of conjunctions and 
disjunctions. Therefore, each procedure can be further expressed or simplified by 
just having conjunctions or disjunctions (using `and' or `or'). 
Our proposed methodology puts a user's dynamically defined policies at the 
forefront and only displays Context Information (Cl) that is relevant as well as 
allowing other Cl that meets such policies to view the presence of the user. 
Consequently, these methods can not only accomplish the requirements of context- 
aware services provision with privacy in ubiquitous environments, but also deliver 
only suitable contextual information or services based on the user's policy settings, 
or even attempt to provide a means of user control policy creation and make it 
more expressive for users. 
5.4.1 PARTIAL IDENTITY 
With regard to mobile devices, they have fixed identifiers which are built into the 
devices for their identifications. Such identities take into account locations data or 
coordinates and user identities (can either be defined by users or fixed from 
network providers) which enable users to enforce the protection of security and 
privacy. In the identity management in MANets, we are not only concerned with 
fixed identifiers, but also with other personal attributes of a user, as we are more 
interested in identifying and providing security to the user of a device rather than 
the device itself. Partial identities on the other hand are defined as a set of personal 
attributes of a user, e. g. his/her work address, home telephone number etc. They 
can also be categorized as: personal identity (PID), corporate identity (CID), and 
social identity (SID) [52]. Hence we can firstly define a basic identity set 
ParitiallD as {PID, CID, SID). 
95 
Hence, an identity of a person can comprise of many partial identities that help to 
represent a specific context or role of a person. As stated by Pfitzmann [128], 
partial identities consist of subsets of attributes of a complete identity. Looking at 
it from a technical point of view, these attributes are data. Hence, a pseudonym can 
be defined to be an identifier for a partial identity. Whereas an "identity" can be 
assumed to uniquely characterizes an individual, a partial identity may not do, 
thereby enabling different degrees of anonymity [128]. 
The issue of users controlling their identity information and privacy plays a crucial 
role in the motivation of this research work. To address the issue, we adopted a 
strategy of making use of identities and partial identities to form part of a multi- 
factor authentication principle. As highlighted in Figure 16, we have divided users' 
identity and presented an identity of an entity "Ababa", where the identity of 
"Ababa" is the combination of a number of partial identities such as work, health 
care and social. This will enable Ababa to have control over which partial identity 
he should make available for other users based on his commitments and 
requirements. Individual partial identities and a device identity can be used for a 
multi-factor authentication of the device when joining a network. 
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Identity Table 
UserlD 
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Figure 17 Identity Attributes 
Although there is a trade-off involved in terms of the processing of a second 
identity for each device, the benefits outweigh the drawbacks as users of' the 
MANet environment will be assured that they only hand over the information that 
is required for certain communication. This will help to eliminate the problem of 
identity theft and prevent the problem of impersonation attacks that are becoming a 
common problem in MANet environments [129]. Figure 17 further expands the 
attributes in Figure 16 as structured identity attributes organised into tables with 
relationships between them. Each of the tables defines a structure in a way that 
information/attributes disclosure will be kept to minimal and not propagated to the 
world. Each identity or partial identity can be mapped to multiple profiles; each 
profile table has a one to many relationships with the ProfileMapper table, while 
each identity table consists of several email tables. The ProfileMapper table can 
have and manage more than one profile type. This also allows each user identity in 
has 
0 
tA 
N 
.. 
has 
1 
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the identity table to appear in more than one profile table, i. e. social profile, home 
profile, work profile etc. 
Hence, user profiles are structured to contain various partial identities, and the 
structure is a 3-tuple consisting of: 
(IDeviceld, profile Type, plDprofle ) 
The profile information consists of attributes that the user has selected to present 
its current profiles, e. g., if the user is at work, his/her profile attributes might 
comprise his/her office room number, extension number, calendar commitments, 
etc. 
Here we define Profletype as an element of a set of partial profiles that represents 
the identity of an individual: 
profileTyp eE (Home, Of ce , Public, Police } 
or profileType is not limited to the elements of the set above, but users are able 
to define new profile types to suit their needs and to meet the conditions and needs 
of where their applications are deployed. For example, the element Police in the 
set above can be further divided into other sub-profiles, e. g. 
{Inspector, Constable, Sergent } 
To put this back into our earlier defined dynamic policy specification, we 
have profileType E P(X) Hence the profile type or setting of each individual is 
factored into the elements that constitute the policy of either the device or data 
within the device. We have also made use of only a dynamic access policy without 
the inclusion of the profile type when needed as well as using profile Type as the 
only element or constrains in a policy without the inclusion of other rules such as 
access policy - canRead, view etc. 
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5.5 CONTEXTRANK 
Sharing information by dynamically and automatically discovering contextual 
information within ubiquitous environments can greatly enhance the usability and 
adaptableness of context-aware applications/systems. However, there is a trade-off 
between how much and how little contextual information should be shared. To be 
more specific, how much of such information should be displayed to the users 
within Community of Interest (Col)? Many factors need to be addressed to 
determine how much contextual information should be available to each user 
within Col. For example, the information may include the role which a user is 
playing within Col, its device type (in terms of the screen size, processing power, 
security settings, etc), what information will be relevant to help the user achieve its 
objectives within Col, what other information the user can share with others, in 
what ways such information will be displayed, etc. 
In order to solve and answer the questions and concerns above, it is of overriding 
significance to comprehend the role of the users and give them the full influence 
on defining what possible contextual information will be able to help them within 
Col and ubiquitous MANet environments. When this is achieved, users within Col 
will make better use of contextual information and acclimatization of systems 
within ubiquitous environments. With this in mind, in UCIM we have presented an 
algorithm -ContextRank -that will help users define policies that will only display 
contextual information needed at any given time to help them fulfil their goal 
within Col. The algorithm will also be able to suggest and predict possible 
contextual information for the users based on their defined policies. 
The goal of the proposed ContextRank algorithm is to suggest new contextual 
information or to predict the utility of certain contextual information for a 
particular user based on the user's profile settings or defined policies. 
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Pl p2 
Figure 18 Profile Type and Context Information 
In a typical Col scenario, we suppose: 
" There are a set of m profile types, P={ pi, p2 ,... pm }, and a set of 
n contextual information items, C ={ c,, c2, ... cn }. 
" There is a set of 1 users, U={u, , u2,... u, }, where each user u, can have 
more than one profile type p, . 
" Each profile type p, has a set of contexts, C,, , which a given profile 
utilises or is associated with. Such usage or linkage is added up to a 
ranking score, generally within a numerical scale, by mining links with 
other contextual information and profiles. Note that C, cC (i. e. the set of 
the contextual information of profile type p, is a subset of the overall set 
of contextual information, C, and it is possible for C P, to 
be a null-set. 
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Figure 18 represents an example of a situation where there are three users with 
three different profile types represented as pi, p2 and p,,, respectively, and the 
availability of five contextual information items, C1, c2, ..., c,,. The links with 
arrows represent the connections between the profile types and contextual 
information items. 
The numbers of profile information and contextual information items can be 
different. Hence, the values shown in Figure 18 are not the same. For example, 
there can be 3 profile types and a set of 8 contextual information items. The 
number next to each line in Figure 18 represents how many times each profile type 
uses each of the contextual information items. For example, p, uses c1 once, and p2 
uses cl 4 times, c2 5 times and c3 4 times. 
The diagram in Figure 18 can also be represented by an adjacency matrix 
A= {a 
p,, 
} where each entry ap, is 1 if an edge exists between user profile p and 
context information c, and ap, =0 otherwise. 
We define the degree of a context information item c, to be the number of edges 
linked to c,, and denote it as dc. Additionally, we use Lp' to signify the number of 
usages from a profile type pl to c;. 
For example, the degree dd, of each context information item depicted in Figure 
18 is listed in Table 1, e. g. d, 2 = 
2. Note that degree dd, only counts the number of 
edges linked to context information item c;. The number associated with an edge 
from profile type pj to c, is represented by Lc' . 
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Table 1 Edge Weight 
CI 
3 
C2 
2 
C3 
2 
C4 
1 
C, 
1 
Moreover, the value of Lý' for each pair of profile type pj and context information 
c; in Figure 18 is given in the table below, e. g. Lz = 4: 
Table 2 Relationship between p and c 
Cl C2 C3 C4 Cn 
pi 1 0 0 0 0 
P2 4 5 4 0 0 
p,,, 2 1 1 1 1 
There are several conditions to be aware of when it comes to displaying contextual 
information in a given order within the system: 
" New contextual information c becomes available within the system - 
recommendation of the importance of such information should be based on 
similarities with the existing information and profile types. 
"A new link is established from a profile p and a contextual information 
item c, where both p and c already exist. This will elicit the increase in 
the importance of c within the system to reflect its usage within the 
algorithm. 
" New profile p is introduced to the environment. The framework should be 
able to compare new p with existing ones and suggest possible contextual 
information that will be useful top. 
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" New p and c- the framework should use similarities between the 
information and profile in recommendation for usage. 
From the above description, it is clear that our proposed ContextRank concept is 
inspired by the PageRank algorithm [99]. It will display the top contextual 
information relevant to a given profile type and its security settings. 
We will define a method to predict the likelihood for associating a profile p to a 
contextual information item c. The method will be able to predict the likelihood 
because we assumed that if a similar profile p has used a similar context c, then 
there is the possibility that a newly introduced context similar to c or profile 
similar to p will associate itself with p or c. This is also based on the social identity 
theory discussed in section 5.3.1 and presented in Figure 12. This method is 
defined to aid in recommending contextual information c to the user of profile p. 
The method requires that for a given new profile p, select the most used contextual 
information for p from the set of all existing context items in {c,, c2, c3, ..., c}. '1'o 
do this, assume that there is a set of k profiles, P= {p,. i, ..., Pvk}, each of which is 
similar top. For every context item cý (1 <j < n), to determine whether c, should be 
recommended top, the following equation is used to calculate the average usage of 
cj by the similar profiles in P: 
Fn,. =( ii L°s' )/k (7) 
Here, L, ''' is the number of usages associated with the link between profile p,, and 
context item c;, If Fp exceeds a pre-set threshold 1, (i. e. 
recommended top. 
F >1) c; is 
A similar method can be used to decide whether a new context item c should be 
recommended to an existing profile. Suppose that (, '= ic,. i, ..., c. 5,,,, } denotes the set 
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of all context items similar to c. For each profile p, (1 <i< m), compute the 
following average usage of the context items in C by p,: 
IF',;., 
_(; I Ln; ýý,, )/ ý' (g) 
If F'P is greater than a pre-set threshold t,, (i. e. F',,, > tp), c is recommended to 
Pi. 
For example, if a new profile p is introduced to Figure 18, which is assumed to be 
only similar to two existing profiles p2 and p,,, in the figure, i. e. P={ p21 pal'}, then 
we have the following calculations for context items c, and C4: 
F,, =(L2' +L, ° )/2 = (4+2)/2 =3, and 
F, =(Lr; +Lý'')/2=(0+1)/2=0.5. 
If threshold t, is set to be 2, then only ci is recommended top due to F,, > 2, but 
c4 is not suggested to p because of Fr4 ,<2. 
Similar calculations for the other 
three context items in the figure can be done to determine whether they should be 
recommended to p. 
The above method is able to calculate the likelihood of associating a given profile 
type to a given context item because we assumed that if a profile has used a 
context item many times, then it is reasonable to suggest that such an information 
item is useful to the profile. Hence, if another profile similar to the one in 
consideration is introduced in the environment, we can recommend the same item 
to the new profile so as to help to improve the security of the system and reduce 
computation resources required to identify possible contextual information to use. 
The new profile can reject and not use the suggested contextual information with 
little or no impact to the security of the whole system. 
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5.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have presented the proposed UCIM together with its modules 
and methods. Some of the significant features of UCIM that makes it unique and 
novel include: the use of contextual information, user-centricity, ability to define 
policies dynamically in an ad-hoc manner and the ability to filter contextual 
information using the defined policies. The next chapter will concentrate on 
providing the implementation results of UCIM based on lab tests, deployment of 
some of the modules in a real test bed and use of real devices with simulated 
scenarios that aim to represent real life events. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
UCIM IN MANETS IMPLEMENTATION 
Most of the frameworks for identity management strive to be general purpose and 
able to provide minimal protection for identity and most importantly lack the 
facility of allowing users to be able to manage their identities themselves. But all 
control is down to the application itself and they are mainly targeting fixed 
networks. This is clearly a very hard challenge, and as we presented earlier, it 
causes problems in ubiquitous computing. In this chapter, we introduce our 
proposed UCIM framework and simulation/Lab testing, an adaptive and resource- 
efficient identity management system with a novel policy specification, context- 
awareness and flexible user-centric design. By working together with user defined 
policies, it can reliably and effectively allow users to create partial identities, 
manage such identities and be able to minimise and prevent data misuse and data 
mishandling. This can further be enhanced by creating an expiry date for partial 
identities and monitoring whom such information is passed on to and how they can 
utilize it. UCIM is suitable for heterogeneous environments such as ubiquitous 
networks with devices known to have less processing power and capabilities. It has 
the following features: a reliable policy creation tool, a resource-efficient identity 
management scheme, a user-centric approach, and context-aware and flexible 
system architecture. 
In this chapter we have presented different examples of implementations and 
simulation results. This is mainly focused on and explained via the use of 
motivational scenarios. Section 6.1 is concentrated on a scenario based on crisis 
management (section 6.1.1) in a controlled Community of Interest (Col), where a 
level of pre-agreed policy is used. This also requires the use of an element of a 
centralised point of control as "the Gold Command" control room. Moreover, the 
role and impact of identity management in SoS is presented in section 6.1.3. 
Section 6.2 provides more details of the functionality of MATTS and its 
simulating environment. Section 6.3 mainly provides the implementations of our 
proposed ContextRank methodology. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 provide more details on 
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our dynamic policy modules and how our solutions are more user-centric and 
allow a dynamic, secure and user control policy definition. In section 6.5, we have 
demonstrated the dynamism and portability of the UCIM modules; this is done by 
integrating one of the UCIMs modules into another P2P framework for a secure 
home gateway. 
Before going into the details of our implementation, we first present an overview 
of what our implementation has covered. We make reference to individual 
modules within the framework and how those modules are linked together in our 
implementation. To do so, we re-present our proposed framework in Figure 19 to 
highlight the modules that we have fully implemented and those that we have 
partially implemented or made assumptions of using other available sources of 
information for the modules. 
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Figure 19 UCIM Implemented Modules 
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As shown in Figure 19, the modules with solid blue lines have been fully 
implemented, and those with doted blue lines have been partially implemented, 
while the one with doted red lines has not been directly implemented but the 
implementation in the simulator used provides the functionality of this module. 
The context provider module has not been fully implemented. We first assumed 
that other available context sensing tools are available and the framework will be 
able to plug those tools. In our implementation we have only used contextual 
information within the simulated environment but have not acquired any other 
outside contextual information. The context information that we have used is the 
list of nodes/devices available within the simulating environments and the 
properties of such devices. The implementation and test results shown in sections 
6.2 and 6.3 provide the proof of concept for this module. 
For the context server module, in our current implementation we have stored the 
available context (list of devices/nodes) within the environment as a list. This is 
then stored within the server environment of MATTS (Mobile Agent Topology 
Test System, which will be introduced in sections 6.1 .1 and 6.2). Other nodes can 
request such information when needed, especially when first joining the network. 
The context requestor module has not been implemented as a standalone module 
but has been incorporated within the MATTS server environment. This allows a 
joining or any device to use the pull method to request information from the server. 
An example is shown on Figure 26 where if the user wants to send a file to other 
devices, then the list of all available nodes are first loaded in the form and the user 
selects from the available list. 
The personal information module has been implemented by allowing users to 
define their profile information and that of the devices. This has been done by 
providing various interfaces such as the node property interface, of which full 
details are presented in section 6.4.3 and Figures 45,46 and 47 respectively. 
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The contextual data module is implemented within MATTS, where the list of 
available nodes/devices are collected and stored; this can be used to send it to the 
devices when needed. Figures 27 and 28 provide further details. 
The policy and rules module has been implemented within our proposed 
framework by providing interfaces that will enable users to perform such a 
function. Sections 6.4.3 on the policy interface and section 6.4.4 for policy logic 
provide further information and the proof of concept for this module. The results 
are also shown in Figures 48,49,50,51,52 and 53. 
The profile information and privacy manager modules are implemented as part of 
the MATTS's server and contextRank simulation environments as presented in 
sections 6.4 and 6.3 respectively. 
To demonstrate how the various modules within the framework are linked; we 
make use of scenarios such as the Boundary check problem in section 6.1.1, 
Identity Management in SoS in sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3, and the home gateway 
scenario in section 6.5 as well as other scenarios within chapter 6. 
To facilitate the understanding of our implementation, we first present an overall 
motivating solution to System-of-Systems (SoS) composition security problems as 
scenarios. We have also demonstrated two such problems with SoS that we have 
implemented. The rest of the implementation follows on from this motivating 
scenario and where appropriate we also present a simpler scenario for some of the 
modules of UCIM in order for the reader to be able to follow through the reasons 
behind such implementations. 
6.1 SCENARIOS 
In this section we will present some motivating scenarios used in the 
implementation of our framework. This is done so as to help the reader to follow 
through our implementation and to make things clearer. 
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6.1.1 SOS COMPOSITION SCENARIO (CRISIS MANAGEMENT) 
As an illustrative example, consider the following fictional scenario - during a 
public event, multiple agencies and organisations who form a community of 
interest (Col) must work together to ensure that the event proceeds smoothly, 
especially if an emergency situation develops. In our example, the set of 
emergency services and organisations shown in Figure 20 have formed a 
composed system in order to easily share data for the purpose of managing an 
event. Due to their differing areas of responsibility, the different parties will have 
different security standards. However, for the purposes of managing a public 
event, data collected by each party may be useful to the others for identifying 
malicious activities and to help maintain public order. As a result, each party 
within Col will need to protect their personal information, to be able to manage 
their identities and may obtain temporary access to certain areas of the other 
parties' database systems. This type of system presents an ideal example for use 
in demonstrating various scenarios such as identity management issues, data 
transfer between organisations, data mishandling issues, profile building and 
boundary checking principles. 
Gold 
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Figure 20 SoS Composition Scenario 
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The roles assigned to each system or component and their security properties are as 
shown in Table 3. Each component within the system needs to cooperate with each 
other so as to be able to resolve the scenario involved in the crisis management 
situation. Each system might need to share its resources or information that is 
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deemed relevant and necessary to help resolve and prevent any further disastrous 
event within the composed system. Specifically, the Sensitivity Level represents 
the importance of a component and its data in the composed system. Sensitivity 
levels range between 0-9, where 0 is the highest and 9 is the lowest. The 
Encryption Strength is represented in an "Algorithm-Key Length" format. A 
component may support more than one encryption algorithm with various key 
lengths. The algorithms and key lengths listed in Table 1 are those used by the 
components to establish external connections. The Encryption Strength is broadly 
ordered from weak to strong as: WEP-114, RC2-128, TDES-168, AES-256 [130]. 
The encryption strengths depicted in this demo can be expanded to include other 
cryptosystems such as public-key ones. But for the demonstration reason only, we 
selected some of the most widely used and known cryptosystems. The `Staff 
Skills' property considers the technical knowledge and IT skills of each 
organisation's staff. It might be measured based on training courses that have been 
attended or certificates obtained. We simply categorise it into levels of Low, Mid, 
and High. Finally, the use of firewalls and IDS are also considered. Defined 
properties are saved as an XML file. 
To demonstrate the above scenario, we need to employ a simulation tool MATTS 
standing for the Mobile Agent Topology Test System. This tool is created as part 
of a project undertaken within the School of Computing & Mathematical Sciences 
at Liverpool John Moores University. Full details of the project and MATTS can 
be found in MATTS's manual [131], and a summary of MATTS is provided 
below. MATTS has been designed principally to allow the testing of secure 
component composition analysis techniques. Full details and functionality of 
MATTS relevant to this framework are provided in section 6.2. 
The code that is used for sending the property described earlier to MATTS and 
others nodes is represented in Figure 21, while the actual code that sends the XML 
file is presented in Figure 22. Before initiating any communication either with 
MATTS or other mobile clients, the intending devices need to first establish 
connection. Currently it is done via socket connection with its code represented in 
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Figure 23. After successful connection, each user within Col is able to define and 
communicate their required policies so as to minimise the misuse of identity 
information and enhance identity management within the composed system. 
Code 1: Sending Properties of Node/Device 
private void SendPropatySdO 
/ Send the property set file to the receiver 
Fi leStrrun readStreatn = 
new FileStream(Contigurition. DEVICE PROPERTYSEr FILE_LONG, File\lode. Open, FileAcce>ý. Read); 
SendTxt("SEND_PROPERTYSET "+ node]]) +""+ readStreamLength); 
i 
i 
1} 
i 
Y Now actually send the file 
SendFile sf=new Sen IFllc(readStream, sock, false); 
sf. ShowDialogO; 
sf = null; 
ýi; ý ýý Ritl'. 111aiý; % 
7 1Send the node's properties to the server 
ýr 1'surnh' si ý 
private void SendPropertiesO 
{ 
i! Send the property Tile to the receiver 
FileStreamreadStream=new FileStre. nn(i', mti;; w rtin; t. DEVICE PROFI. E_FILE_LONG, Filc\l l(:. Open, I ilc: \ne. x. Read); 
SendTxt("SEND_PROPERTIES "+ nodelD +""+ readStream. Length); 
1! Now actually send the file 
SeudFllc sf= new ScndFilc(rcadStream, sock, false); 
sf. ShowDialogO; 
of= null; 
} 
Figure 21 Sending Properties of Node/Device 
The code presented in Figure 21 contains a section of the code that locates the 
property files of the node that is trying to connect to another node or MATTS. It 
TABLE 3. ROLES INVOLVED IN THE DEMONSTRATION AND THEIR SI ('I'RI IY PROI'P. Rlll S. 
Kole 
Police 
Ambulance Service 
Mobile Network Operator 
1)cpartment of Transport 
Banks 
I lospitals 
Fire and Rescue Service 
[vent Organiser 
Se2rilirily lriel hin-option 
. S7mr? {/b Ský//. Sk!! h I im)) id/ 11 M 
0 : V-'S-25G Ili}; h 1'cs 1'cs 
3 R(12-128 Mid Y. No 
3 '11)IiS-16S Mid Yes Ycs 
3 'I'UI": S-168 IA, w ), (.. % No 
0 : \FS-256 Ili}; h Yes Ycs 
4 
. \I": S-256 Mid Ycs No 
5 W1 ? 1'-114 Iligh N., No 
5 K(: 2 -12H I.,, \a N., N., 
takes the file and sends it to the MATTS service. The MATTS server then 
interprets the file after receiving it, allows the node to join the network, populates 
the node with its property, and reconfigure the whole network based on the 
property of the new node. Here, it is worth pointing out that in the UCIM design 
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and implementation, we have not addressed the issue of key management that is 
beyond the scope of this project. 
Let us assume an attacker is trying to break into a Police computer network and 
steal valuable data such as information concerning criminal proceedings, or the 
user identity information so as to impersonate them. However, the attempt fails 
because the defence mechanism adopted by the Police is too strong for the attacker 
to penetrate. Therefore, one of his alternatives is to attack via other systems that 
are connected to the Police system, for example, the Event Organiser's system. 
Knowing this, the attacker shifts his attention from the Police to the Event 
Organiser's workstations. Suppose that due to lower security requirements, the 
Event Organiser is running a server suffering from a flaw that can be exploited by 
the attacker. The attacker can use this flaw to gain access to the Event Organiser's 
system, and it is then straightforward for him to gain access to the Police data 
through the connection between the Event Organiser's system and the Police 
system. However, in normal circumstances the Event Organiser is not allowed to 
access the Police data, but if the attacker is able to explore some weakness within 
the Event Organiser's system, there is a possibility of gaining access to some 
valuable and/or sensitive information that comes from the police systems. 
If the user of the Event Organiser's system has specified a stronger policy in such a 
way that his/her information cannot be passed from other third parties, and if the 
policy specified is rightly enforced, then the attacker will not be able to obtain such 
information. Hence, the attack will not be successful. On the other hand, if the 
specified policy has been inappropriately enforced, the attacker will be able to gain 
access to such information. At the same time, if a boundary check to be introduced 
in the next sub-section was performed when external devices or organisations 
attempted to join the composed system, such weaknesses could be exposed, and 
appropriate measures taken to address them. We will demonstrate how this could 
be done for the systems described in the scenario. 
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The code presented in Figure 22 performs the function of sending any XMI, file 
between the nodes or the nodes and MATTS server. It first locates a file, and reads 
the content of the file into a stream reader. It then sends the stream across the 
network connection. It also creates a new file on the other end and copies the 
stream into the new file. The new file will be available for the intended recipient to 
make use of. Any exceptions/errors that occur within this process are thrown as 
required. The code in Figure 23 is used to create a new socket that allows the 
nodes/devices to be connected to the service. It first creates a new socket, checks 
its IP address and port, and calls the connect () function within the code. When 
connection is successful, it disables and enables relevant user interface functions 
on the device. 
Code 2: Sending XML Files 
/! send the vnl file to Jlatls 
private void Send3 MLToMattsO 
1c 
data= "1nitialization; "; beginning of the data to send, indicating the 
'purpose is to send the device profile/initialise 
try i YfileStrem read content of a file for sedning 
Pilcs'trc: unradztream=new I ilc ür. nn(i', mti_nr: ai, ui. DEVICE_PROFflE_FLLE_LONo, fi. -o-i, open, 1 I, 
I ce, >. Read). 
i ý XMLFileData = new byte(readstreamLength]; readatrcam. Read(XMLFileData, 0, XMLFikeDataLength); 
//attach the mmlie of the profile 
data +=i'ctdic tratio, t. DEVICE_PROFI E_FIIE_LONO+ 
sw. Write(data)J'sending "Initiatization. Proftle natne: 
aw. Write(XMIFIIeDatLLength); üsend the length of the profile 
sw. Write(XNI FileDsta) /sending the actual content of the profile file 
catch (1'. ý'. L CIA I Of IX) 
{ 
} 
} 
stawsBar. Invoke(new ti ct: >t; i(ii, I t ir f c. t l? clcgat c(ihis. SCLStawsBalTpQ), exMaoage. ToSUirW): 
Figure 22 Sending XML Files 
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Code 3: Establish Connection 
public void Coc ectToServerO /'changc privatc to public 
{ 
,. niti: Jisation oCconununiadione 
autu/Bttr. Text 
iPep = ý. 'ý di cý n. d f n. IP_ADDRFSS: 
 ervcr=ncw Sckct(A , 4LIl). $ItRNdwork. 
. 
So ck ct' 1')p e. 3treatn. I'r, aocol l\ h c. Tep): 
/'stmt cotutecting, if success, enablddisable buttons 
try 
{ 
s erver. C onnect(ipep); 
Send. Enabled = tnir, 
btnBrowse. Frabled - true; 
ncnin Enabled = falsc: 
catdi (ýýxL. cll(ý: ccpriýni) 
{ 
ý 
statusBar. Texd = "Unable to connect to server"; 
Sen&Enabled a false; 
btnBr'owsaEnabled = false; 
retum. 
n. = new '-n%, i1. Sn . il r(iver): 
w-new Ii a rm'Kca. l" (tv): 
sw= new 13i u. e \\I it c, (to); 
try 
{ 
//Sand the "Hello" Message to iudicatc presence of dev icc 
} 
cntch (I(. ccPn) 
() 
} 
Figure 23 Establish Connection 
6.1.1A THE BOUNDARY CHECKING PROBLEM 
A boundary checking scenario is used to see how a user will be able to protect its 
identity and other information when other users/nodes are involved outside the 
boundary of the initial system configuration. As we have also integrated our work 
into the domain of secure system components composition, the boundary checking 
is perhaps the most effective and sensible procedure in secure components 
composition as well as user identity and information protection within a system. In 
general, by exploiting a weak external interface provided by one component, an 
attacker can get access to critical information originally well protected by other 
components. To prevent it, a boundary check should cover many security-related 
aspects along the communication channels between a composed system and the 
external world. As an example, the security properties that need to be checked 
might include the server version and its last update date as well as an automated 
scan of server-side vulnerabilities. It may then be possible to make a sound 
judgment about the system based on the information checked [132J. 
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Figure 24 A composed system of trusted internal nodes, with no external 
connectivity. 
Figure 25 A composed systems with a connection to the outside. 
To aid with the explanations in the scenario, two examples are presented in Figure 
24 and Figure 25. In Figure 24, a composed system is shown consisting of internal 
nodes only. As all the nodes are trusted by each other because they form a Col 
among themselves, and there is no connectivity to the outside, the security 
properties of the individual nodes are assumed to be acceptable to all of the 
organisations involved. In Figure 25, a connection is desired between one of the 
internal nodes and an un-trusted external node whose security properties are 
unknown. The internal node is now known as a boundary node and its security 
capabilities are important for protecting the composed system from the external 
node. Therefore, the boundary node security properties must be at a level that 
complies with the prescribed security policy for the composed system in order for 
the connection to be allowed. 
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This topology is also represented in the MATTS modelling environment as shown 
in Figure 27. In this figure, the modelling environment shows the various nodes of 
the composed system (shown as labelled circles -P is the Police, E is the Event 
organiser, M is a Mobile network operator, B is a Bank, T is the Department of 
Transport, R is the Rescue team and fire service, A is the Ambulance service and + 
is a Hospital). The circle in the top right corner of the display is a visual indicator 
of the results of boundary check system analysis. The system analysis indicator 
turns green to indicate an acceptable network configuration, and turns red if a 
boundary node / nodes do not meet the specified security policies. In such a 
situation, communication between the boundary nodes and the external nodes 
would be denied and the location of the offending boundary node / nodes causing 
the security problem would be highlighted. 
Having established details of the new device, MATTS adds the new node with 
appropriate connections to the network model and uses this to perform a re- 
evaluation of the network properties. If the new network model is considered 
secure, then the new device is allowed to communicate with the boundary node 
and the result is used to assign appropriate rights to the connected device. 
Otherwise, the connection is not permitted. A re-evaluation is triggered each time 
the connection structure changes, i. e., a device wishes to connect to a boundary 
node or withdraw from the network. 
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Please select the file/data you want to 
send using the fie browser options 
below. 
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Send 
Browse I 
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Cancel Get IP 
Figure 26 Sending Files between Organisations once connected to the Network 
using a PDA. 
If such a connection is allowed, the user is then given the opportunity to interact 
with other organisations' devices (either real or modelled) that are present on the 
network, e. g. by sending a file to another organisation using a PDA as shown in 
Figure 26. 
M Mobil. Agent Topology T. st Symm 
Figure 27 Initial Network 
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Figure 28 Analysed Network 
Returning to the scenario and the application of this policy, if a PDA were to 
connect to the Police, Mobile Network Operator, Bank or Hospital, the system 
analysis indicator highlighted on the network topology screen would turn green to 
indicate an acceptable configuration, assuming that the security properties of these 
organisations' systems and PDA meet the given security policy. It' the PDA 
connects to any other organisation that does not meet the specified security 
policies, e. g. the Event Organiser, the indicator would turn red and communication 
between the nodes would be denied as shown in Figure 28. In addition, a visual 
indicator is presented in order to highlight the location of the offending boundary 
node or nodes causing the security problem. 
Tests of the system using this configuration show that it is able to effectively 
identify potentially unsafe boundary connections based on the policy, and that it is 
able to achieve run-time re-evaluation as the network topology changes. Through 
the identification of unsafe boundary connections, it is easy to establish which 
nodes in the network constitute an increased risk due to their external network 
interfaces. Greater security can then be applied to these nodes as required. By 
being able to properly detect issues resulting from boundary check related 
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problems, we are able to detect attackers both within and outside the composed 
system from access to user identity information as well as other information. At 
the same time, we are able to give the users full control of their personal 
information by allowing them to define the relevant required policies. This process 
provides an efficient user centred identity management platform within Col. 
Proper detection and protection of user identity information within the boundary of 
Col in SoS is one element that addresses the problem of identity theft and other 
issues. However, there should be a time when users within Col need to use their 
own devices. Hence, proper identity provision & preservation and authorisation & 
authentication are also of crucial importance. These form the focuses of the next 
section, where we will extend the above scenario to make use of a test bed for a 
verification of our work. 
6.1.2 IDENTITY MANAGEMENT IN SOS 
Establishing an IM policy within a single entity is undemanding compared to 
situations of Col. Therefore, establishing an IM strategy can be a challenging task 
for Col because of its heterogeneity in technology, standards, and identity 
management implementations. This takes a new dimension when we are dealing 
with SoS because of the need to have interoperable IM across multiple systems. 
However, implementing it in a SoS coalition's crisis management environment 
presents inimitable challenges. Coalition activities or events in regular day-to-day 
work and involvement always prove to be difficult when it comes to agreeing on 
how to use personal identity information. 
This is more so when at the same time trying to allow users from different 
organisations to make use of their own devices. Consequently, it is more 
problematic when it comes to natural or man-made crises that can result in 
widespread damage to the information infrastructure with large-scale financial, 
environmental and/or human losses. This can affect the emergency services' 
(police, fire and medical) ability to communicate with restrictions on the sharing of 
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information, making it difficult for them to provide emergency services to the 
population. The availability of important information can play a vital role in 
humanitarian assistance. Emergency ad-hoc communication networks could be 
established in order to operate and provide emergency services. 
Identity management solutions typically consist of various functionalities. The 
details of such functionalities are summarised in other publications, e. g. [1331. In 
this section, we are mainly concerned with two main functionalities: identity 
provision & preservation and authorisation & authentication. So these attributes 
are of crucial importance in SoS for managing services such as access control of 
resources based on specified policies and criteria such as roles, device types, and 
sensitivity of information within SoS. Life-cycle management of user profiles and 
other information within Col in SoS is also essential in terms of who should access 
such information and share it with whom, what level of details is required, etc. 
However, as can be seen below, a successful implementation of identity 
management within a SoS Crisis Management situation or SoS environment 
provides a number of benefits. Some of such benefits include: quicker 
development of SoS, minimisation of identity duplicates, diminishing of privacy 
and security violations, reducing data and profile misuse, the ability to make use of 
partial identities, etc. However, to be able to succeed in doing so, we need to make 
the systems more user-centric in nature. 
Building from the scenario in the section 6.1.1 above and Figure 20, we assume 
four individuals from various agencies and command structures are involved to 
help resolve the situation within the incident. In the case of this scenario we have a 
Gold command officer from the Police, a Silver command member from the 
ambulance service, a Bronze command member from a location where the incident 
has happened, and a volunteer who is there to help. 
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The Gold commanders or officers are in overall control of their organisation 
resource at the incident. They will not be on site, but will be based in a control 
room. These consist of officers from various agencies involved in the scenario. 
They will be responsible for formulating the strategy for dealing with the incident. 
The Silver commanders or officers on the other hand are those that are on ground 
within the surrounding of the disaster/scene but are not directly involved and are in 
charge of all their resources. They report back to the Gold commanders. They 
decide how to best utilise their resources so as to achieve the strategic aims of the 
Gold Commanders as well as determining the tactics to be used. At the scene of 
the event, each Silver commander works in proximity and harmony with other 
Silver commanders from other agencies. They will not be directly involved in 
dealing with the incident. The Bronze commanders from each agency involved in 
the incident are those officers that are directly involved in dealing with the 
incident. They directly control the organisations/agency resources at the incident 
and will be working with their staff to deal with the incident. 
We assume that each of the individuals involved is equipped with their own 
computing devices (e. g. laptops or smart mobile phones) containing valuable 
information that is of crucial importance in helping with the sequence of events 
within the incident. Hence, it is of paramount importance that each user is able to 
make use of their own devices; their information should be kept as secure as 
possible; other members within Col should be able to request relevant information 
from other members; and individual identities within Col need to be verified and 
authenticated. The fifth node within this scenario is the MATTS server that is used 
as a central focus for authenticating data and forwarding information as required. 
Details of the scenario and its implementation results based on a test bed are 
presented in the next sub-section. 
6.1.3A OUTDOOR EXPERIMENT USING MESH NETWORK TESTBED 
In this experiment the MATTS application has been improved to allow testing of 
UCIM, by adding modules and applications together with other functionalities. 
Specifically the extension includes an integration of several tools: 
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"A secure sandboxed virtual machine, helping in keeping different 
processes and applications in separate partitions, so as to isolate them 
from the system and enhance security of the system. 
"A mobile code framework, allowing communication between agents 
running on different network nodes. 
"A composition analysis tool, and a formal analysis tool, for analysing the 
systems for any security breaches or access requests. The tools perform 
the main analysis job regarding any interaction between the nodes within 
the system. 
Using these tools, a user can model pre-crisis scenarios and a crisis management 
response emergency network using different nodes, assign security and non- 
security properties to these nodes, and perform a vulnerability analysis of the 
modelled network. 
To summarise the scenario described so far, we have the following: 
" The partners have their own devices, e. g. laptops/netbooks, PDAs, or 
smart mobile phones. 
" The devices have policies and property files as shown in (Figure 29) pre- 
loaded. The policy file illustrated in Figure 29 demonstrates that each 
policy contains a device name, a device type, and the organisation of the 
device owner/user, the role of the user, the sensitivity level of the 
information to be shared, and the user's authorization level. 
" As they try to join the network using the AWDS protocol to be discussed 
further later, their policy and property files will be sent to the network to 
define which of the other partners will be able to view their presence, 
share information with them, etc. 
The profile or information from each Col member is stored in a XML file created 
using the property interface application, which includes: 
" Device type (e. g. laptop, netbook, PDA, or mobile phone) 
" Organisation (e. g. police, military, hospital, emergency, or volunteer) 
" Role (e. g. gold, silver, or bronze) 
" Sensitivity level (0-9) 
" Authorisation level (0-9) 
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1'? xml version-"1.0"? > 
I<PropertySet> 
<Property id-"Name" type-"string" /> 
<Property id-"Type" type-"option" /> 
<Property id-"Id" type-"int" rergeflin-"O" /> 
<Property id-"Access Control" type-"tool" /> 
] <Property id-"Staff Skills" type-"option"> 
<Option emus-"l">Lo4</Option> 
<Option eniun 2">Hedium</Option> 
<Option enure "3">H1gh</Opt ion> 
</Property> 
<Property id-"Physical Security" type-"int" /> 
<Property id-"Period of Inactivity" type-"float" /> 
</PropertySet> 
Figure 29 XML Property File 
Each user within Col will only be allowed to join the network if its policy is in 
compliance with the network system's policy. Each request of identity intormation 
will also need to be made after the initial authentication. The owner of the 
information has full control on the policy regarding how, whom and when such 
information should be used or forwarded to. To provide a proof of concept for this 
scenario, we have conducted an outdoor experiment using a test bed of 5 
laptops/netbooks running the Ubuntu Operating System [1341 with the capability 
of creating a mobile ad-hoc network. This is achieved through the use of the Ad- 
hoc Wireless Distribution Service (AWDS) [135] installed on the netbooks. 
AWDS is used due to the benefits it offers over other available mesh networking 
protocols, such as being open source software, running in user space, and more 
importantly operating in the layer 2 of the network. This results in an Ethernet- 
based LAN like experience for connectivity requiring no IP addresses, meaning 
that Layer 3 is left free to deploy any required protocols. 
Figure 30 AWDS Topology Viewer screen shot showing node connectivity 
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Figure 31 Mobile ad-hoc network in a 100 square metre area using five netbooks 
These features allow us to control the connectivity and communication rules within 
our scenario based on the individual devices' XML property tiles. AWI)S also 
provides a topology viewer (Figure 30) that allows the user to access a 
visualisation of the nodes in the network in real time. 
Figure 32 MATTS Interface for IM in SoS 
Figure 31 provides a 100 square metre representation of our outdoor experiment 
using a mobile ad-hoc network on five netbooks representing individuals from the 
Col as discussed earlier. In this experiment four of the netbooks represent each of 
the four individual users within the CoI and the fifth netbook acts as the MAVFS 
server. Each of these netbooks has defined their own policies using the policy 
interface shown in Figure 45 and Figure 46, and has other identity information 
stored as XML files. This experiment has demonstrated a case where the volunteer 
node could access the information of the police node, which would violate the 
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system security policy. This is because the volunteer node was not secure enough 
to have access to confidential information such as those stored in the police node. 
This situation was identified by the MATTS node, so any request from the 
volunteer node for access to the police node's information was rejected. This is 
shown in Figure 32 with the affected nodes highlighted in red, with their properties 
displayed in the box next to the nodes. 
The mobile ad-hoc network test bed described above allows the simulation of the 
scenario with the benefit of executing in a real world. It provides the means of 
connecting multiple wireless nodes, avoids the need to have a consistent managed 
infrastructure, or can be used in areas where the infrastructure may be unavailable. 
The mobile ad-hoc network capabilities make it an attractive choice for mobile 
devices because of the benefits it offers, which are self-healing, self-managing, and 
providing a quite reliable network because every node serves as a relay for the 
other nodes in the network, if managed properly. 
These benefits will be of crucial importance in a crisis situation where the 
attendees are likely to have devices that offer network connectivity through 
wireless means such as PDAs, laptops and mobile phones, and the traditional static 
infrastructure based communications are damaged. 
The network connection mentioned previously will allow the sharing and gathering 
of information and data about the situation that can be used by the command and 
control structures to inform the decisions made [136]. 
The interface for this server-side software using IM in SoS is shown in Figure 32. 
The figure shows nodes from various interconnected organisations. In the upper 
right corner of the interface the `X' indicates a security problem has been 
identified in the network that involves multiple nodes simultaneously. This 
provides a notification. The dialogue on the left in Figure 32 shows how the user 
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can modify the properties of a node in order to manage the model. This also 
provides a means of resolving security issues by making suitable changes to node 
properties (e. g., by increasing staff skills assigned to the node). 
After establishing the required authentication, another issue that is of paramount 
importance with Col in SoS is how the information transferred from one member 
in Col to other is used. The information could be mishandled and possibly used for 
profile building by attackers of Col. These are the focuses of the next sub-section. 
6.1.3 DATA MISHANDLING AND PROFILE BUILDING 
Data mishandling/forwarding and gradual profile building, possibly for some 
malicious intent, is one of the serious concerns in ubiquitous computing as a result 
of the growing threat in identity theft. In general, being able to forward certain 
confidential information from the original intended recipient of the data based on 
its fulfilment of the policy required or trust of the data owner without the 
knowledge or approval of the owner might result in serious consequences. Also, 
gradually storing partial identity information of a user from one social event or 
interaction to another might result in an array of partial profiles that when put 
together might reveal more than what the users might want to reveal to anyone. 
Hence, a process of being able to control the usage of information after its initial 
exchange is of curial importance. Also by exploiting a weak external interface 
provided by one user, an attacker can get access to critical information originally 
well protected by other users, if these information is not fully protected from being 
forwarded or is allowed to stay with the other user after the expiry of its usage. To 
prevent it, the owner of the information should be able to define policies to cover 
many security-related aspects along the communication channels between a 
networking system and the external world. As an example, the security properties 
that need to be checked might include that if the distance between the users is 
violated, the information should be automatically deleted; and the information 
should only be available for a given duration; and there should be the ability to 
automatically check against such rules. It may then be possible to make a sound 
judgment based on this. The pre-agreement security policy within the individuals 
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in Fig 13 is to share any required information between the parties of Col if they are 
within the boundary of the system and scenario environment. Any member of Col, 
which violates this agreement by moving out of the system boundary, is to 
relinquish the right of using the already shared information and not to forward it to 
any other parties outside the system boundary. 
Figure 33 Profile Building 
Figure 34 Data Mishandling 
We utilize two examples depicted in Figure 33 and Figure 34 to aid with the 
explanations contained in this section. In Figure 33, a possible example of profile 
building after a change of user contextual information is presented. It shows a set 
of users that meet the policy of the devices connected as well as a situation of 3 
users who have changed their profile settings or violated some of the device 
policies. If the partial profile of a user is not automatically removed from the 
devices of such users after few exchanges of different profiles and partial 
identities, it is possible to build a whole picture of the other users from those 
obtained partial identities. 
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In Figure 34, a connection is established between one of the nodes, which shares 
connection with another device or set of users, and those users referred to as proxy 
nodes whose security properties are unknown. The node that intersects the two sets 
of nodes can potentially forward data from the nodes within one set to other nodes 
in the other set, if relevant security policies have not been specified for such data. 
A classic issue that we are trying to address is how an operating platform like 
Android [48] or Apple [49] OS allows installed third party applications to forward 
users' private information, device identities etc. to third parties without informing 
the users. 
Continuing from the scenario in the previous section, let us assume that one of the 
ad-hoc connected trusted users is somehow forwarding some important data to 
another user outside the network due to lower security requirements or measures 
taken to disallow any form of data transfer without the authority of the original 
owner of the data. This can also be a case whereby a trusted user has legally 
obtained the information before leaving the connected environment, and there is no 
mechanism to examine when any of the users has violated any of the security 
requirements, i. e. leaving the network with the sensitive information. All sensitive 
data and user partial profiles should be revoked from the user as soon as possible. 
If there has been no pre-defined or dynamic way of defining or enforcing such 
policies, the weaknesses could be exposed. However, by careful policy definition, 
appropriate measures can be taken to address them. We will demonstrate how this 
could be done for the system described in the scenario. 
In our demonstration, we use the icons shown in Figure 27 to represent various 
organisations/users within the scenario. To establish the data and partial identity 
properties of the individual users, each organisation represented by an icon checks 
its own security-related properties (this information may be pre-established) and 
the user is allowed to define new policies as required. Hence, we use the windows 
mobile HTC shown in Figure 35, the PDA in Figure 36 and Figure 37 for the 
deployment of our implementation in the Microsoft Visual Studio 2005 
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environment. Figure 35 shows a state whereby one of the nodes has violated the set 
policy and a message is shown informing the user that this has been violated and 
the shared file/information has been deleted from the user's device. Figure 36 on 
the other hand shows a similar situation, but now the user concerned has fulfilled 
the required policy and the required file is transferred to the node. Figure 37 is 
similar to Figure 35, but on a simulating device instead of a real device. 
Communication between the devices is done via wireless communication. We 
make use of the x and y co-ordinates of individual users within the devices to 
determine their locations in relation to other users within the system - for 
simulation purposes. This can be replaced by actual coordinates of devices in real 
life situations. 
Figure 35 Dynamic Policy Demo "Fool - with the file 
deleted due to a policy violation 
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Figure 37 Delete File-Policy Violated 
The user of the HTC and PDA is able to specify to which organisations' systems 
he wishes to send its information, either partial profile or data, after checking the 
compatibility of its policies. 
The method presented in this thesis provides a number of advantages against 
existing traditional methods. It allows devices to be configured during runtime 
with little or no interruption to service provision. Users are able to make some 
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changes to the settings, which will instantly take effect dynamically. It makes the 
configuration process dynamic, increases the range and security control of the 
application, and eliminates the needs of an expert to change policies and other 
settings by allowing users to define such policies via a simple user interface, which 
will in turn be translated into policies and the device get configured dynamically. 
As it currently stands, we only anticipate problems when it comes to dealing with 
more complex policy negotiations, possibly requiring a more in-depth method and 
algorithm to handle such situations, which forms part of our future direction of 
study, as well as enabling multi-hop communication and handling other security 
issues such as an integration of services. 
The implementation of the above example using the policies defined is shown in 
Figure 36 and Figure 37, where profile files are either transferred or deleted based 
on the location of the owner of the information and its location in relation to other 
users, contextual information and policy specification. Here, each device is 
configured dynamically according to the policy specified, and re-configuration is 
also done dynamically and automatically after any change of contextual 
information, policy etc. 
6.1.4 DEVICE CONFIGURATION 
Before going into the details of device configuration, let's define some of the terms 
used within this section and thesis: 
" Target or target device: this connotes to the device or resource that other 
devices/resources will like to communicate with, e. g. by requesting profile 
information, data etc. 
Subject: this denotes either a device or service that is requesting 
information from the target device. 
" Proxy: this signifies a subject that can go through to request information 
indirectly from a target that can send relevant information to the subject. 
For example, target A is connected to subject B, B is connected to subject 
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C, but A has no direct connection to C, so A is indirectly connected to C via 
B and B is a proxy of C. 
It is also worth pointing out that although we have utilized the components within 
the proposed methods as either devices or persons (individuals), they can also be 
equipment's, e. g. medical equipment, fire service equipment's, other 
equipment's/services that might help users of the devices to fulfil their 
responsibilities in large dynamic crisis management in ubiquitous environments. 
We divide the process of dynamic device configuration in three main stages 
illustrated in Figure 38: configure the interface based on either a pre-defined or 
user defined policy, obtain contextual information within the range of the device, 
and configure it dynamically based on the contextual information gathered and 
negotiate policies and user requests dynamically. The algorithm depicted in Figure 
38 shows the process of configuring the device. It first gets the list of all nodes 
within the range. Compare the target and subject node policies. If there is a match, 
it creates a list of nodes, sends the new list to the target node, and configures the 
device. If there is any change in the contextual information of proxy nodes, this 
will also notify the relevant nodes and trigger the process of reconfiguration of the 
nodes. 
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Figure 38 Step-by-step Device Configuration 
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6.1.5 USER INTERFACE (UI) CONFIGURATION 
Each device will have some default settings of its device profile, user profile and 
policy settings. When the device is introduced into the environment, the automatic 
configuration process is initiated. Figure 39 presents the flowchart of the required 
process. If the user preferred settings are automatically detected, the user will have 
the option to either modify such settings or not. This process is not applied if there 
are no predefined user settings. If the default settings are selected, the inlormation 
is then presented to the module that automatically and dynamically configures the 
device. 
11 Detect profile information and policy settings 
Figure 39 Flow chart for configuration device 
Then the configured device should be presented to the user. If'the user chooses to 
modify the default settings or their own specified settings then an interface will he 
provided for them to modify such information. After such modifications the 
process of configuration will start. 
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If the contextual information of the device changes, this information can be 
changed/updated dynamically with little or no impact on the availability of the 
service and functionality of the device to the user. 
The above can also be implemented in a way that the user is permitted to specify 
one or more preferences associated with the device configuration settings, 
including the user's policy, some parts of the user profile, etc. New data fields can 
also be defined to be used for data entries in terms of new properties, for policy 
creation or user profile specification. The layout of such an input interface will be 
based on a Meta data, i. e. using XML files to generate data entry forms 
dynamically. Some of the computing devices used are designed to interact in a 
client server setting. Client devices include: PDA's, mobile phones, HTC, 
palmtop, iPad, etc. The communication between such devices and the server is 
done wirelessly through communication interfaces, and the communication can be 
via audio, text, pictures, images and data transfers such as files between the 
devices or clients and server. Each mode of communication will be automatically 
detected and determined based on device setups using policies and relevant 
contextual information provided and the given scenario. 
6.2 MATTS AND COMPOSITION CLIENT APPLICATION 
MATTS has been introduced in section 6.1.1, which was designed principally to 
allow the testing of secure component composition analysis techniques. In this 
section we provide further details of MATTS's functionality. We have improved 
MATTS to allow the testing of UCIM in crisis management scenarios, by adding 
modules and applications together with other functionalities. The extension 
integrates together a number of tools as explained in section 6.1.3. 
MATTS is implemented as a single native C++ application. Within the single 
application it is possible to model multiple interacting components by executing a 
byte-code that can be compiled using a RISC-like Assembly language. 
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The compiler wraps up executables into neat bundles that include a code section 
and a block of workspace memory. The MATTS language is unusual in that it 
works directly in memory, it does not make use of any registers, so that all states 
are held entirely in the workspace memory. MATTS is therefore able to 
implements a simple mobile code framework that allows any executing code to 
automatically transport itself to another machine running MATTS with one simple 
instruction. 
MATTS is able to run multiple pieces of code simultaneously that are also able to 
communicate with each other. This allows component topologies to be built up 
using links between components. Simple `Compose' scripts - which are in an 
XML format - can be created that allow component topologies to be tested against 
security criteria. The language used to create Compose scripts is actually itself 
Turing Complete, and has been designed to suit the task of analysing topologies. A 
language is Turing complete if for each function defined within the language that 
can be calculated with a Turing machine, it can be proved that there is a program 
in this language that performs the same function. A Turing machine is a very 
simplistic theoretical computer model with an endless tape of cells, which has a 
given set of symbols, a pointer to the cells and a finite state control. It is also 
capable of manipulating those symbols according to a given set of rules. 
An important design element of the system is that it provides a graphical 
overview of all the running agents and their communication links. The user can 
interact with this in order to control the agents. In addition, a console is provided 
for each agent to allow direct interaction with the agent. There are two levels of 
interaction: interaction with the agent and interaction with the system of agents 
(the composition). There is a slight added complication to the actual MATTS 
application, in that nodes can also be representative of remote devices (e. g. 
portable devices) or even further instances of the application itself. In this case, 
the remote devices are `dummy' nodes, since they're not capable of running 
arbitrary code and instead only have a subset of functionality plus a local on- 
device control Graphical User Interface (GUI). We have also implemented a 
137 
version of the dummy nodes as the CompositionClient application, run based on 
mobile devices or PDAs. However, this version of dummy also runs functions 
that help the intermediate process, but actual analysis of the whole system is 
done in MATTS. 
The CompositionClient application has been primarily designed and implemented 
for the purpose of setting devices/node properties by the users themselves rather 
than just hard coding such properties in MATTS. This has been further extended to 
allow devices to be able to send properties files and other files, create connections 
with the server, and display a dynamic interface using property sets as well as 
allowing users to define policies dynamically using the policy interface creation 
tools. All of these components of the CompositionClient will be discussed in the 
next few sections as well as the rest of the thesis. 
Finally, Compose scripts can invoke a formal analysis engine that is built into 
MATTS that is able to analyse executables based on pre, post and mid conditions. 
Although it's a relatively simple analysis tool, it allows some quite detailed 
information to be gained about specific pieces of code and to be used during 
component composition analysis. We present the code that initialises device 
connection (from the MATSS point of view) as well as creates a buffer and an 
XML object to load the relevant properties of the device, as shown in Figure 40. 
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Code: Device Connection 
1* 
* Initialise the Devi c eConne ction object 
DeviceConnection:: DeviceConnection (SOCKET nAcceptSock, cSaver * psSever, cWindow' psWindow) 
this->nAcceptSock = nAcceptSock; 
this->psServer = ps Server; 
this->psWindow = psWindow, 
eCommand = CONCOM INVALID; 
eState = CONSTATE_COMMAND; 
nFileRead = 0; 
nFileSize = 0; 
nNode = 0; 
ti Create a cSaveXNIL object to load the node XML properties 
psSaveXML = new cSaveXML (psWindow); 
11 Allocate some space to read in the property info 
TODO: Change the property reading to use an input stream (smaller input buffer) 
pcProperties = (char *)malloc (PROPERTIESXML BUFFER); 
nPropertiesSize = 0; 
pcPropatySet=(char *)tnalloc (PROPERTIESXML BUFFER); 
nPropertysetSize = 0; 
} 
Figure 40 Device Connection 
The code presented in Figure 40 is used for connecting a device to the network/ 
MATTS server in this case. The code first creates a device connection function in 
MATTS, taking three parameters: socket, server and cWindor. It also creates a 
few local variables such as nFileRead, nFileSize and nNode. It then creates an 
XML object to load the node/device XML file property. This is done by allocating 
some space in the memory that will store this information temporarily belörc the 
connection is established; MALLOC is used in this case. It further tries to establish 
the connection via the created socket to the server. After a successful connection, 
the stored property details in the memory are used to fill up the required property 
fields of the device within MATTS's environment and the node/device is now 
ready to interact with other nodes within MATTS as required. If there is an error in 
establishing connection, this will be notified to both the server and the user to take 
an appropriate action. 
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The actual code from the CompositionClient that is responsible for sending the 
XML file after a successful connection is shown in Figure 41. 
Our work has improved and extended some modules in MATTS, which mainly 
allow different components/systems to be connected to MATTS either virtually or 
using real devices like the HTC phones and PDAs that we used in our 
implementation as well as other nodes like netbooks. We have created the code 
and relevant user interfaces that handle such processes. We have also created the 
policy and property tools that allow MATTS and other virtual or real nodes to be 
able to define their own properties and policies. We have provided means for 
MATTS to receive, interpret, use and send any XML file within the system as well 
as receiving any other files required. We have utilised the already existing analysis 
scripts within MATTS to help the testing of the scenarios used in our 
implementation. The CompositionClient is another tool that our work has 
developed, which enables MATTS functionality with real devices. 
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Code: Send XML File 
//send the ml file to Matts 
private void SendXMI. ToMattsO 
{ 
data= "Initialization; " b eginning of the data to send, indicating the 
I/purpose is to send the device profile/initialise 
try 
{ 
! fileStrem read content of a file for sedning 
FileStreatn readstream=new FileStreaun(('onfigur(itiý)n. DEVICE_PROFILE_F1LE_LONG, 
Filelbfode. Open, FileAcceý. Read); 
XMLFileDaa = new b}ie[readstreamLength]; 
readstream, Read(XMLFileData, 0, XMLFileData. Length); 
//attach the name of the profile 
data +_ CoafiSuration. DEVICE_PROFILE_ 1LE_LONG+ "; ; 
sw. Write(data); 'Isending "Initialization; Profile name; " 
sw. Write(XMLFileDatalength); I/sendthe length of the profile 
sw. Write(XMLFi leData), //sen ding the actual content of the profile file 
} 
catch (Exception ex) 
{ 
} 
statvsBar. Invoke(new SetStatuýB u-Te\lDele_atLýthis. SetStatusBaTad), acMessage. ToStringQ); 
} 
Figure 41 Send XML File 
6.3 CONTEXTRANK APPLICATION 
6.3.1 SCENARIO 
We consider a public event such as a conference as an example. In this scenario we 
suppose that delegates at the event come from various disciplines in the research 
community. Each delegate requires a system or a way of being able to access 
facilities provided by the conference or for their own purposes (e. g. a PI)A or 
phone). Some delegates might have more than one area of research interest, or 
might also have undergone some training or have qualifications outside of' their 
speciality. For example, they may be trained in first aid, have been a professional 
medical doctor before moving into research, or be a member of an approved 
security agency. During the event, organizers might want to tailor their programme 
to the needs of delegates as well as trying to utilise delegates with certain skills for 
other tracks or other unexpected events during the conference such as accidents, 
medical emergencies, and so on. 
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By using the dynamic policy creation tool, users will be able to define their 
policies and personal profiles dynamically and can set up policies and/or partial 
identities to release different elements of their profiles automatically depending on 
the context. This can be achieved by the ContextRank algorithm proposed in 
section 5.7 to filter relevant information for each user and help the organising 
committee as well as other delegates to make best use of the available resources 
and help each other when required. The process involved is depicted in the 
sequence diagram in Figure 42. 
The process in Figure 42 first requires the device to send its property file/details to 
the policy interface module. This is used in generating the policy of the device 
with user intervention and input as required, or the default policy file from the 
device can be used instead. The policy of the device is sent to the contextRank 
algorithm module. Then a loop is initiated between the context information sever 
module and the contextRank algorithm module. The loop is for computing the 
weight of each relevant contextual information item within the context server that 
meets the policy of the device. The weight of each contextual information item is 
returned to the algorithm. Another loop is initiated to try and find if there is any 
similarity between the available contextual information items, and the result is also 
sent back to the algorithm. The final result of the computation is then returned to 
the device as a list of n relevant contextual information items that meet the policy 
of the device and can help the user of the device to fulfil its role within the scenario 
concerned. 
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Figure 42 ContextRank Sequence Diagram 
6.3.2 OVERVIEW 
The ContextRank application is designed to function in two main ways: either just 
as a filtering algorithm considering only the relevant contextual information for the 
user, or incorporating user defined policies from the Dynamic Policy creation 
module or any other policy in filtering contextual information. It is designed to 
take in the criteria under which contextual information can be filtered and produce 
an output for the users that meets its required criteria. 
Hence, the algorithm will be able to filter delegates based on their speciality. For 
example, after an incident, the organizing committee might want to get 
9. Sand result 
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experienced medical doctors or first aiders, this algorithm will filter that 
information and redirect recourses as needed. 
Inputs 
9 An array or list of all available contextual information within the range of 
the user. 
" One or more policy files. 
Outputs 
"A list of relevant contextual information for the user. 
" Access to users' data or profile info. 
" Possibly a request for further information if required. 
The details of the process involved in generating the output from the input are 
presented in section 5.7. 
6.4 DEMO WITH POLICY INTERFACE APPLICATION 
6.4.1 DYNAMIC POLICY SPECIFICATION INTERFACE 
Defining user policies dynamically is one of the key elements of our proposed 
UCIM framework. In this section we provide the details on how a user is able to 
interact with a simplified and implemented user interface to create policies from a 
given set of property files. The property files define the available properties of 
individual nodes within the system. Each property will be used as an element 
within a rule, and combining such rules will create a policy. Other underlying 
technical functions are hidden away from the user, which have the capability of 
taking the user's input from the policy interface to create an XML policy file that 
will be used within the system when needed. Below we provide an overview of the 
key elements that helps the interface to be user friendly, together with some 
aspects of its components: 
" Users are allowed to dynamically specify policies using predicates and 
functions. 
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" Policies are built from predicates (which are just inequalities containing 
properties and values) and sub-functions, joined together using logical 
operators. 
" The use of sub-functions within the interface eliminates the problem of 
tackling complex mixtures of conjunctions. and disjunctions; however, it is 
also possible that this will weaken the required flexibility. 
"A policy can be easily translated and used in many other applications. 
" The methodological design can be implemented for any scenario and is 
adaptable - it's not designed for a single purpose usage. 
" Policies are aimed to be stored in a tree structure in memory or in XML 
files in a way that is lightweight and portable. 
" The design of the system is modular -meaning new modules can be 
plugged in to improve functionality. 
" The methodology could be easily integrated into current existing solutions, 
e. g. Ponder, to act as client applications and pass on created policies to the 
Ponder engine for processing. 
" Policies can also utilize users' partial identities. 
" Users can modify policies, e. g. change their areas of speciality or training 
to help in emergency situations. This will take effect dynamically and with 
minimal interruption of the system. 
Inputs to the interface are defined manually through the interface, or loaded as an 
XML file defining necessary predicates. These inputs include: 
"A list (array) of properties. This is in the form of a PropertySet XML file 
as output from the PropertySet Tool, 
" User defined constraints on elements of the properties and other sub- 
rules/policies. 
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The outputs from the interface are currently produced in the form of an XML file 
containing one or more rules/policies/predicates for which satisfaction can be 
determined. 
6.4.2 POLICY XML FILE 
Policy XML files specify simple security policies. In this context, a security policy 
is simply a statement in propositional logic that can be evaluated by substituting 
the values of properties into free variables. A policy is considered to be satisfied if 
it evaluates to true, and violated otherwise. 
These policies are really intended to be applied to a single device. To tie multiple 
policies together across multiple devices, Compose XML files should be used. 
Although the policies are encoded in XML, the important part is really just the 
logical statements, and the functions needed for substitution. 
Policy XML files are created using the PolicyCreate tool. Policy XML files are 
used by the ContextRank algorithm defined in section 5.7. They are also 
referenced by Compose XML files in order to create more complex policies 
interpreted by MATTS. 
<Policy name="Risk"> 
<Function id="main"> 
(LowRiskMedValue AND MedRiskLowValue) 
</Function> 
<Function id=" LowRiskMedValue"> 
((Risk-Level &lt; 0.2) AND (Asset-Value &lt, = 2)) 
</Function 
<Function id="MedRiskLowVa1ue"> 
((Risk-Level &lt; 0.5) AND (Asset-Value &lt; = 1)) 
</Function> 
</Policy> 
Figure 43 User Policy 
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As an example, Figure 43 shows a policy requirement defined using some of the 
predefined properties of the device. These predefined properties serve as the 
elements to be used in creating a policy. The figure demonstrates only the use of 
the 'AND' and 'OR' logical operators. A small window in the interface (Figure 
46 shows the user the policy defined, while the translated policy is shown as an 
XML file. 
We apply the data abstraction rule to determine the level of details of the 
delivered data, when a positive access decision is returned from the access 
control rule. 
To access this information at any time from the interface, the following rules will 
apply: 
if (profileType== office &(actionType= 
= trigge-rconznntnt. icationlactionType 
= makeAppoin. tmen. t)) 
{ 
p! D == office 
t else 
If f (prof ileType == Home) 
{ 
pfD = Home 
} else 
if(profileType == Social & (actionType = 
= trig gercoanmitnicationlaction. Type == bookTable)) 
{ 
pID = Social 
} else 
If (profileType == HealtCare) 
{ 
pID = Healtcare 
ý 
The example rule above, checks to see if the profile type is office and the action 
within the rule is either trigger communication or make appointment. If this case 
is true, it sets the user pID to office. Otherwise, it checks if the profile type is 
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home. If the case is true, it sets the pID to home, etc. After setting the pID, other 
polices relevant to the pID will be enforced automatically, i. e., it allows only 
users whose pID are the same, e. g. home, to see the user available within the 
network. 
In implementing the policy specification interface, we have implemented two 
versions. One mainly targets mobile devices and their properties for creating a 
policy file based on another in-house developed application that allows users to 
create new properties for a system. The second version is mainly web based but 
can still be used in mobile devices as it follows our main principles of making 
the framework lightweight. In doing so, we have divided the implementation into 
three different modules: the property interface, Policy Logic and Policy Creator. 
The property interface allows the users to define the data fields/properties that 
can be used to define the required policies. The policy logic deals with the 
technical aspects of the policy creator. This contains details on translating the 
input from the policy creator to create the set of policies for the system. The 
policy logic hides all the technical details from the user. The user makes use of 
the policy creator to define policies for its system. 
6.4.3 THE PROPERTY INTERFACE 
The property interface is designed to enable the systems to allow each node's 
property to be set or determined on an individual basis. Each node can have 
different property options and therefore capabilities rather than each node having 
the same set of properties in a static manner. The property interface aims to make 
the device user interface to be configured dynamically with different property 
options to meet the challenging needs of ubiquitous environments and the need 
of individualised policy specification by each node/user based on their profile 
types. Full details of the property interface can be found in our internal report 
[137], and a summary of the interface is provided below. 
The process for the dynamic creation of a device interface and properties of 
individual nodes is based on using XML file. This is predefined with basic root 
elements of node properties, and users are allowed to modify or add new 
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properties to the files or even create a new set of properties and store them as an 
XML file. Although it is possible to write the required XML file in a text editor, 
this is not user friendly and not suitable for non-technical users or in emergency 
situations. Hence there is a need to develop the interface. The structure of the 
XML file is presented in Figure 44. 
I 
t? xml ver3ion-"1.0" encoding. "utf-8" 
]<PropertySet zileName-"\ProgramnFiles\PropertySetl. onl"> 
<Property id-"Name" type"Text"/> 
<Property id-"External" type-"Binary" /> 
<Property idm"Sensitivity Level" type-"Integer" rengellin-"0" rengeMax=09" /> 
<Property id-"IDS" type-"Floating Point" /> 
<Property 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
<Option 
id-"Encryption" type""Option"> 
entu, m"1">NEP-40</Option> 
entun-"2">RC2-{0</Option> 
enum-11 3">RC4-40</Option> 
enum-"6">YEP-114</Option> 
enum-11 5">DES-56</Option 
enum-11 611 >RC5-56</Option> 
enum-"7">RC2-128</Option> 
enum-"8">RC4-128</Option 
enum-"9">RC5-128</Option> 
enum-"10">SDES-168</Option> 
enum-"11">ZDEk-128</Option> 
enum-"12">Sklgjaok-80</Option> 
Figure 44 Example of different property types 
The properties have two main attributes: the id attribute gives a property a name, 
such as "Name" or "Encryption". The type property defines the type of the 
property, which effectively decides how it is represented on a User Interface. 
There are five different types currently: 
</Property> 
</PropertySet> 
Text - the property is represented through a text value, for example, the 
name might be "Police". 
" Binary - the property is represented by means of a true or false value (a 
checkbox on a user interface). For example, "Is the node external'? 
Yes/No". 
" Integer - the property is represented by an integer. This can be un-ranged 
without any extra attributes, or includes a minimum value, a maximum 
value or both. 
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Floating Point - the property is represented by a floating-point number. 
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Figure 46 A Fully Populated Property Set 
A user can create a variety of XML files similar to the one in Figure 44 using the 
interface presented in Figure 45 and its sub-interface. The interface in Figure 45 is 
used by users to create new property sets, add or edit security properties. It also 
displays the list of available property files so that the user can select the required 
one, modify or add new properties and save the file. An example of a fully created 
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property set is shown in Figure 46. The interface in Figure 46 consists of three 
sections. The left part displays available properties from the loaded property file, 
and ticking the check box next to a property name means adding this property to 
the new file. The middle part allows the user to configure new property elements, 
and this in turn will be added in the left part of the interface. Finally the right part 
of the interface displays the XML file of the new property file being created. 
6.4.4 THE POLICY LOGIC 
When implementing the policy interface, we have adapted two versions, one for 
PDA/mobile devices (HTC phones and other phones emulators) and the other for 
web services. However, both of these two implementations are compatible to 
PDA's, HTC phones and desktop PCs. The main difference between the two is 
that the PDA version has both the policy logic and policy interface in one 
implementation, whereas the web service based implementation provides a 
separation between the policy logic and policy creator interface. This is needed 
so as to separate the technical aspect of the policy creation from the user and also 
to make the interface more lightweight in terms of trying to deploy it using 
devices with fewer resources. It also helps to make things simpler for the end 
user of the system. 
The main role of the policy logic is to implement the required parser for the web 
service based policy creation tool. There is no user interface attached to this 
module, but it has to be running before the user can run the actual policy creator 
interface. This module consists of two main part, a machine generated parser by 
peg-sharp 0.3.427.0 from Parser. ged, which is a C# packrat parser generator. 
Parsing Expression Grammar (PEG) is a type of analytic formal grammar. It is 
used to describe a formal language in terms of a set of rules for recognising 
strings in language. Hence, we make use of this parser to transform our grammar 
in the design section into codes and rules for user defined policies. The second 
part of the module consists of hand written code, developed to be used by the 
semantic actions for the machine generated parser. An extraction of the machine 
generated code is shown in Figure 47, while an extraction of the hand written 
code is shown in Figure 48. 
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Code: ? tachine Generated Parser Code 
// Machine generated by peg-sharp 0.3.427.0 from Parser. peg. 
using System; 
using System. Collections. Generic; 
using System. Globelization; 
using System. Runtime. Serialization; 
using System. Security. Parmissions; 
Inamespace PolicyLogic 
j{ 
ý 
ý 
ý 
[Seriali-able] 
internal sealed class ParserEsception 
{ 
public ParsarExcoption() 
} 
: Exception 
public ParserExcaption(string massage) : base(nessaga) 
{ 
) 
public ParserException(int line, int col, string file, string message) : base(string. Format 
("{e} at line {l} col {2}{3}", massage, line, Col, file I. null ? 
{ 
} 
(" in "f file) . . ")) 
public ParserException(int line, int col, string file, string format, params object[] ergs) 
this(line, col, file, string. Format(format, args)) 
{ 
] 
public ParserException(int line, int col, string file, string message, exception inner) : base 
(string. Format("{O} at line {1} col {2}{3}", message, line, col, file 1. null ? (" in "+ file) :" "), 
! inn*r) 
i i 
text) 
} 
i 
} 
(SecurityPermission(SecurityAction. Demand, SerializationFormatter a true)] 
private ParserException(Seriali_ationInfo info, Stream ingContext context) : base(info, con- 
{ 
} 
If Thread safe if Parser instances are not shared across threads. 
internal sealed partial class Parser 
{ 
public Parser() 
{ 
m nonterminals. Add("Start", new ParseMethod( ](this. DoParseStartRule}); 
m nonterminals. Add("Expression", new ParseMethod[][this. DcParseExpressionRule}); 
m_nonterminals. Add("Operation", new ParseMethod[]{this. DoParseoperationRule)); 
m nonterminais. Add("OperationBracketed", new ParseMethod[] 
(this. DoPars. OperationBraeketedRule}); 
} 
public Operation Parsa(string input) 
( 
} 
T 
ý 
return DoPars. File(input, null); 
// File is used for error reporting. 
public operation Persu(string input, string file) 
( 
} 
return DoPars. Fil. (input, filo); 
*region Private Types 
// The result of parsing a literal or non-terminal. 
lendregion 
Figure 47 Machine Generated Parser Code 
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Code: Hand written Code 
using System; 
using System. Collections. Generic; 
namespace PolicyLogic 
{ 
// This is the hand-written code used by the semantic actions for the 
machine generated parser. 
internal sealed partial class Parser 
{ 
{ 
} 
} 
{ 
} 
} 
// Create an operation from a binary operation 
private OperationFunction DoCreateoperationBinary(List<Result> results) 
OperationFunction result; 
result = new OperationFunction(results[1]. Text); 
result. AddValue(results[A]. Value); 
result. AddValue(results[2]. Value); 
return result; 
// Create an operatino from an n-ary operation 
private OperationFunction DoCreateOperationNary(List<Result> results) 
{ 
OperationFunction result; 
int Count; 
result = new OperationFunction(results[1]. Text); 
for (Count = 8; Count < results. Count; Count +_ 2) 
{ 
result. AddValue(results[Count]. Value); 
} 
return result; 
// Create an operation from an n-ary function 
private OperationFunction DoCreateFunctionNary(List<Result> results) 
OperationFunction result; 
int Count; 
result a new OperationFunction(results[9]. Text); 
for (Count = 2; Count < results. Count; Count += 2) 
{ 
result. AddValue(results(Count]. Value); 
} 
return result; 
Figure 48 Hand Written Code 
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The code in Figure 47 is machine-generated as a result of using peg-sharp 0.3.427.0 
from Parser. ged to enable the proper functionality of the parser function used in 
creating the policies from the user interface. The code fragment shown in Figure 
47 first creates a Parser Exception function to throw out any errors or exceptions 
when parsing. It also creates few other parser functions and takes only a string to 
be parsed as input and another one that takes in both a string and a file as 
parameters. The file parameter is used for error reporting purposes. The code 
shown in Figure 48 on the other hand is hand-written. It creates a couple of 
operation functions that create an operation from an n-array. 
6.4.5 THE POLICY CREATOR 
The policy creator interface is the main user interface for interacting with users. 
It allows users to define policies mainly from given property files, by loading the 
required property files. Users can also introduce new properties by using the free 
text entry option of the interface. Figure 49 presents both the text free entry and 
property based policy interface designed for the use of mobile device, while 
Figure 50 and Figure 51 present the web based policy creator interface. Another 
functionality of the web based interface is the ability to create sub-functions 
within a policy, which can be later reused. Users can also save these sub- 
functions or the whole policy. As a user is creating a policy, the resulting policy 
is shown in the info section part of the interface. The user can easily delete rules 
within a policy from the middle section of the interface as well as entering new 
rules for sub-functions using the Enter tap. The policy can be navigated based on 
the level shown in the info section of the interface. The code used for configuring 
the interface in Figure 49 is presented in Figure 52. 
154 
Figure 49 PDA based policy interface (text free entry based on property file) 
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Figure 51 Web Based Policy Creation Interface for Sub-Functions Level 1 
The code presented in Figure 52 is used to configure each node or device 
automatically when the modules of the framework are loaded. It first checks the 
version or type of the operating system (OS) the device is running. This enables 
the framework to decide how to configure each device. It then sets the relevant file 
path to locate the required property set file for the device. It then creates an 
XMLNodeList to contain all the XML attributes, which represents the properties in 
the property file. It also reads the file into a file stream reader and goes through 
each loop statement to configure the devices with all the relevant properties found 
in the file. The final device configuration is then displayed to the user. 
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Code: Configure UI 
//Configures key components of the UI 
I/this includes the combo box that holds the Properties 
//this combo box iy filled with controls that are then 
f/c ontigurcd. 
private void Cvfflg treUIQ 
c PropatitsCB. DIaplayManber ="Name": 
string fllePath ý". 
//Iýýnd prupý7lic+ 
if (Syste[n. Lan ir, aiuiirnt_OSVaiiotLT4)Strl7tgQ. StartsWith("blicrosoR Windows NT")) 
ftlePath = 
else flI ePath = '1\Prop <an Pil es\\Pol icylnt crfac e\Y'; 
tiinlNýlcl, iýl nodeLid=PiIcSIrc>uninc;. ßetXmlNodeList(fiIePnth+propeYty3d, "/PrnpcttySctlPropeaty"): 
for (int pom = O; pos< nodeLirLCount; poo++) 
foreach (smlAtnrnnuc ettrib in nodeList(posj. Atiributes) 
I 
switch (attrib. Name. ToLc wcrO) 
case --type": 
switch (attrib. Valu aToLowcrO) 
case "bitraly". 
i'hcckMis cb =new C'hccl. fio, C); 
cb. Natne ° nodeC. ieR[pos]. Attributes["i d"]. Value. To3tritaQ; 
KNcwCB. Visiblc - tnýc; 
//NrwC'13 `-= nodeLibli pusý. Atlribuleb["id°]. Vaiue. ToStcinaO; 
cb. Locatlon=nrw. v P, +iut(92.39); 
//NewC13. Location = ncwv Point(92,59); 
PropertiesCB. Items. Add(cb); 
//i'ropeti i csC 13. Reins. Adcl(NewCB); 
cb. Visible= false; 
//NewCß. Visible =' false; 
break; 
break; 
º } if (Propertie. CB. Itenv[Pon] t- nu lt) 
Uiis. Contro L. Add((( 'i Q, I)Properti e. CB. IternrlPoa]): 
} 
} 
Figure 52 Configure UI 
6.5 SECURITY MODULE FOR HOME GATEWAY FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we present another contribution of our work by creating an addition 
to another framework developed by a colleague in the School. The framework is 
aimed at and making good use of home appliances in a peer to peer network (refer 
to our published work for full details [138]). The design and implementation of the 
framework lacks the security requirement to insure that home appliances can 
communicate in an effective and secure manner. Hence, using our methodology 
discussed in chapter five, we added new modules that provide this required 
security. 
The framework is presented in Figure 53, where peers A-L and R-V are members 
of the normal peer network, while peers M-Q are acting as a Gateway Peer 
Overlay Network for the peers. As the state of the system is dynamic and 
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constantly changing, it is possible that the network might later grow considerably 
and one of the peers in the P2P network may become part of the Gateway Peer 
Overlay Network to provide `gateway` functionality to a group of peers who wish 
to share and offer ad-hoc services. As mentioned earlier, the overlay network 
forms a logical layer on the top of the Internet utilising the Internet base transport 
protocols. In this context, our overlay network of gateway peers belongs to the 
same level as a peer but their functionality acts as a logical layer above the normal 
peer network. 
Service 
Management 
Security 
Management 
Performance 
Analyzer 
Figure 53 Gateway Peer Overlay Network 
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Our enhancement is in the form of the process of controlling access to services to 
only authorised devices within the environment. To do so, we extended the 
framework to incorporate a policy manager within the service manager as shown 
in Figure 54. When a service is requested by a device, the service manager will 
first check the policy relating to the service before relinquishing the service to the 
device. 
Here, we allow the home owner to be able to define policies that will decide 
automatically and dynamically who is allowed to access his/her music sharing 
environment (see Figure 55). The implantation shown in Figure 55 is an extension 
to the work done by Muhammad et al [138], by adding a module that extends the 
used UPnP Device template in their work. The required policy(s) is defined for 
each device via the extension of the XML Devices Description used by UPnP 
DeviceType: V Device Template as shown in Figure 55. Here, the policy can be 
defined as a policy set for each device. In Figure 55, we have defined policy list 
elements that have a list of possible service rules for the home network. When 
other devices are trying to access the service provided by a certain device, the 
device service policy as shown in Figure 55 will first be consulted to make sure 
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that there is no violation of the device policy before granting or denying access to 
the requested service. The implementation of a user interface that will allow such 
definitions and translations of input from the interface into an XML policy file was 
discussed in section 6.4 when we dealt with the dynamic policy creation. In the 
case of a personal usage of the framework, i. e. within a home or personal 
environment, the definition and modification of a policy can be based on a simple 
user interface as shown in Figure 49 using the mobile application version or web 
service based one as shown in Figure 50. 
1661"' 
Figure 55 Device Policy List 
-? cr. arations tor other services defined ny a UPnP Fnrurn working 
c-c^r"7ir^.: ýc (if any) go here 
<policyId>urn : upnp-orei: serviceId: ::,, vi, -eIC</serviceId> 
<SCPDURL>URI, -CO cervicýdrsý iption</SCPDURL> 
<controlURL>URI, for control</controlURL> 
<eventSubURL>URL for eventing</eventSubURL> 
</ oP licy> 
UPnP Device Template 
Service Access Policy List 
<policyType>urn: schemas-upnp-org: service: sorvice'! 'yfc: v</serviceType> 
<policyList> 
< op licy> 
/ 
160 
6.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, our main focus is on the implementation of UCIM together with 
its sub-modules and provides the results from our lab test. We have presented the 
implementation phases, simulation of the framework, screenshots as well as 
some code fragments of the modules of UCIM. Firstly we have explained the 
implementation phases including a motivational scenario(s) used for the 
implementation. We have also provided a more in-depth reasoning behind our 
chosen methodology and presented some of the work that has been carried out to 
help with the understating of the framework. We have demonstrated through 
simulations that our proposed framework and methodology have provided a more 
user-centric and context-aware interface, our policy creation tool has provided a 
more dynamic and portable application compared to other existing schemes as 
well as solving the problem of using nested brackets in terms of policy 
specifications. One of the lessons that can be drawn from this chapter amongst 
others is that our UCIM framework provides a dynamic modular architecture. 
Each module is fully functional on its own, and it is portable and can be used as 
added features to other solutions as demonstrated in section 6.5. The solutions 
and methodology are applicable to other environments in addition to ad-hoc 
ones, but the main design is ad-hoc centric. Our simulation results have provided 
a proof of concept and an implementation of identity and personal information 
management both within social and critical infrastructures crisis management 
situations. The creation of policies can be achieved in a dynamic way and in a 
more user centric manner, as we have provided a means of separation from the 
technical aspects and eliminated the existing problem of creating and modifying 
policies. The next chapter will provide more details on the evaluation of UCIM 
based on the laws of identity and lab results. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EVALUATION 
In this chapter, we start by reviewing the requirements of identity management in 
MANets and ubiquitous computing in general. We then evaluate the performance 
of UCIM against the requirements based on the Law of Identity and lab test results 
of the applications developed. We have also made use of scenarios to demonstrate 
and evaluate the functionality of our proposed methodologies as presented in 
chapter five. A successful identity management system in ubiquitous computing 
must have the following features: context-awareness, user-centricity, dynamic user 
policy specification, real-time device configuration, scalability, adaptability, 
resource efficiency, security, privacy assurance and effectiveness. Comparing with 
existing solutions, UCIM has addressed all of these issues from the start of its 
design. For example, it achieves user-centricity by giving users an interface to 
define policies in relation to available contextual information. UCIM also 
considers capacity constrained nodes in MANets by adopting proxies, where a 
novel hybrid metric is designed to balance the system resources for proxy 
selection. 
7.1 ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
In this section we analyse the IM module of our framework based on the seven 
laws of identity which has been proposed by Cameron [113]. This provides a good 
starting point for our analysis criteria. Before that we first re-cap on the key 
features of UCIM. 
The framework has capitalized and addressed some of the weaknesses identified in 
the related work section (chapters three, four and five). For example, the generic 
police toolkit developed by Ricardo [139] relies on the role of a system 
administrator. Its policies and rules are statically defined and require some level of 
knowledge before such definition. In UCIM, we extend the rule and policy 
definition by eliminating the role of the system administrator and allowing users to 
define policies themselves via the use of an intuitive graphical interface. 
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The overlay networks proposed by Chen et al. [86] divide nodes to perform 
various independent tasks, and each node depends on the existence of another, 
which causes the problem of a single point of failure. UCIM allows each node 
within the topology to have the full functionality of the framework. Although this 
might require more resources compared to having individual nodes performing 
separate functions, it allows individual nodes to only query nodes that are next to 
them for required information, eliminates the need of an Segment-Tree Virtual 
Network (STVN for short), that is used to construct the overlay network, and 
hence reduces computation power for improved efficiency. We also make use of 
the push method only during an initial connection so that all nodes can receive 
real-time information. This reduces the effect of heavy overheads in terms of data 
transfer that has been one of the drawbacks of the framework by Chen et al. Also 
the push approach is applied to individual nodes based on their demands, and when 
real-time information is available users are notified. Furthermore, we make use of 
XML schemas for storing and acquiring information in a more portable way, 
compared to the conventional usage of databases, to reduce the level of processing 
and storage needed, which is one of the requirements of devices with less 
processing power. 
Additionally, in UCIM we apply the concept of RBAC but put users in control of 
access policies and rules. This is achieved by integrating contextual information 
(mainly users' status/commitments) in an access decision process instead of using 
traditional RBAC. Hence, users' contextual information and roles have a 
significant and active influence on the access decision making module. Hence, we 
call our approach to access control as Contextual Based Access Control (CBAC), 
which takes context information (mainly the users' statuses) as a deciding factor of 
either allowing users to access the required information or denying such access. 
We further extend the idea of CBAC by developing a new dynamic policy 
interface tool that eliminates the problem of tracking a complex mixture of 
conjunctions and disjunctions. 
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The 7 laws of identity by Cameron [113] try to define a unifying identity Meta 
system for addressing the problem with an absent identity layer of the Internet, 
which makes it vulnerable. Hence, these laws try to define a new standard that 
identity providers and researchers should try to adhere to in order to eliminate the 
problem or the side effect that undermines most technological development. These 
laws are developed and enhanced through various discussions on Cameron's blog 
that involves various readers and developers from both the academia and industry. 
Hence, as widely debated and adopted laws [1401, it is of paramount importance 
that we try to compare and evaluate our framework in accordance with them. 
Although the laws are mainly developed for the Internet, we can see their 
application to MANet and SoS composition environments that we are working in. 
These laws and the related discussion on the blog provide a wider concept on the 
needs and importance of protecting personal information and identity management. 
Small devices are often used in MANets and SoS as well as other smart 
environments, and they are interconnected with access to the Internet. The current 
trend of the Internet development is moving towards Internet of Things (IoT) to 
allow small and smart devices to be interconnected seamlessly. The vulnerability 
of identity theft and misuse of personal information in such environments more 
critical than or as dangerous as it is on the Internet. 
Law 1: User Control and Consent: An IM system must put users in control of 
what digital identities are used and released, protect users against deception, and 
verify the identity of any party who asks for user information. We have defined 
user control as being able to determine when, where, how and whom their 
information is sent to or viewed by. Hence, when a user joins a network with a 
given set of profile information, he/she has permitted other users within the 
network, who meet the set rules and policies with respect to the given profile 
information, to view such information. Hence, we are able to meet this law as well 
as eliminate the multiple consent solution proposed by Eap et al. for service 
oriented architectures [561. The policy interface, property interface, data 
mishandling and profile building in section 6.1.3 provide more details on how to 
give users full control of their digital identities. Consequently, our implementations 
as demonstrated in Figure 29, Figure 35, Figure 43, Figure 45, Figure 46, and other 
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results in chapter 6 provide the proof of the framework's concept. It is worth 
pointing out that we have not tested the issue of deception as stated in this law. 
Law 2: Minimal Disclosure: An IM system should limit the disclosure of identity 
information for a constraint use, in case of a security breach. The domain centric 
IM research strongly supports this view by applying the principles of anonymous 
access in an attempt to prevent the correlation of IDs. In our proposed framework, 
we also provide the facility of enabling a user to specify which of their personal 
information should be included within the profile for other users to access or view, 
using the policy interface as described in section 6. Hence, UCIM not only 
supports anonymity but also limits the amount of personal data to be disclosed (see 
section 5.5.3 and Figure 15). These are achieved by allowing users to define and 
have different profile types (see Figure 18 and section 5.6.1) and decide which to 
use at any given time to best suit their commitments. Our notion of allowing users 
to create and impose an expiry date/time for their information fully provides the 
requirement of this law. 
Law 3: Justifiable Parties: An IM system must only disclose identity information 
to parties having a necessary and justifiable place in a given identity relationship. 
Cameron has not discussed the issue of trust. Instead, he suggests that users should 
determine whom they can trust, and the IM system should provide the necessary 
information for the users to make these decisions. Hence, in UCIM this law is used 
to determine that the user should decide whom they should trust and when a 
particular profile is made available within the network. This implies that any user 
that fulfils the set rules and policies of the profile, as defined in the policy interface 
module in sections 5.4.1,6.4.4 and 6.4.5 as well as in Figure 13 and analysed by 
MATTS as presented in section 6.2 and Figure 32 using the defined polices, is 
trusted. 
Law 4: Directed Identity: An IM system must support both omni-directional 
(public) identity to facilitate the discovery and unidirectional (private) identity to 
prevent unnecessary release of correlation identity information. In our framework 
we provide the ability of dividing personal information into partial identities and 
sub-profiles as presented in section 5.6.1 and Figures 16 and 17. Hence users are 
able to separate which information about them should be made public and private. 
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Law 5: Pluralism of Operators and Technologies: An IM system should be able to 
work with multiple identity providers (IdPs). This requires that an IM framework 
must support multiple IdPs, but this does not imply that a user must have more 
than one IdP. For this particular law, we have not tested our framework to see if it 
is capable of working with multiple identity providers. But based on our 
simulation, users can define various identities that are associated to them and 
interact with other users who are from different agencies. This principle is 
demonstrated in the crisis management scenario presented in section 6.1, and the 
results of the implemented scenario presented in Figures 20 and 24. 
Law 6: Human Integration: An IM system must include human user to be a 
component of the distributed system integrated through unambiguous 
human/machine communication mechanisms. In UCIM user participation is a 
central point of the framework design, and this design principle is reflected in the 
user control and consent of the UCIM system as well as users' role in defining 
rules, policies and profile information. Some relevant details of the user interaction 
as defined within the various UCIM modules are presented in sections 6.4.3,6.4.4 
and 6.4.5 as well as in Figure 13. 
Law 7: Consistent Experience across Contexts: An IM system must provide users 
with a simple and consistent experience while enabling separation of contexts 
through multiple operators and technologies. UCIM provides consistent user 
experience across multiple contexts via the use of a simple user interface. Also 
users are able to access resources and contextual information from other 
users/nodes after successfully establishing connection within the network 
topology. Our user interface implementation of the framework provides the 
required consistency for the user. For example, the user interfaces in Figures 45, 
46,49,50 and 51 show the consistency in terms of usage with similar keywords 
and interface layouts for user defined policy interfaces. We have tried to achieve 
such consistence on both device based and web based interfaces. Also the same 
property interface is used for both the policy interface and the two groups 
(property and policy) interface, designed to be consistent. This also applies to the 
simulation environments as presented in Figures 27 and 28, while making use of 
icons in both the implementation and scenario diagrams. 
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7.2 SIMULATION AND LAP TEST RESULTS 
In the first part of this chapter our focus was on evaluating UCIM based on the 
seven laws of identity. This section of the chapter turns the focus to evaluating 
UCIM based on the lab test results as shown in chapter six. Before going into the 
details, our results are divided into two main sections: the use of simulated 
nodes/devices within our in-house developed simulator, and using real devices, i. e. 
PDA's, HTC mobile phones and desktop PCs. We have presented in chapter six 
how to make use of these simulated nodes and real devices. 
7.2.1 SIMULATION 
For simulating our framework, we make use of MATTS to create virtual devices 
and create connections between them either manually or automatically. A given 
scenario can be loaded dynamically using an XML script that contains basic 
details of the required scenario. Each device is automatically configured based on 
the given details in the XML scenario file. However, devices/node properties can 
be modified after the scenario has been loaded so as to create situations in which 
the security of the devices can be compromised while allowing the devices to 
make proper use of contextual information. An example of a simulated 
environment based on MATTS with nodes representing a crisis management 
scenario introduced in chapter six is shown in Figure 27 and Figure 28 
respectively. A portable version of the implementation on small portable devices 
with various virtual icons representing individual devices is shown in Figure 35. 
Also profile building and data misuse scenarios are illustrated in Figure 36 and 
Figure 37. 
There is no limit to the number of either virtual or real devices that can be 
connected to the MATTS simulator, although our trials only used a maximum of 
ten virtual devices and up to three physically connected devices. Any of the 
virtual devices can also be configured to behave as an external device. We have 
not noticed any connectivity or performance impact as a result of increasing the 
number of devices (maximum of ten virtual devices are used) in our simulator. 
167 
However, when the number of devices is increased significantly, it is possible to 
have some impact on the connectivity or performance. 
We have also deployed our solutions to a real test bed using a scenario to evaluate 
the functionality and usability of the systems developed. Figure 56 provides a 100 
square meter representation of our outdoor experiment using a mobile ad-hoc 
network on five netbooks representing individuals from the Col as discussed in 
section 6.1.2. 
Figure 56 Mobile ad-hoc Network in a 100 Square metre area using five 
netbooks 
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7.2.2 PORTABLE DEVICES 
As it has been hinted above, not only have we been able to implement UCIM on 
portable devices but also we are able to run a simple simulation of eight virtual 
devices based on the scenario and implementation of the ContextRank algorithm 
and profile building. Although the implementations of the algorithm is based on 
using two constraint variables: the user profileType and its location (using the 
screen size of the device and the parameter for the surrounding contextual 
information), we can see no reason why the portable version of the simulation 
will not work with more variables or a more complex policy as well as more than 
eight virtual or real devices. 
The proposed framework and its implementations have also been deployed and 
tested using various portable devices either as real devices or using the available 
device emulators in the NET Compact development environment. Figure 59 
shows an example of some devices on which we have deployed our framework 
and tested it. We have also used the Samsung mobile emulator deployed on three 
versions of HTC phones, a PDA emulator shown in Figure 37 and a real PDA 
shown in Figure 49. Hence, the scope of the portability and heterogeneity of 
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UCIM has been demonstrated. We can see no reason why it can't be deployed 
and used on other kinds of portable devices, desktops, laptops or netbooks. 
I 
Figure 59 UCIM deployed in Various Portable Devices 
7.2.3 DEVICES COMMUNICATION 
In our current implementation of UCIM, external devices are connected to each 
other or the MATTS simulator by making use of the available wireless technology 
communication within our laboratory rather than ad-hoc protocols, while devices 
in the virtual simulation environment are either connected using a link 
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automatically or manually. We have developed a simple socket connection 
mechanism to allow devices to send information within the simulator to real 
devices. Hence, users are allowed to select the required information to send, then 
create a socket connection and send the file or information. There are drawbacks to 
this form of communication but our thesis is not aimed at the development of 
communication or ad-hoc network protocols. Hence this can be considered as 
something for future work to help improve the efficiency and communication 
security of the framework. Currently we have also developed an ad-hoc test bed 
based on Ad-hoc Wireless Distribution Service (AWDS) wireless multi-hop 
routing protocol and have tested the modules of our framework for functionality. 
AWDS is a Layer 2 routing protocol for wireless mesh networks. It provides 
transparent Ethernet-like access to all participating nodes, thus easily allowing the 
deployment of different higher-level protocols like IP (with DHCP), IPv6, 
AppleTalk. 
7.2.4 SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section we analyse UCIM and its mechanism in terms of providing a secure 
platform for identity management within ubiquitous environments. This is done by 
rendering a tabular contrast of UCIM with reference to other related frameworks or 
systems as discussed in previous chapters. The comparison and analysis is mainly 
focused on the key security features and aims of UCIM to provide a more secure 
platform for ubiquitous environments. In order to achieve that, we have explored 
some of the factors that will enhance user adaptability and encourage them to put 
more focus on security related issues. These include amongst others: 
interoperability, user-centricity, context-awareness, dynamic policy creation, 
lightweight, information granularity, identity provision and preservation and 
authorisation & authentication. 
Before going into the details of the comparison of our framework with others, our 
security analysis makes use of attack scenarios as presented in the implementation 
section in chapter 6 of the thesis. For the attacker model we assumed that the 
attacker is able to execute code or misuse the system. It can be an insider or/and 
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outsider attacker. Consequently, in our scenario in section 6.1 for SoS composition 
in crisis management, our implementation looks at the possibility of attacks from a 
volunteer node/device within the composed system as well as other nodes within 
or outside the boundary of the composed system. Subsequently, the boundary 
check problem presented in section 6.1 as well as the data mishandling and misuse 
scenarios provide a proof of concept and security analysis of our framework. The 
scenario of identity management in SoS also presented in section 6.1 focuses more 
on the issue of identity management in a real life scenario using a test bed so as to 
analyse how secure our proposed framework is. To further analyse the security of 
our framework, we extended the work on a home gateway framework as presented 
in section 6.5. 
Table 4 presents a tabular summary for the comparison of UCIM and other related 
frameworks. The table lists some of the main features and goals that we initially 
setup for the UCIM project. Rows in the table represent the names of the 
frameworks or the name of the authors of relevant proposed methodologies. The 
columns represent the features we are interested in for providing a secure context- 
aware and user-centred identity management platform for MANets within 
ubiquitous environments. 
The entries of the table are either a Y, N or ?. Y represents the availability of such 
a feature within the framework concerned, which is either fully or partially 
supported or addressed theoretically. N represents a situation whereby such a 
features has not been supported or even addressed theoretically. ? is used when we 
are not sure if such a feature is available or not, because none of them have 
claimed to provide such functionality and we have not seen any other evidence that 
they have done so. It is worth also pointing out that we have tested or verified it 
ourselves. 
Expressiveness: this feature mainly deals with how readable the policies used in 
such a framework are or if such policies are addressed within the framework 
concerned. As we can see from Table 4, only our proposed UCIM framework and 
P3P are able to provide an easy to read and understand policies for most uses. The 
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rest of the studied frameworks have either not provided any policy usage or offered 
the policies that are not expressive. 
Table 4 Framework Comparison 
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UCIM Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SOUPA N N N ? N N N N 
RBAC N N N N N N N N 
Ponder N N N N N N N N 
P3P Y N N N N N N N 
KAOS N N ? N ? N ? N 
Personal IM N Y N N N N Y 
Google latitude N N N N Y N N N 
Chen et al N Y N N Y N N ? 
EMERGE N N N N Y N ? ? 
Cradock et al N N N N Y N N N 
Helmhout et al N N N N Y N N N 
Google + Project ? Y ? N ? N Y N 
The Google+ project has designed and developed its interface with 
considerations given to the need and requirement of users, but it fails to meet the 
other security elements listed in the table. For any entry with a question mark `? ', 
there has been no proof or claim by the authors of such frameworks that they 
have addressed the issues either in their design or implementation. 
User-centricity: this manly focuses on looking at if the frameworks have been 
able to put users in full control of defining, editing and using security elements in 
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terms of protecting users' personal information. Again it is only UCIM that 
provides such capability. With regards to KAOS, we are not sure (as it is not 
stated or claimed in the paper) whether it offers the capability, while the rest 
have not. 
Conjunctions and disjunctions: this deals with if any of the frameworks has 
provided users with means of defining policies without requiring the use of 
nested brackets to distinguish between policy rules using `and' and `or', while at 
the same time making it simple and easy for a lay user to read and define such 
policies. It is only UCIM that addressed the needs of this requirement; the rest of 
the studied work has not addressed the issue. 
Ubiquitous: this refers to if a framework is designed purposely for ubiquitous 
environments or it can be easily tailored to meet the requirements of such 
environments. Only UCIM is mainly designed for usage with devices found in 
ubiquitous environments. We are not sure of KAOS, while the rest target at 
either the Internet use or specialized applications. And their adaptableness for 
ubiquitous devices is limited if not impossible. 
Context-awareness: most of the applications studied have been able to address 
some elements of contextual information with regards to helping provide good 
security for users. Six out of the twelve frameworks researched either have 
provided contextual information to users or can incorporate such functionality. 
But their considerations do not treat users as the central focus to help display 
only suitable information to the users. Additionally, five of the frameworks do 
not support contextual information, while we are not sure about one framework 
in terms of such capability. On the other hand, UCIM has utilized this feature to 
allow users to define policies that can filter contextual information based on their 
requirements and situations. 
Dynamic Policy Creation: This feature is aimed to give users more control on 
defining some policies required in terms of the usage of their personal 
information and identities. This will in turn help improve the security issues of 
data and information misuse as we have described in the scenario in the previous 
chapters. It is only our proposed UCIM that provides such capability. The rest of 
the studied frameworks have all hardcoded their policies within the systems. 
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There has been no separation between the policies and the actual functionalities 
of the systems. 
Partial identities: use of partial identities is of crucial importance in improving 
the security of systems within ubiquitous environments. This can help prevent 
attackers from building a full profile of a user on their devices by deleting profile 
information from the drives or misusing the users' information, when such 
information has been compromised. It also gives a user total control on which of 
its partial identities the user wants to make use of at any given scenario, while all 
such partial identities are unanimously linked to that user. Only one of the 
studied frameworks provides such capability, and UCIM builds on such work to 
improve it. We are not sure (no proof or claim made by the authors) if two of 
these frameworks have addressed this issue. 
Table 5 Comparison of Models 
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Isolated Single No No No Few and very 
ID support support control weak protection 
Centralized Single Limited Limited Few Much but weak 
ID support support control protection 
Federated Multiple Multi Nearly Much Much and strong 
ID's domain fully control protection 
support support 
UCIM Multiple Multi Yes Full Strong and full 
ID's domain control protection 
support 
Looking back on the classifications of IM into three main models [47], we now 
provide a comparison of UCIM with these models, and demonstrate where 
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UCIM fits within the three categories and the levels of security the models in 
question provide. This comparison is summarized in a tabular form in Table 5. 
In Table 5, isolated models make use of a single identity type, have some support 
for services composition, cross domain support and user control, and provide few 
and very weak mechanisms in terms of privacy protection. Centralized models on 
the other hand provide limited support for both services composition and cross 
domain support, make use of a single identity type, and provide more privacy 
protection but still very weak one. A federated model tries to address the 
limitations of the isolated and centralized models. It makes use of multiple 
identities, provides services composition, and nearly fully supports cross-domain 
operation and much stronger privacy protection. Our proposed UCIM can be 
compared with the federated model, and resolves some weaknesses of the 
federated model by providing full support for cross domain operation, giving 
users full control of their identity information, and defining their own policies. 
The use of user defined policies helps to provide a stronger support for privacy 
protection. 
A more closely related system to compare with our work is the Google+ project 
[141] that tries to address some of the security issues in terms of who amongst the 
system users your information is shared with. This is done by providing a means of 
defining sub-groups called `circles' of your contacts. As shown in Figure 60, you 
can create new circles and drag and drop your contacts to a given circle. The circle 
feature allows you to share what matters with the people who matter most or 
whom to share it with. It aims to eliminate the shortcomings of the current social 
networking medium of using just friends. Your contacts can also be added to more 
than one circle. The whole aim of the Google+ project is to help users to be able to 
manage their contacts and information to be revealed to each contact within 
various circles. 
However, looking deeply into the Google+ project, the user has no control on 
defining policies or defining which information each circle member can view. The 
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circles created are static. The privacy window setting for the Google+ project is 
very complicated, and it does not provide users with much functionality as 
depicted in Figure 61. Another drawback of the circle idea is the fact that, 
whatever you share within a circle goes to all users within the circle, you cannot 
change the settings dynamically, and you cannot control information flows, data 
sharing and mishandling between your circles of contacts and others that they 
might share contacts with. 
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In comparison with the Google+ project in Figure 61, our privacy interface and 
policy creation interface in Figures 49,50 and 51 give users more control on how 
to define their policies and are more initiative and functional. As the Google+ 
project allows adding users in more than one circle, this also creates the problem of 
duplicates of data and possible information misuse, whereas our solution has 
clearly provided a separation and minimised such s problem. Although the 
Google+ project has implemented some elements that are related to our proposed 
solution of restricting access to personal information and managing identities 
based on who are in contact with whom, our solution is more dynamic than the 
Google+ project's static circle creation and addition. 
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7.2.5 REFLECTION ON AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This subsection provides a review of our aims and objectives in comparison to 
what the project and thesis have achieved based on the implementation shown in 
chapter six. 
We believe that our design and implementation in chapters five and six together 
with the evaluations in previous subsections can demonstrate that our project has 
been able to accomplish its aims and objectives as summarized below: 
" Heterogeneity: There are thousands of diverse devices in ubiquitous 
computing environments. The classification of network nodes could help 
us effectively organise the entire system. Moreover, by cooperating with a 
context-aware system, UCIM is able to generate contextual information 
relevant to specific devices. These provide better understanding of the 
need of individual nodes on both software and hardware levels. The 
ContextRank algorithm further strengthens this means. 
" User centricity and control: By making use of the policy interface model, 
we have given users the ability to control how their information is used by 
defining their policies dynamically. The interface itself is a simple one 
that a lay man can utilise with no difficulties. 
7.3 SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have presented the analysis of UCIM based on the seven laws 
of identity, test results from our lab and test bed. We have also provided a run 
through on how UCIM is able to satisfy the set requirements as well as the aims 
and objectives of the project outlined in both chapters one and five. The chapter 
has also provided a detailed analysis of the framework in comparison to other 
frameworks and models. In the next chapter, we will present some concluding 
remarks and point to areas of future research that might be of paramount 
importance to improve the framework and meet the expected requirements of 
future identity management in ubiquitous environments. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis has first established the history of computer networks. From the early 
years, computers were seen as standalone, stored in large rooms, inflexible, and 
providing computing resources within localised environs. This situation has 
changed with the advent of ARPANet in the late 1960's, where a set of 
computers were connected together to allow remote access to computer 
resources. This led to a stage where computers are more portable and can be 
placed on the desk. Since then, millions of computers have joined the network 
forming the biggest computer society - Internet. By enabling us to shop, work 
and study remotely, the Internet changes our daily lives in many ways. We have 
pointed out that the development of computers has undergone three major waves: 
mainframe computers, personal computers and the introduction of the concept of 
ubiquitous computing. 
The concept of ubiquitous computing was introduced as a prospective view about 
the future usage of computers. Smaller and cheaper computer chips have enabled 
us to embed computing ability into any appliances, e. g. a cup, lighter, cloths and 
even a piece of paper. People's daily activities become closely connected with 
computers and beneficially become more convenient. The development of 
computer networks also has rapidly changed, where we have MANets used for 
various purposes from being limited to the military to a stage where it is available 
for public usage. 
However, the great features of ubiquitous computing inevitably expose its inherent 
vulnerabilities; our main focus in the thesis is providing a secure identity 
management framework via context-awareness and user-centricity. The 
convenience brought by ubiquitous computing could also be taken advantage by 
intruders, trying to misappropriate users' private and confidential information. It 
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makes things too easy for malicious people to build a system to spy on others. For 
example, an intruder may compromise the identity, integrity and confidentiality of 
an information system by using a stolen ID to modify or access valuable 
information, or compromise the availability of an information system by 
possessing the system resources in order to interfere with authorised users' normal 
access. Like any other computer systems, one of the main prerequisites for the 
wide adoption of a ubiquitous network is security. The network has to be properly 
secured so that it can be relied upon. When it comes to the use of convenient 
devices and before users can agree to adopt such applications, they need to be 
persuaded that they will be able to have full control of their personal information 
from misuse. Hence, they can permit the usage of such information, but at the 
same time they will like to maintain the right to be able to revoke such 
permissions, keep an eye on how such information is used, etc. 
An overview of existing identity management schemes provided in section 3.1 has 
revealed several weaknesses that hinder their direct application to ubiquitous 
networks and MANets environments in particular. These shortcomings are caused 
by their lack of considerations about the heterogeneity, flexibility, context- 
awareness, user-centricity and resource constraints of ubiquitous networks and 
devices. 
As demonstrated earlier, to overcome the above problems, we have proposed a 
novel secure context-aware and user-centric identity management system - UCIM. 
UCIM is a very flexible, adaptive and resource-efficient identity management 
framework with novel techniques, which utilises contextual information, user 
policy creation, a service-oriented mechanism and flexible user-centric design. By 
working together with user defined policies, UCIM can reliably and effectively 
deter users' personal information from misuse and mishandling as well as giving 
the user full control of their partial identities by allowing them to define and 
enforce the expiry date/time of their information. UCIM comprises the following 
main components: Contextual Information, Privacy Identity Manager and Privacy 
Manager as the main modules of the framework. It also consists of a user policy 
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creation tool, utilisation of contextual information to help enforce security and 
experience of users, a user-control mechanism, a resource-efficient mechanism on 
how data is stored and transmitted between nodes in the network, and flexible 
system architecture. Our future work will focus on the further examination of 
UCIM and the refinement of its models. In the next section, we will also 
recommend some possible extension of UCIM to incorporate simple practical 
scenarios, implement it in real-life situations and extend it to issues of cyber 
security situation awareness. 
8.2 FUTURE WORK 
We have identified the weaknesses of current identity management frameworks 
and related work as well as provided the requirements for a new generation of 
identity management solutions that protect ubiquitous computing networks and 
devices in a resource-efficient way and give users full control of their personal 
private information/identities. UCIM is presented in this thesis as such a solution. 
It can provide a number of capabilities as summarised in the previous sub-section. 
However, this solution is not fully complete, and it also points out other areas that 
research and developments efforts need to be concentrated on to make the solution 
more effective and address other identified areas of improvements. More 
specifically, the future work includes the following main directions: 
" Contextual Information Module: as part of our future work, we 
recommend an implementation of the Contextual Information Module as 
a standalone server that will store all contextual information as well as act 
as a backup facility when nodes are out of certain ranges where machine 
learning techniques will be implemented to help refine the accuracy of 
users' privacy policies. 
" Similarities between two contextual information or profile types: as future 
work we also recommend extending the algorithm designed in section 5.7 
to include ways of calculating the similarities between two objects of the 
same category (i. e. two contextual information or two profile types) when 
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they are introduced to the system. This will further enhance the 
effectiveness and usability of the framework. The extension will also 
incorporate ways of calculating the ContextRank algorithm by making 
use of the new similarities function/algorithm. 
" Implementation of a simple classroom scenario: currently in the student 
lab seasons that I am running, it is evident that quite a few students are 
struggling but at the same time they are shy or self-conscious to ask for 
help because of various reasons. Another possible application scenario 
for UCIM will be to incorporate the work of Chen et al [85] on paper 
based leaning with a supporting mobile policy based solution. 
Particularly the policy interface module of UCIM can be implemented 
for the student lab scenario, which allows students to use policies to 
request help and decide who can see it, e. g. only staff or just some 
students. It should also display if a student can help others on what 
sections of lab work, etc. Not only will this help evaluate the usability of 
UCIM, but it will also help students improve their understanding of the 
lab sessions. This provides a way that UCIM can be further enhanced to 
handle other similar scenarios and real life events that are not anticipated. 
" SoS cyber security scenario for the Ministry of Defence (MoD): one of 
the main areas of interest in the MoD Defence Science and Technology 
(DSTL) cyber security call for research proposals is on the area of 
Enhanced Situation Awareness (ESA). Its target is to provide tools and 
techniques that will allow computer network defence operators to 
dynamically query a distributed information system or repository and 
visualise the results in support of agile risk based decision making in 
real-time. UCIM has the scope of being enhanced by extending the 
existing modules and adding few ones so as to provide a proof of concept 
for the required tool to fulfil the need of future cyber security issues and 
trends. 
" Ad-hoc network protocols: currently we have tested UCIM based on 
wireless communication technologies, i. e. using the available wireless 
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network within the lab and the AWDS protocol to connect devices. We 
think it is important to integrate one of the ad-hoc protocols into UCIM, 
or even improve the protocol to make it more lightweight and efficient. 
It will also be possible to extend the usage of UCIM to other areas like 
future home networks and services by extending the work that we have 
done on the secure gateway for P2P. This will incorporate more home 
networked or healthcare appliances. By doing so, we can further 
demonstrate the concept of the portability and heterogeneity of UCIM 
and also evaluate it within various ubiquitous environments. 
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